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ABSTRACT 
 
 On November 29, 2009, Swiss voters adopted a ballot 
initiative introducing a constitutional ban on the construction of 
minarets.  This Article provides a thick description of the 
minaret vote’s context.  A legal analysis addresses the 
implications of the ban under national, regional, and 
international normative frameworks.  The Article argues that 
the ban is irreconcilable with the Swiss constitutional bill of 
rights and several international human right provisions.  In 
Switzerland, however, respect for the vox populi potentially 
trumps any concern over conflicting international obligations, 
and there is no effective judicial review of initiatives.  This lack 
of judicial review is partly a result of the myth system of modern 
Switzerland and its emphasis on popular sovereignty.  Yet, the 
fears that fueled the prohibition of minarets in Switzerland are 
widespread in Europe.  Hostility to Islam is partly rooted in 
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historical traditions and partly due to disagreement over how to 
integrate newcomers into Western society, and this Article 
suggests an approach that carefully balances expectations of 
Muslim adaptation with a less exclusive construction of 
European identity. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
And the Lord came down to see the city and the tower, which the 
children of men builded. And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, 
and they have all one language; and this they begin to do; and now 
nothing will be restrained from them, which they have imagined to do. 
— Genesis 11:5–6 
 Why do we build towers?  The first tower, if we are to believe the 
Old Testament, was constructed in the plane of Shinar, where the 
now numerous descendants of Noah decided to build a city and a 
tower.  With the tower reaching unto heaven, they hoped to make 
themselves a name, lest they be scattered abroad upon the face of the 
earth.1  Provoking the wrath of a God jealous and fearful of their 
ascending power, the builders of Babylon achieved the opposite: for 
their alleged hubris, they were dispersed, their speech confounded, 
and their name forgotten.2 
 The Babylonians have vanished, and Babylon is no more—even 
though the zikkurat of Babylon was, contrary to the biblical account, 
actually completed.3  Yet people still build towers, spires, and 
skyscrapers, presumably for the same reason as the Babylonians: to 
provide a shared identity and lasting monument to their community.  
Towers also continue to be perceived as a symbol of budding ambition 
and power.  They may arouse jealousy and resentment—not only of 
the divine sort, but of rivaling communities that fear the eclipse of 
their own identity and name. 
 These fears may help to explain why on November 29, 2009, 
Swiss voters passed a ballot initiative for a constitutional ban on the 
construction of minarets by a majority of 57.5 percent.4  The vote was 
preceded by a campaign focusing on the alleged spread of political 
Islam in Switzerland, warning of the slow and subversive ascent of an 
alien Muslim community to prevalence and, eventually, dominance.  
A minaret ban, its proponents argued, would effectively protect the 
Swiss constitutional order, safeguard fundamental rights, and halt 
the spread of Sharia law.  In short, it would offer a panacea to the ills 
of Islamization.  
                                                                                                                      
 1. Genesis 11:1–4 (King James). 
 2. Id. at 11:5–9. 
 3. For the reconstructions suggested since Robert Koldewey started 
excavations in 1899, see HansJörg Schmid, Rekonstruktionsversuche und 
Forschungsstand der Zikkurat von Babylon, in DAS WIEDER ERSTEHENDE BABYLON 
(Barthel Hrouda & Robert Koldeweyeds eds., 5th ed. 1990). 
 4. Bundesratsbeschluß über das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung, Nov. 29, 
2009, BUNDESBLATT [BBL] 3437, 3440 (2010). Voter turnout was 53.8 percent. Id. 
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 Prior to the vote, the Swiss government made it clear that it 
might be difficult to reconcile the ballot initiative with the country’s 
constitutional bill of rights and with international human rights 
obligations.5  The two chambers of Parliament recommended rejection 
of the ballot initiative by wide margins.6  With the exceptions of the 
Swiss People’s Party and the Confederate Democratic Union, which 
launched the initiative,7 all political parties opposed the ban, as did 
the Protestant and Catholic Churches.8  Opinion polls suggested that 
a comfortable, if narrowing, majority opposed the proposal.9  Yet, 
unexpectedly, the voters adopted the ballot initiative by a 
considerable margin.  Article 72 of the Federal Constitution 
(Bundesverfassung, BV), which addresses the federal and cantonal 
competences over organized religion, is now complemented by a third 
subparagraph reading that “the construction of minarets is 
prohibited.”10 
 The Swiss minaret ban might well be dismissed as an oddity or 
curiosity, the outcome of a peculiar political system in an 
introspective country that still seems (or hopes) to stand isolated from 
the currents of history.11  But the prohibition of new minarets is 
                                                                                                                      
 5. Bundesrat [Federal Council], Botschaft zur Volksinitiative ‘Gegen den Bau 
von Minaretten’ [Government Report on the Ballot Initiative ‘Against the Construction 
of Minarets’], BBL 7603 (2008). For convenience, I use the phrase “bill of rights” for the 
fundamental rights listed in Title 2, Chapter 1 of the Swiss Constitution, even though 
these provisions do not hold a special status vis-à-vis other constitutional norms. 
BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 7–36. An 
unofficial English translation of the Swiss Constitution is available at 
http://www.admin.ch/ch/e/rs/1/101.en.pdf.  
 6.  BBL 4381 (2009). For details, see infra note 47 and accompanying text, 
cataloguing parliamentary rejection of the minaret ban. Mirroring the structure of the 
U.S. Congress, the Federal Assembly is composed of the National Assembly 
(Nationalrat, 200 members) and the State Assembly (Ständerat, 46 members). In the 
following, “Parliament” is used interchangeably with Federal Assembly. 
 7.  With 26.6 percent of the vote, the right-wing Swiss People’s Party 
(Schweizerische Volkspartei) had garnered the largest share of votes in the 2007 
election to the Swiss National Assembly. The Confederate Democratic Union 
(Eidgenössische Demokratische Union) is a conservative fringe-party (1.5 percent of 
votes in the 2007 election) advocating Christian values. For the results of the 2007 
election, see BBL 8015 (2007). For an overview of the Swiss political landscape, see 
Andreas Ladner, Political Parties, in HANDBOOK OF SWISS POLITICS 309, 311 (Ulrich 
Klöti et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007), arguing that direct democracy weakens the influence of 
Swiss political parties.  
 8.  See Für religiösen Frieden—gegen Minarettverbot, NEUE ZÜRCHER ZEITUNG 
[NZZ] (Zurich), Sept. 3, 2009, at 14. 
 9.  Less than two weeks before the ballot, only 37 percent of those questioned 
supported a ban, while 53 perecent rejected it. Mehrheit stimmt gegen Minarett-
Initiative, TAGESANZEIGER (Zurich), Nov. 18, 2009, available at 
http://www.tagesanzeiger.ch/schweiz/standard/Mehrheit-stimmt-gegen 
MinarettInitiative/story/10402950. 
 10.   BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 72.  
 11. See Andrea Brandt, Angst vor Eurabien, DER SPIEGEL (Ger.), Dec. 7, 2009, 
at 112; Laurent Joffrin, Absurde, LIBÉRATION (Fr.), Nov. 30, 2009, at 2. 
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bound to have wider implications.  In the short term, the ban raises a 
number of specific legal questions.  For instance, after the 
implementation of the ban, the history of which is set out in Part II, 
the Swiss Constitution contains provisions guaranteeing equality and 
freedom of religion, as well as a provision that selectively restricts 
one religious community.  These contradictions are the result of a 
constitutional system that attributes extraordinary influence to 
voters through ballot initiatives and referenda while severely limiting 
judicial review of popular decisions. 
 Part III discusses whether the minaret ban contravenes 
national, regional, or international legal provisions.  Constitutional 
experts in Switzerland have assumed that the ban violates 
international human rights norms,12 but a detailed analysis is still 
outstanding.  This Article argues that the minaret ban is indeed 
irreconcilable with Switzerland’s international obligations under the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
 Conflicts between national law and international obligations are 
not exclusive to Switzerland, but due to the significant participatory 
rights of Swiss voters in policymaking, the conflict between 
democratically legitimized norms on the national level and 
obligations on the international level is particularly acute.  Does the 
minaret ban stand for the continuing prevalence and superior 
legitimacy of national norms and perhaps even provide an object 
lesson on how to establish a democratic commonwealth?  Direct (or, 
more precisely, semi-direct) democracy13 is rarely seen as a danger; 
complaints are usually made about too little democratic participation, 
particularly within emerging supranational structures such as the 
European Union.14  But should reverence for the vox populi be 
absolute?  Should the majority always have its way, even at the 
expense of fundamental rights enshrined in constitutions and 
conventions?  Or should votes not only be counted, but weighed as 
well?  
                                                                                                                      
 12.  Alain Griffel, Vom Umgang mit verfassungswidrigen Initiativen, NZZ, Dec. 
9, 2009, at 13; Jörg Paul Müller, Wie weiter nach dem Minarettverbot?, NEUE ZÜRCHER 
ZEITUNG AM SONNTAG [NZZaS], Dec. 6, 2009, at 12; René Rhinow, Will ‘das Volk’ 
wirklich Minarette verbieten?, NZZ, Dec. 9, 2009, at 13; see Robert Kolb, Völkerecht und 
Völkerpolitik—Gedanken zur Minarettinitiative, 19 SWISS REV. INT’L & EUR. L. 467 
(2009) (providing one of the first legal analyses after the vote took place). 
 13. Even though the Swiss system is more accurately described as “semi-
democratic,” cf. WALTER HALLER ET AL., ALLGEMEINES STAATSRECHT 76, 79–86 (4th ed. 
2008), in the following I generally refer, for convenience’s sake, to direct-democratic 
participation. 
 14. See, e.g., Stephen C. Sieberson, The Treaty of Lisbon and Its Impact on the 
European Union’s Democratic Deficit, 14 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 445 (2008) (analyzing the 
Lisbon Treaty’s “potential for reducing the European Union’s ‘democratic deficit’”). 
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 Comparing ballot initiatives in Switzerland and the United 
States, Part IV asserts that the concept of unbridled popular 
sovereignty is the central tenet of a (relatively recent) Swiss national 
narrative.  Yet I argue that the mythical veneration of direct 
democracy is based on historical misconceptions and overstates the 
level of actual popular participation, past or present.  Based on these 
observations, Part V suggests that Switzerland’s current 
constitutional framework for ballot initiatives requires some 
recalibration to ensure that the majority exercises its prerogative 
within the confines established by fundamental human rights 
provisions.  
 Constitutional reform might prevent a repeat of similar 
initiatives.  It will not, however, remedy the underlying conditions of 
which the minaret vote was a symptom.  The adoption of the ban 
confronts us with the question of how political communities, 
oscillating between prejudice and justified concerns, may react to a 
world where the clear cultural delineations of yore (if indeed they 
ever existed) have dissolved.15  From a sociological viewpoint, the vote 
on minarets was not primarily motivated by concern for the Swiss 
constitutional order, and it certainly was not motivated by any real 
threat to that order posed by pointy turrets.   It was a vote on 
integration and exclusion, and on the terms under which we are 
willing to welcome—a somewhat euphemistic term—the “other” in 
our midst. 
 Part VI, therefore, addresses controversies about the place of 
Islam and Muslims in Western societies, which is a question that is 
by no means exclusive to Switzerland.  Due to the peculiarities of 
their political system, Swiss voters were able to express their views in 
an unmitigated and unfiltered way, but there is little doubt that in 
other European countries the outcome of a vote on minarets would be 
similar.16  Part VI sets out how such hostile attitudes to Islam are 
partly rooted in historical traditions and partly influenced by 
discussions over how to integrate newcomers into Western society, 
and suggests an approach that carefully balances expectations of 
Muslim adaptation with a less exclusive construction of European 
identity.   
 Clearly, a society requires some consensus on what normative 
framework should be binding on everyone, and in this context, 
concerns over fundamentalist threats to a liberal constitutional order 
are legitimate, even imperative.  I also argue that Muslims 
themselves might need to reconsider their perceptions of Western 
                                                                                                                      
 15.  Cf. Daniel Thürer & Lorenz Langer, Combating Racism—A Call for Justice, 
in INTERNATIONAL LAW, CONFLICT, AND DEVELOPMENT 181, 185 (Walter Kälin et al. 
eds., 2010). 
 16.  See infra note 402 and accompanying text (noting speculation that votes in 
other European countries would likely lead to a similar ban on minarets).  
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society and of their relations with it—whether they want to remain 
Muslims in Europe, or become European Muslims.  However, whether 
a change in Muslim attitudes would result in less European hostility 
towards Islam remains questionable; the circumstances of the 
minaret vote show that negative views of Islam are not related to 
actual exposure to and interaction with Muslims.17  Instead, vague 
fears of outsiders were “instrumentalized” for political gain and 
channeled towards symbols of “the other.”  Under a pathetic fallacy, 
the difficult debate over integration was reduced to an emotional 
quarrel over the alleged baleful influence of an architectural 
structure. 
II.  THE BALLOT INITIATIVE AGAINST MINARETS:  
ORIGINS, CAMPAIGN, AND OUTCOME 
 The origins of the minaret initiative can be traced back to 
Wangen, a small community in the canton of Solothurn.  There, a 
Turkish cultural association obtained permission in 2003 to use a 
building in the industrial area as a clubhouse and community center 
with rooms for administration, catering, and prayer.18  In 2005, the 
association applied for a permit to add a symbolic minaret of about 
six meters to the building’s rooftop.19  After the request had been 
rejected twice by the communal planning commission, it was 
eventually granted upon administrative appeal with the restriction 
that no prayer call be raised.20   
 This decision was contested by the municipality and two 
neighbors; the latter claimed that adding a minaret transformed the 
building into a mosque and therefore required an additional permit.21  
The cantonal administrative court rejected these appeals and 
observed that the original permit allowed for praying rooms: just as a 
church was a church with or without a tower, a minaret would not 
alter the purpose of the existing building.22  The administrative court 
addressed the matter exclusively under the legal framework for 
planning applications, which does not differentiate between a minaret 
and a chimney.23  Neighbors and members of the community 
appealed to the Federal Supreme Court, arguing that the religious 
                                                                                                                      
 17.  See infra note 506 and accompanying text (noting that “[o]f the voters 
supporting the ban, only 15 percent had based their decision on criticism of Muslims in 
Switzerland”). 
 18.  Verwaltungsgericht [Cantonal Administrative Court] Nov. 24, 2006, 
VWBES.2006.293 (SO), 19 SOLOTHURNISCHE GERICHTSPRAXIS [SOG] 92 (Solothurn). 
 19.  Id. at 89.  
 20.  Id. at 89, 93.  
 21.  Id. at 93.  
 22.  Id.  
 23.  Id. at 95. 
870 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law [Vol. 43:863 
need for the minaret should have been assessed by an expert, but the 
Court denied any need for an expert’s report on the religious 
relevance of adding a minaret to prayer rooms.24  
 This court victory and the subsequent construction of the token 
minaret in Wangen brought biblical wrath and jealousy on Muslims 
in Switzerland.  When the minaret was eventually erected in early 
2009, it was only the fourth such structure in Switzerland.25  Another 
three or four minarets were at an early planning stage or had been 
stalled by legal proceedings similar to the conflict in Wangen.26  
Despite this negligible number, the Swiss People’s Party and the 
Confederate Democratic Union took up the issue.  Through 
parliamentary motions in several cantonal legislatives, they 
unsuccessfully tried to prohibit the construction of minarets.27  In 
April 2007, the two parties launched a ballot initiative to establish a 
constitutional ban on minarets at the federal level.28  
 Swiss ballot initiatives have an extraordinarily low threshold 
(100,000 signatories within 18 months suffice to submit any issue to a 
nationwide ballot);29 they are passed by a simple majority of voters 
and of cantons;30 they are always aimed at amending the 
Constitution;31 and they address a wide variety of policies.32  Apart 
from the formal restriction on combining unrelated subject matters in 
a single ballot, the only substantive limit is drawn by peremptory 
norms of international law or jus cogens (which the Constitution does 
                                                                                                                      
 24.  Bundesgericht [BGer] [Federal Supreme Court] July 4, 2007, docket no. 1P 
26/2007 (Switz.), available at http://www.bger.ch. For an outline of the procedural 
stages of appeal, see infra note 121. 
 25. In 1963, the Ahmediyya movement built the first minaret in Zurich. Other 
minarets have been constructed in Geneva and Winterthur. Petra Bleisch Bouzar, Von 
Wohnungen und Fabrikhallen zu repräsentativen Moscheen—aktuelle Bauvorhaben von 
Moscheen und Minaretten in der Schweiz, in BAU UND UMWANDLUNG RELIGIÖSER 
GEBÄUDE 49, 57 (René Pahud de Mortanges & Jean-Baptiste Zufferey eds., 2007); 
Susanne Anderegg, Besuch in der Moschee von Winterthur, TAGESANZEIGER, Nov. 7, 
2009, at 21.  
 26.  Several projects were abandoned in the face of staunch local resistance. 
BBL 7603, 7614–15 (2008). However, the permit for a minaret in Langenthal was 
upheld on appeal by the cantonal building department in September 2010. The 
authorities argued that the permit had been granted prior to the ballot initiative and 
was, at the time, in conformity with building regulations. Grünes Licht für Minarett in 
Langenthal, NZZ, Sept. 22, 2010, at 13.   
 27.  For an overview, see id. at 7615 n.32. 
 28. BBL 3231 (2007). 
 29.  With over 5,030,000 eligible voters, Vorlage Nr. 544 Ṻbersicht, 
SCHWEIZERISCHE BUNDESKANZLEI, http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/va/20090927/det 
544.html (last visited Sept. 26, 2010), this equals less than 2 percent of the electorate. 
 30.  BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 139(5), 142(2). 
 31.  Id. art. 139(1).  
 32.  See infra note 41 (discussing various ballot initiatives rejected by Swiss 
voters). 
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not further specify).33  Competence to adjudicate the validity of 
initiatives is not vested in a judicial body such as the French Conseil 
Constitutionel,34 but rests exclusively with the bicameral Federal 
Assembly, Switzerland’s legislature.35  Unless the Assembly finds an 
initiative invalid on formal or substantive grounds, it adopts a 
recommendation to voters based on a report by the Federal Council 
that contains the government’s nonbinding views on validity.36  The 
Assembly—and the government in its recommendations—have 
construed this restriction in very narrow terms.  Essentially, the 
standard established by the obiter dictum of the International Court 
of Justice in Barcelona Traction (Belgium v. Spain)37 has been 
applied: if an initiative does not promote aggression, genocide, 
slavery, or racial discrimination and does not violate a core provision 
of international humanitarian law, it is submitted to the voters. 38  So 
far, only one initiative has been invalidated on material grounds.39  
Parliamentary motions to declare the minaret initiative void as a 
violation of jus cogens were unsuccessful.40  
 Ballot initiatives allow Swiss voters not only to react to policy 
proposals, but to initiate and actively shape policies, ranging from 
mundane matters such as the post office network to fundamental 
policy decisions on healthcare, finances, environmental protection, 
culture, security, and immigration.41  Even the fundamentals of 
                                                                                                                      
 33.  BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 139(3). For an overview, see Etienne Grisel, 
Les droits populaire au niveau fédéral, in VERFASSUNGSRECHT DER SCHWEIZ/DROIT 
CONSTITUTIONNEL SUISSE 383 (Daniel Thürer et al. eds., 2001). 
 34.  1958 CONST. arts. 60–62 (Fr.). 
 35.  See BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 139(3) (vesting authority to review the 
validity of a popular initiative in the Federal Assembly). On the structure of the 
legislative, see supra note 6 and accompanying text.  
 36.  BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 139(3); BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE 
BUNDESVERSAMMLUNG [Federal Assembly Act] Dec. 13, 2002, SR 171.10, arts. 97–98, 
100. The Federal Council (Bundesrat) is the highest executive body. Its seven members 
(with one member holding the annually rotating presidency) take decisions in corpore. 
BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 174–76. In the following, “Government” refers to the 
Federal Council, and “minister” is used interchangeably with Federal Councillor. 
 37.  Barcelona Traction, Light & Power Ltd. (Belg. v. Spain), Second Phase 
Judgment, 1970 I.C.J. 3, 32 (Feb. 5). The ICJ did not expressly refer to lus cogens, but 
implied its existence when addressing obligations erga omnes. Stephan Wittich, 
Barcelona Traction Case, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL 
LAW ¶ 26 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 3d ed. 2007). 
 38.  Bundesrat, Botschaft über eine neue Bundesverfassung [Government 
Report on a New Federal Constitution], BBL I 362 (1997).  
 39.  The Swiss People’s Party initiative “for a sensible asylum policy” violated 
the peremptory principle of non-refoulement. BBL I 1355 (1996); BBL III 1486 (1994).  
 40.  See infra note 47 (discussing unsuccessful challenges to the validity of the 
minaret initiative). 
 41.  An initiative for maintaining an extensive network of postal offices was 
rejected in 2004. Other initiatives included increasing federal spending on culture 
(1986, rejected); abolishing the army (1989, 2001, rejected); re-criminalization of 
abortion (2002, rejected); a ten-year moratorium on nuclear power plants (1990, 
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international policy and membership in international or 
supranational organizations can be directly determined through 
popular decision.42  Democratic participation at the federal level is 
complemented and often extended by the cantonal constitutions, some 
of which provide not only for constitutional ballot initiatives and 
referenda, but also for statutory initiatives and budget referenda.43 
 For the minaret initiative, more than the required 100,000 
signatures were collected by July 2008, well before the eighteen-
month period passed.44  In its subsequent report to the Federal 
Assembly, the Federal Council discussed the validity of the minaret 
initiative at length, arguing that the initiative did not violate 
peremptory norms of international law and was therefore valid.45  
Nevertheless, the Council still recommended its rejection at the ballot 
box.46  The National Assembly adopted the conclusions of the 
government on the validity of the initiative: a motion to dismiss the 
initiative based on incompatibility with peremptory international 
norms was defeated by 128 to 53 votes.  The Assembly also joined the 
government, by 129 to 50 voters, in recommending that voters reject 
the ballot initiative.47  During the subsequent campaign, supporters 
of the ban did not recoil from using controversial means to secure a 
                                                                                                                      
adopted, 2003 renewal rejected); IVF prohibition (2000, rejected); introducing a public 
option for health insurance (2007, rejected); and legalizing marihuana (2008, rejected). 
Initiatives on limiting immigration and naturalization were rejected in 1922, 1970, 
1974, 1977 (twice), 1988, and 2000. Pending initiatives demand, inter alia, a 
constitutional protection of Swiss banking secrecy, a pay cap for executives, and a ban 
on the sale of SUVs (with the latter potentially clashing with WTO rules). For a 
chronological list of ballot initiatives, see Chronologie Volksinitiativen, 
SCHWEIZERISCHE BUNDEKANZLEI, http://www.admin.ch/ch/d/pore/ vi/vis_2_2_5_1.html 
(last visited Sept. 26, 2010). 
 42.  The ballot initiative “For Swiss Membership in the United Nations” was 
adopted in 2002. In 1986, membership had been rejected in a referendum. Swiss 
participation in UN peace-keeping forces was rejected in a referendum in 1994. BBL III 
1251 (1994). The relationship with the European Union has also been shaped through 
the ballot box. Membership in the European Economic Area (EEA) was narrowly 
rejected in 1992, Alan Riding, Swiss Reject Tie to Wider Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 
1992, at A7, while a ballot initiative for EU membership application was 
overwhelmingly turned down in 2001. Swiss Say ‘No’ to EU, BBC NEWS, Mar. 4, 2001, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/1201133.stm. Referenda on the conclusion of sectorial 
bilateral agreements with the European Union, BBL 3773 (2000); accession to the 
Schengen Agreement and Dublin Regulation, BBL 5183 (2005); free movement for 
citizens for new Member States Bulgaria and Romania, BBL 6903 (2005); and on 
development aid to new EU members, BBL 451 (2007) were approved. 
 43.   ULRICH HÄFELIN ET AL., SCHWEIZERISCHES BUNDESSTAATSRECHT ¶¶ 1384–
85 (7th ed. 2008). 
 44.  BBL 6851 (2008). 
 45.  BB1 7603, 7609–12. (2008). 
 46.  Id. at 7651.  
 47.  Amtliches Bulletin der Bundesversammlung [AB] [Official Bulletin of the 
Federal Assembly] I, 118–19 (2009). In the State Council, the validity of the initiative 
was also unsuccessfully challenged (with 16 to 24 votes), and the recommendation to 
voters to reject the ballot adopted by 36 votes to 3. AB III 545 (2009). 
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yes vote; the posters for the initiative showed a veiled woman in front 
of a Swiss flag pierced by countless minarets.48  The Minister of 
Justice was accused of supporting female genital mutilation when she 
argued against a ban.49 
 When the ban was adopted, disbelief and surprise in Switzerland 
were mirrored in the international media.50  Regional and 
international bodies quickly expressed concern over the vote.51  
Unsurprisingly, criticism was particularly vocal in Muslim 
countries.52  Turkey’s Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan saw the 
vote as evidence of “increasingly racist and fascist attitudes in 
Europe,” and President Abdullah Gül called it a disgrace for 
Switzerland.53  In a letter, the ambassadors of the Organization of the 
Islamic Conference (OIC) member states in Geneva voiced their hope 
                                                                                                                      
 48.  See Michael Kimmelman, When Fear Turns Graphic, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17, 
2010, at AR 1 (discussing one such poster). In some cities, the posters were held to 
violate the criminal provision against racism and their use was prohibited. Cf. 
SCHWEIZERISCHES STRAFGESETZBUCH [STGB] [CRIMINAL CODE] Dec. 21, 1937, SR 
311.0, art. 261bis (2010). It was not the first time that posters of the People’s Party 
caused controversy. In 2004, the People’s Party fought expedited naturalization of 
third-generation immigrants with a poster on which dark-skinned hands grabbed 
Swiss passports. Paul Vallely, Switzerland: Europe's Heart of Darkness?, INDEPENDENT 
(London), Sept. 7, 2007, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/ 
switzerland-europes-heart-of-darkness-401619.html. When collecting signatures for a 
ballot initiative to deport criminal foreigners in 2007, it used white sheep kicking a 
black sheep off the Swiss flag. Id. For more on this initiative, see infra note 383 
(discussing deportation measures). 
 49.  Symbole in der Religionsfreiheit, NZZ, Oct. 16, 2009, at 13. 
 50.  Deborah Ball & Nicholas Birch, Swiss Ban Minarets in Controversial Vote, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2009, at A8; Stéphane Dupont, Suisse: l'interdiction des minarets 
met le monde en ébullition, LES ECHO, Dec. 1, 2009, at 18; Serge Enderlin, Les Suisses 
sonnent le glas des minarets, LIBÉRATION, Nov. 30, 2009, at 2; Elisalex Henckel, Hass 
tritt unter der Decke von Harmonie hervor, DIE WELT, Nov. 30, 2009, at 3; Oliver 
Kamm, Swiss Minaret Ban Fits Pattern of Populist Protest in Western Europe, SUNDAY 
TIMES (U.K.), Nov. 30, 2009, at 29. 
 51.  Press Release, Council of Eur. Parliamentary Assembly, Minarets in 
Switzerland—Reaction of PACE President (Nov. 30, 2009), available at 
http://assembly.coe.int/ASP/Press/StopPressView.asp?ID=2266; Press Release, 
Thorbjørn Jagland, Sec.-Gen., Council of Eur., Concern About Referendum on Minarets 
(Nov. 30, 2009) [hereinafter Sec.-Gen. Jagland], available at https://wcd.coe.int/ 
ViewDoc.jsp?id=1549357&Site=DC; European Comm'n Against Racism and 
Intolerance, Statement on the Ban of the Construction of Minarets in Switzerland, 
COUNCIL OF EUR. (Dec. 1, 2009), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/ 35-
Declaration_minarets/Declaration_en.asp; Swiss Minaret Ban Discriminates Against 
Muslims, Says UN Expert, U.N. NEWS CENTRE (Nov. 30, 2009), 
http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=33089. 
 52.  Deborah Ball, Muslim Leaders Condemn Swiss Ban, WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 
2009, at A14; Iran zitiert Botschafterin [Iran Summoned the Swiss Ambassador], 
NZZAS, Dec. 6, 2009, at 11. 
 53.  Heftige Reaktion der Türkei, NZZ, Dec. 2, 2009, at 11. The Turkish Minister 
for European Affairs also called upon wealthy Muslims to withdraw their deposits from 
Swiss banks and instead invest the moneys in Turkey. Demonstration in Ankara, NZZ, 
Dec. 3, 2009, at 15. 
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“that the Swiss Government would do all in its powers to rescind this 
decision through appropriate parliamentary and judicial measures.”54  
More recently, Colonel Muammar Gaddafi called for jihad against 
Switzerland as an infidel state that destroys mosques, declaring that 
any Muslim in any part of the world working with Switzerland would 
be an “apostate” and “against Muhammad, God and the Qur'an.”55  
 Official criticism was not limited to Muslim states and 
organizations.  When presenting the annual Human Rights Report by 
the U.S. Department of State, the Assistant Secretary of State for 
Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor singled out the Swiss minaret 
ban as the prime example of an increasing trend of discrimination 
against Muslims in Europe.56  During its spring session, the UN 
Human Rights Council also adopted a resolution, introduced by 
Pakistan, that “strongly condemned” the minaret ban.57  And in June, 
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe expressed 
particular concern about the vote and urged “the Swiss authorities to 
enact a moratorium on and repeal” the prohibition on the 
construction of minarets “as soon as possible.”58 
 Prior to the vote on the initiative, the Swiss government warned 
that a ban on minarets might have serious political, economic, and 
legal consequences at the international level.59  However, even 
though the reaction in the Muslim world was harsh and outspoken, 
no retaliatory measures have been implemented so far.  Muslim 
states and their regional organizations do not seek a repetition of the 
“days of rage” that followed the publication and republications of the 
                                                                                                                      
 54.  The OIC Secretary General Is Disappointed, and OIC Group in Geneva 
Strongly Condemns Decision to Ban Construction of Minarets in Switzerland, OIC 
NEWSL. (Org. of the Islamic Conference, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia), Dec. 9, 2009, available 
at http://www.oic-oci.org/newsletter.asp (browse the dropdown menu for the correct 
date and click “view”). 
 55.  Mark Tran, Gaddafi Calls for Jihad Against Switzerland, THE GUARDIAN 
(London), Feb. 26, 2010, at 18. This outburst is the latest salvo in an acerbic bilateral 
dispute originating in the 2008 arrest of one of Gaddafi’s sons in Geneva. Gail Collins, 
Op-Ed., Score One for the Diplomats, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 25, 2009, at A23. At one point, 
Gaddafi suggested to the G-8 and the United Nations that Switzerland be divided 
between France, Germany, and Italy. Id. 
 56.  Michael H. Posner, Briefing on the Release of the 2009 Country Reports on 
Human Rights Practices, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (Mar. 11, 2010), 
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/rm/2010/138263.htm. The minaret vote is documented 
extensively in the Report. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN 
RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 2009 HUMAN RIGHTS REPORT § 2(c) (2010), http://www.state.gov/g/ 
drl/rls/hrrpt/2009/eur/136061.htm.  
 57.  H.R.C. Res. 13/16, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/Res/13/16 (Mar. 25, 2010); see 
infra note 266. 
 58.  Resolution on Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe, PARL. ASS. 
COUNCIL OF EUR. DOC. (RES 1743) (2010). 
 59.  BBL 7603, 7645, 7649 (2008). 
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Danish Muhammad cartoons.60  Swiss business leaders expressed 
their hope that rational Muslim investors and consumers would not 
hold the vote against companies such as ABB or Nestlé and still visit 
Switzerland as tourists.61  As it took several months for the full scale 
of the backlash against the cartoons to emerge,62 this sanguine view 
might yet prove overly optimistic. 
 The legal implications of the vote are equally difficult to predict.  
In the government’s view, the proposed ban was irreconcilable with 
constitutional provisions on nondiscrimination and freedom of 
religion,63 and ran counter to the exclusive competence of the cantons 
to regulate religious matters.64  The ban was also considered 
incompatible with (non-peremptory) Articles 9 and 14 of the 
European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR), which protect 
freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, and prohibit 
discrimination.65  Finally, the ban was inconsistent with (equally 
non-peremptory) Articles 2, 18, and possibly 27 of the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibiting discrimination, 
guaranteeing freedom of conscience, religion, and belief, and 
protecting minorities.66  On the other hand, supporters of the 
initiative claimed that it did not affect the religious freedom of 
Muslims.67  They argued that, because the Qur’an does not mention 
minarets, the structures are not of a religious nature and therefore 
are not protected by the right to freedom of religion.68 
III.  THE NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK AND ITS IMPLEMENTATION 
 The minaret ban affects three distinct but interdependent 
normative orders: Swiss constitutional law, regional human rights 
law, and international human rights provisions.  The norms of each 
body of law are applied and implemented either concurrently or 
                                                                                                                      
 60.  Cf. ANDERS JERICHOW & MILLE RODE, PROFET-AFFÆREN: ET PEN-DOSSIER 
OM TWELVE MUHAMMAD-TEGNINGER—OG HVAD SIDEN HÆNDTE: DOKUMENTER & 
ARGUMENTER 133 (2006).  
 61.  Ball, supra note 52, at A14; Gabriela Weiss & Daniel Hug, Marke Schweiz 
ist stärker als alle Boykott-Aufrufe, NZZAS, Dec. 6, 2009, at 41; Keine 
Katastrophenstimmung, NZZ, Dec. 2, 2009, at 11. 
 62.  JYTTE KLAUSEN, THE CARTOONS THAT SHOOK THE WORLD 39 (2009). 
 63. BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 8(2), 15; BBL 7603, 7615–17 (2008). 
 64.  BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 72; BBL 7603, 7619, 7649 (2008). 
 65.  European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms arts. 2, 18, 27, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 [hereinafter 
ECHR]; BBL 7603, 7631–39 (2008). 
 66.  International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]; BBL 7603, 7630–
43 (2008). 
 67.  AB I 95 (2009). 
 68.  AB I 90, 95 (2009). 
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separately by three distinct judicial systems.  Switzerland gives 
immediate effect to self-executing international treaties.69  Breaches 
of self-executing regional or international human rights instruments 
can therefore be invoked before Swiss courts separately or in 
conjunction with constitutional provisions.70  On the regional level, 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) adjudicates violations 
of the ECHR.  And on the international plane, treaty-based bodies, 
such as the UN Human Rights Committee (CCPR), watch over the 
implementation of the respective treaties and sometimes act as an 
adjudicative body.  In the following subparts, I discuss the scope of 
the pertinent material provisions of each normative order; how, by 
whom, and before which judicial bodies these norms can be invoked; 
and the likely consequences on the national, regional, and 
international plane.  
A.  National Norms: The Swiss Constitution 
1. Freedom of Religion, Equality, and the Ban on Minarets 
 Article 8(1) and (2) BV guarantee equality before the law and 
prohibit discrimination based on, inter alia, origin, race, sex, way of 
life, as well as religious, ideological, or political convictions.  Article 
15 BV protects both the internal and external aspects of freedom of 
religion: everyone is free to hold and profess a belief or 
Weltanschauung.71  Religious practices fall within the scope of the 
norm if they are a consequence of, and directly linked to, religious 
convictions, and the courts generally defer to the respective religious 
community on the religious relevance of a practice.72  Thus, the 
Federal Supreme Court rightly refused to assess the necessity of the 
minaret in Wangen from a religious viewpoint.73  The Court has 
clearly established that building permits for religious structures 
                                                                                                                      
 69.  The ECHR and the ICCPR (unlike the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter 
ICESCR]) are considered self-executing. BGer Sept. 22, 2000, 126 ENTSCHEIDUNGEN 
DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESGERICHTS [BGE] I 240, 243; BGer Apr. 10, 1996, 122 
BGE I 109, 114. For an overview of the position of international law in Swiss municipal 
law, see HELEN KELLER, REZEPTION DES VÖLKERRECHTS 345–72 (2003). 
 70.  Mark Villiger, Die Wirkungen der Entscheide der EMRK-Organe im 
innerstaatlichen Recht, namentlich in der Schweiz, 104 ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR 
SCHWEIZERISCHES RECHT 471 (1985). 
 71.  BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 15(1)–(2) (bekennen, professer, and 
professare respectively in the original). 
 72.  See BGer Oct. 24, 2008, 135 BGE I 79, para. 4.4 (ruling that compulsory 
mixed swimming classes are constitutional).  
 73.  See supra note 24 and accompanying text (discussing the denial of the need 
for an expert report on the relgious relevance of adding a minaret to prayer rooms). In 
BGer Oct. 24, 2008, 135 BGE I 79, para. 4.4, the Court confirmed that the secular state 
must not judge on the theological justifications of religious practices. 
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affect religious freedom.74  It has not yet specifically addressed 
minarets, but academic opinion has predominantly subsumed such 
architectural features of mosques under Article 15 BV.75  The 
perception of minarets as a symbol of Islam76 suggests that they fall 
under the scope of the constitutional protection of religious 
manifestation.  It may well be true, as pointed out by the ban’s 
supporters, that the turrets have not been a feature of Muslim places 
of worship from the beginning of Islam,77 that there are numerous 
mosques without minarets,78 and that minarets were not originally 
linked to the call to prayer.79  But the decision of what forms part of 
religious practice should be left to the faithful whenever possible.80 
 However, neither equality nor religious freedom is absolute 
under the Swiss Constitution.  Legislative acts may prescribe 
discriminating treatment on “reasonable and objective grounds” 
necessitated by the subject matter of the legislation.81  Similarly, 
legislation that attaches differing consequences to one or several of 
the criteria listed in Article 8(2) BV only creates a presumption of 
discrimination, which can be overcome by proving that the differences 
are proportional82 and justified on objective grounds.83  The freedom 
                                                                                                                      
 74.  BGer June 21, 2004, docket no. 1P 149/2004, available at 
http://www.bger.ch (analyzing the permitted construction of an illuminated 25-foot 
cross using religious freedom tenets); BGer Mar. 19, 2003, docket no. 1A.69/2002, 
available at http://www.bger.ch (Islamic cultural center). 
 75.  PETER KARLEN, DAS GRUNDRECHT DER RELIGIONSFREIHEIT IN DER SCHWEIZ 
233, 251 (1988); REGINA KIENER & MATTHIAS KUHN, INTEGRATION UND HABITAT 33–34 
(2004); Christoph Jäger, Kultusbauten im Planungs, Bau- und Umweltschutzrecht, in 
BAU UND UMWANDLUNG RELIGIÖSER GEBÄUDE, supra note 25, at 110, 119; Wolf S. 
Seidel & Bernhard Waldmann, Sakralbauten im Lichte der Grundrechtsbindung und 
Grundrechtsverwirklichung, in BAU UND UMWANDLUNG RELIGIÖSER GEBÄUDE, supra 
note 25, at 71, 79–80; Bernhard Waldmann, Moscheebau und Gebetsruf, in MUSLIME 
UND DIE SCHWEIZERISCHE RECHTSORDNUNG 221 (René Pahud de Mortanges & Erwin 
Tanner eds., 2002). Contra 2 ANDREAS AUER ET AL., DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL SUISSE: 
LES DROITS FONDAMENTAUX ¶ 473 (2d ed. 2006). 
 76.  JONATHAN BLOOM, MINARET: SYMBOL OF ISLAM 7 (1989). 
 77.  For a discussion of the origins of minarets, see infra note 100, noting the 
identifiability and significance of minaret architecture. 
 78.  See infra note 106 (discussing instances in which there is opposition to 
minarets).  
 79.  ROBERT HILLENBRAND, ISLAMIC ARCHITECTURE: FORM, FUNCTION, AND 
MEANING 129 (1994).  
 80.  BGer Oct. 24, 2008, 135 BGE I 79, para. 4.4. 
 81.  See, e.g., BGer Nov. 23, 2004, 131 BGE I 1, para. 4.2 (ruling it 
discriminatory to impose a levy for road maintenance only on land owners); BGer Mar. 
19, 2003, docket no. 1A_69/2002, para. 3.3, available at http://www.bger.ch (upholding 
a limit on the number of people admitted to Friday prayer in an Islamic cultural center 
for safety reasons). 
 82.  BGer Mar. 19, 1997, 123 BGE I 152, para. 7 (holding that the fixed quotas 
for women in public administration demanded by a cantonal initiative (under the 
equivalent provision of the 1874 Constitution) disproportionately discriminated on a 
gender basis).  
878 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law [Vol. 43:863 
of religion guaranteed by Article 15 BV may also be subject to 
restrictions.  The Court is free to assess the consequences of “religion 
as a social phenomenon”84 and to balance religious commands with 
other values protected by the Constitution.85  Restrictions are 
permissible if they are enacted by law, pursue a public interest in a 
proportional manner, and leave the core of religious freedom intact.86  
The proportionality test for both Articles 8 and 15 is subdivided into 
an assessment of suitability (can the public interest be achieved at all 
through the proposed restriction?), necessity (is a less intrusive 
means available?), and proportionality in a narrow or strict sense 
(does the public interest, on balance, outweigh the consequences of a 
restriction?).87  The legality principle requires restrictions to be based 
on “substantial” law (i.e., on a general and abstract norm); severe 
restrictions have to be established by formal act (i.e., a norm adopted 
by the legislature).88  Both criteria are met by Article 72(3) BV.89  
 What public interest may the proponents of the ban have hoped 
to achieve with their initiative?  Interests that are generally held to 
justify restrictions include the protection of public safety, health, 
morals, or the fundamental rights of others; safeguarding the 
environment or animals; guaranteeing sustainable urban and 
regional planning; maintaining peace between different language 
groups or religions;90 and even furthering the integration of Muslim 
immigrants.91 
 The first argument by minaret opponents in the official ballot 
pamphlet was that the Muslim population living in Switzerland grew 
from 56,000 in 1980 to over half a million.92  This rapid growth, they 
argued, created a difficult challenge for Switzerland because Muslims 
in Switzerland did not merely exercise their religion but “increasingly 
                                                                                                                      
 83.  BGer Nov. 21, 2003, 129 BGE I 392, para. 3.3 (stating that the limitation of 
political rights of aliens is objectively justified, while wholesale preferential treatment 
to Swiss citizens (as demanded by a cantonal ballot initiative) is not). 
 84.  BGer June 18, 1993, 119 BGE Ia 178, para. 4c (ruling that compulsory 
mixed swimming classes are unconstitutional). 
 85.  BGer Oct. 24, 2008, 135 BGE I 79, para. 7.  
 86.  BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 36 (enumerating the conditions for 
permissible restrictions on fundamental rights). 
 87.  HÄFELIN ET AL., supra note 43, ¶¶ 320–23. 
 88.  Id. ¶¶ 307–11.  
 89.  Rainer J. Schweizer, Art. 36, in DIE SCHWEIZERISCHE BUNDESVERFASSUNG: 
KOMMENTAR, paras. 10–12 (Bernhard Ehrenzeller et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008). 
 90.  Id. para. 19. Keeping religious peace is an aim explicitly listed in the 
Constitution. BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 72, para. 2. 
 91.  BGer Oct. 24, 2008, 135 BGE I 79, para. 7.2. 
 92.  SCHWEIZERISCHE EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT, VOLKSABSTIMMUNG VOM 29 
NOVEMBER 2009: ERLÄUTERUNGEN DES BUNDESRATS (2009). These brochures are sent 
to voters prior to the quarterly votes on ballot initiatives and contain the voting 
recommendations of the Federal Council and the Federal Assembly as well as the 
condensed arguments of the committee that launched the respective initiative. 
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started to lay claim to legal and political rights.”93  According to the 
ban’s proponents, the minaret is not mentioned in the Qur’an and has 
“nothing to do with religion”; instead, the minaret is a symbol of 
Islam’s political and social claim to power.94  Turkish Prime Minister 
Erdogan was quoted reciting a poem that described democracy as a 
train boarded by Islamists to ride to power and compared minarets to 
the bayonets of the faithful.95  Accepting minarets, the initiators 
further asserted, would unavoidably entail the call of the muezzin.96  
Thus, minarets were—just as the burqa, forced marriages, and 
female circumcision—a claim to power.97  They functioned as 
spearheads for the introduction of Sharia law and would lead to the 
Islamization of Switzerland and to irreconcilable conflicts with the 
fundamental freedoms and rights granted by the Constitution.  
Whoever wanted to live in Switzerland, the ban’s proponents argued, 
had to respect the Swiss Constitution, and the minaret ban would 
drive that message home.98 
 These arguments are reproduced here at some length because 
they are central in assessing the objectives that the ban is supposed 
to achieve.  It was presented as a panacea to a plethora of gravamina 
caused by the spread of an alien religion.  Yet, notably, the ban’s 
supporters encountered difficulties in making up their mind as to the 
exact nature of minarets: even though allegedly and essentially 
nonreligious, minarets nevertheless served to propagate Islam.  The 
ban’s supporters did not explain how the minaret—whether religious 
in nature or not—threatened public peace, safety, or morals.  
Obviously, protecting equality of women; preventing female 
circumcision and forced marriage; maintaining the rule of law; and 
safeguarding the fundamental rights of others would all justify the 
restriction of religious freedom.99  But were these the aims addressed 
by the initiative?  And if so, was the initiative an effective way to 
address them?  Parts IV and VI discuss possible ulterior motives of 
                                                                                                                      
 93.  Id. at 27. This would correspond to 6.5 percent of residents. Cf. BUNDESAMT 
FÜR STATISTIK, DEMOGRAFISCHES PORTRÄT DER SCHWEIZ 7 (2009) (providing census 
data). For a discussion of census data, see infra note 406. 
 94.  SCHWEIZERISCHE EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT, supra note 92, at 27.  
 95.  Id.  
 96.  Id.   
 97.  Id.  
 98.  Id. 
 99.  In 2008, the Federal Supreme Court held that it was constitutional to 
oblige Islamic youths to attend co-ed swimming classes. See BGer Oct. 24, 2008, 135 
BGE I 79, para. 7 (justifying the rule by holding that, while religious dress codes and 
rules on exposure to the other sex were protected by the right to freedom of religion, 
the “considerable public interest” in providing equal education to both sexes, and to 
further integration of immigrant children militated the restriction on individual 
liberty). This overturned a 1993 ruling in a similar case, where the Court had 
attributed higher importance to the free exercise of religion. BGer June 18, 1993, 119 
BGE Ia 178, paras. 7, 8. 
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the ballot’s proponents; presently, this Part establishes whether there 
was a rational and effective connection between the aims professed 
and the ban proposed.  
 The initiators did not give a definition of minarets, presumably 
assuming that the term described structures with definite and 
exclusive properties.  The matter is probably somewhat more complex 
(sacral architecture tends to fulfill several purposes, which often vary 
over time100), but even assuming that we know all the 
phenomenological qualities of a minaret and all its possible 
occurrences, the rationale for the ban suffers from several 
deficiencies.  
 The ban’s proponents were very unclear about the ontological 
nature of minarets.  Allegedly nonreligious in nature, the towers 
nevertheless spread a religion (Islam), and religious law (the 
Sharia).101  The notions of what such religious law encompasses are 
vague at best.  The odious practice of female genital mutilation, for 
instance, has cultural rather than religious roots and is not limited to 
Muslims102—otherwise it would be difficult to explain why, up until 
the 1950s, clitoridectomies were performed in the West for allegedly 
medical indications.103  Cultural traditions also may partially account 
for practices such as prearranged or forced marriages, or the burqa, 
even though here the link to religious norms and their varying 
                                                                                                                      
 100.  Robert Hillenbrand, Manāra, Manār, in 6 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF ISLAM 361 
(C.E. Bosworth et al. eds., 2d ed. 1991) states that “[u]nlike the other types of Islamic 
religious building . . . the minaret is immediately and unambiguously [recognizable] for 
what it is.” Its use for the call to prayer, however, which is frequently considered a 
defining element, e.g., Jonathan M. Bloom, Minarets, in 4 THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD 6 (John L. Esposito ed., 2009), cannot be a sufficient quality, as 
the four minarets in Switzerland may not be used by a muezzin. Another criterion 
might be the slender, pencil-sharp shape of the towers, yet this is but one of many 
architectural variants of minarets. See infra notes 495–97 and accompanying text 
(discussing various styles of minarets). Most scholars agree that minarets developed in 
Syria during the Umayyad dynasty, inspired by the towers of the Damascene basilica 
that was replaced by a mosque at the beginning of the eighth century C.E. BLOOM, 
supra note 76, at 11. Some minarets were indeed “a lance aimed at the infidels,” such 
as the Minaret of Jam in Afghanistan, erected in contested territory and inscribed with 
suras related to military victory and conversion. ROBERT HILLENBRAND, ISLAMIC ART 
AND ARCHITECTURE 155 (1999). More importantly, minarets—like church towers—
provided a focal point for the community. The construction of minarets was also an 
important opportunity for patronage. Hillenbrand, supra, at 365. 
 101.  Cf. infra notes 104–05 (discussing veils as both a religious and secular 
symbol).  
 102.  Etin Anwar, Female Genital Mutilation, in 2 THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA 
OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD, supra note 100, at 244–45. 
 103.   Cf. John Duffy, Masturbation and Clitoridectomy: A Nineteenth-Century 
View, 186 J. AM. MED. ASS'N 246, 246–48 (1963) (discussing the history of the 
controversial practice of performing clitoridectomies to combat female masturbation 
and its allegedly grave physical and mental ills it supposedly induced); see also JOEL 
BRASLOW, MENTAL ILLS AND BODILY CURES 165–68 (1997) (analyzing the practice in 
California in the first half of the twentieth century). 
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construction by the faithful and by religious authorities is more 
obvious.  In particular, the question of female veiling is, in the West, 
an issue almost exclusively associated with Islam.  As a prescription 
applying only to women, the veil raises complex gender issues;104 as a 
religious symbol, the headscarf has also led to controversy in 
Switzerland over the religious neutrality of public schools.105 
 Gender equality and the separation of state and religion are 
legitimate concerns of the body politic, as is the curbing of religious 
extremism and ideologies of intolerance or violence.  However, none of 
these threats to a democratic society are causally linked to minarets.  
A turret, no matter how prominent, piercing, or phallocratic, does not 
influence the content of sermons held in the adjacent mosque.  There 
is no connection between the construction of minarets and extremism; 
in the Muslim world and elsewhere, minarets adorn the mosques of 
moderate, pious, or fanatical congregations.  Rather, some of the 
movements most closely associated with fundamentalist Islam 
actually reject the construction of minarets as ostentatious or as an 
illicit innovation.106  Criminal law can, and does, address female 
genital mutilation.107  Similarly, forced marriages may be countered 
by family and possibly criminal law provisions.108  Moreover, the 
underlying issue of gender equality has unfortunately proven 
                                                                                                                      
 104.  For a brief overview, see generally Fadwa El Guindi & Zuhur Sherifa, 
Hijāb, in 2 THE OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD, supra note 100. For a 
gender perspective, see generally ETIN ANWAR, GENDER AND SELF IN ISLAM 104–08 
(2006). 
 105.  The Federal Supreme Court has held that prohibiting a female teacher at a 
public school from wearing a headscarf was a proportional means to protect the 
religious peace and neutrality of state institutions. BGer Nov. 12, 1997, 123 BGE I 296. 
The judgment was upheld by the European Court of Human Rights. Dahlab v. 
Switzerland, 2001–V Eur. Ct. H.R. 447 . Similarly, the Federal Supreme Court ruled 
that the display of crucifixes in classrooms was unconstitutional. BGer Sept. 26, 1990, 
116 BGE Ia 252. 
 106.  In Wahhabism the minaret has sometimes been opposed as unnecessary 
and a deviation from original practice. Hillenbrand, supra note 100, at 361. Shia 
mosques frequently lack minarets for the same reason. Bloom, supra note 100, at 6. 
 107.  Female genital mutilation is punishable under Article 122 STGB (grievous 
bodily harm). STEFAN TRECHSEL & REGULA SCHLAURI, UNICEF, WEIBLICHE 
GENITALVERSTÜMMELUNG IN DER SCHWEIZ 9–13 (2004). The first conviction took place 
in 2008. Bedingte Freiheitsstrafe wegen Beschneidung der Tochter, NZZ, June 27, 2008, 
at 39. For Germany, compare Andrea Hagemeier & Jens Bülte, Zum Vorschlag eines 
neuen § 226a StGB zur Bestrafung der Genitalverstümmelung, 65 JURISTEN ZEITUNG 
406 (2010). 
 108.  Forced marriages performed abroad violate the Swiss ordre public and 
therefore, are not recognized in Switzerland. BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DAS 
INTERNATIONALE PRIVATRECHT [IPRG] [International Private Law Code] Dec. 18, 1987, 
SR 291, art. 27, para. 1. Within Switzerland, a marriage that has been entered into 
under pressure is valid, but its annulment may be requested within limited time. 
SCHWEIZERISCHES ZIVILGESETZBUCH [ZGB] [CIVIL CODE] Dec. 10, 1907, SR 210, arts. 
107, para. 4, 108, para. 1. Under criminal law, forced marriages may constitute 
coercion. STGB art. 181. 
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persistent in non-Muslim societies as well.  Solving this problem 
requires a long-term approach and the enforcement of 
nondiscrimination provisions in family,109 labor,110 constitutional,111 
and international law.112 
 The legitimate public aim of curbing religious extremism cannot, 
therefore, be attained through prohibiting minarets; indeed the latter 
is unrelated to the former.  Consequently, the requirement of 
suitability of a measure restricting religious freedom is not met, and 
the ban constitutes an unjustified infringement on Article 15 BV.113  
Nor can the discriminatory nature of a prohibition of minarets be 
justified.  By preventing only Muslims from building religious 
structures within the limits set out by planning laws, a collective 
punishment is meted out to the entire Muslim community for the 
extremist views of some of its members.  Even worse, this 
punishment is unrelated to the extremism and intolerance in 
question.  The question of necessity, then, is moot.  If a restriction of a 
fundamental right is not effective to achieve the purpose proclaimed, 
it becomes unnecessary to consider whether there might be an 
equally effective, but less intrusive measure.  Nor can proportionality 
in its strict sense be assessed.114 
                                                                                                                      
 109.  Until 1988, the Swiss Civil Code presumed that the husband represented 
and was the head of the conjugal union, that he chose the place of abode, and that he 
“duly provided for the maintenance of wife and children.” ZGB Dec. 10, 1907, AS 24, 
233, arts. 160–67 (1912). The wife, in turn, was expected to “assist him, to the best of 
her abilities, by word and deed in his effort to maintain their home,” and manage the 
household affairs. Id. 
 110.  GLEICHSTELLUNGSGESETZ [GLG] [Equality Law], Mar. 24, 1995, SR 151.1. 
 111.  See BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 8(3) (guaranteeing equality of the sexes). 
The clause on equal payment has a horizontal effect. It is noteworthy that women were 
granted the right to vote on the federal level only in 1971 by a referendum (with a view 
to the ratification of the ECHR; an earlier attempt in 1959 had failed). BBL I 485 
(1971); BBL I 61 (1970). In Appenzell Innerrhoden, women obtained the cantonal vote 
only in 1990 by fiat of the Federal Supreme Court. BGer Nov. 27, 1990, 116 BGE Ia 
359.  
 112.  See Convention on the Elimination of All Discrimination Against Women 
art. 3, Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter CEDAW] (creating an obligation on 
state parties—including Switzerland who ratified the Convention in 1997—to take “all 
appropriate measures, including legislation to ensure the full development and 
advancement of women”); see also Optional Protocol to the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, art. 2, Oct. 6, 1999, 2131 
U.N.T.S. 83 (granting to individuals of state parties—including Switzerland who 
ratified the Protocol in 2008—the right to complain to the Committee on the 
Elimination of Discrimination Against Women about violations). 
 113.  See supra notes 86–87 and accompanying text (discussing the test for 
determining whether restrictions are permissible). 
 114.  See BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 15, 36 (providing for enumerated 
religious freedoms and an independent limit that state intrusions on said “fundamental 
rights” must be “proportionate”); see also HÄFELIN ET AL., supra note 43, ¶¶ 320–23 
(raising suspicion on the ability to assess the proportionality of restrictions on liberty). 
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2. The Least Dangerous Branch: The Role of Swiss Courts in 
Implementing Constitutional Norms 
 Two weeks after the minaret ban passed, two complaints were 
lodged directly with the Federal Supreme Court.115  These complaints 
argued that the initiative violated constitutional and international 
law.116  They were summarily dismissed; ballot initiatives may be 
challenged only on the grounds of electoral irregularities.117  As 
discussed, there is no antecedent judicial review of constitutional 
amendments.118  In Switzerland, the judiciary is the least dangerous 
branch of government.  With the vote on November 29, 2009, the 
construction of minarets is prohibited with immediate effect and 
regardless of contradictions with other constitutional provisions or 
international law.119  The Swiss Federal Supreme Court also lacks 
the competence for abstract review of the legality of an initiative ex 
post; it examines claims of alleged violations of federal or 
international law only in the context of a specific case under 
consideration.120  For the Court to make a pronouncement on the 
minaret ban, a private party would therefore have to apply for a 
permit to build a minaret and appeal the predictable rejections 
through the various administrative and judicial instances to the 
Court.121 
 On what norms would an appellant have to rely?  The Court is 
equally bound by federal acts and international law.122  As the 
supreme federal law, the Swiss Constitution must be binding on the 
Court as well, although this is not made explicit.  The Constitution 
                                                                                                                      
 115.  BGer Dec. 14, 2009, docket no. 1C_529/2009, available at 
http://www.bger.ch; BGer Dec. 14, 2009, docket no. 1C_527/2009, available at 
http://www.bger.ch. 
 116.  BGer Dec. 14, 2009, docket no. 1C_529/2009; BGer Dec. 14, 2009, docket no. 
1C_527/2009. 
 117.  BUNDESGESETZ ÜBER DIE POLITISCHEN RECHTE [BPR] [Federal Act on 
Political Rights] Dec. 17, 1976, SR 161.1, art. 77(1). 
 118.  See supra notes 34–35 and accompanying text (discussing how competence 
to adjudicate the validity of initiatives is vested exclusively with Switzerland’s 
bicameral Federal Assembly). 
 119.  BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 195; Dieter Biedermann, Art. 195, in DIE 
SCHWEIZERISCHE BUNDESVERFASSUNG: KOMMENTAR, supra note 89, paras. 5–6. 
 120.  BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 189(1)(a)–(b); HÄFELIN ET AL., supra note 43, 
¶¶ 2071–72. 
 121.  Procedures and remedies vary from canton to canton. In most cases, the 
initial application would be submitted to a local building commission (in smaller 
communities usually a political lay body), the decisions of which are first appealed to 
the cantonal building department and then to a cantonal administrative court, all of 
which are bound by federal law and, therefore, obliged to impose the federal minaret 
ban. A public law appeal may then be lodged with the Federal Supreme Court. 
BUNDESGERICHTSGESETZ [BGG] [Federal Court Act] June 17, 2005, SR 173.110, art. 
82(a). 
 122.  BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 190. 
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does not elevate fundamental rights above other constitutional 
guarantees; as lex specialis (and posterior), the minaret ban in Article 
72(3) therefore supersedes the guarantees of nondiscrimination and 
freedom of religion in Articles 8 and 15 BV,123 and the Court will 
henceforth have to construe these guarantees in conformity with the 
minaret ban.  If a Muslim community persists in obtaining a building 
permit for a minaret and appeals to the Federal Supreme Court, an 
application based solely on constitutional law is unlikely to succeed. 
 Yet, applicants may also invoke international treaty law before 
Swiss courts, in general, and the Federal Supreme Court, in 
particular, because international law is binding on the Court.124  
Relying on the equal status of federal acts and international law, the 
Court strives to construe the former in conformity with the latter.  
However, the Constitution does not indicate which normative order 
should prevail in case of irreconcilable differences.  On the face of the 
constitutional set-up, the Court would therefore not even be allowed 
to find unconstitutional a mere federal act.  In 1999, however, the 
Court stated that international law, and human rights norms in 
particular, trump colliding national law on principle.125  This 
conclusion complements Article 5(4) BV, which obliges both federal 
and cantonal authorities to heed international law.  Article 5(4), 
however, is not construed as a strict conflict-of-law rule,126 and the 
Court has previously held that new federal law prevails over 
international obligations if the law is passed in deliberate 
contradiction to international obligations.127  If a federal act may thus 
trump international law, the same would a minore hold true for the 
Constitution.  
 When considering a complaint against a refusal to grant a 
building permit, the Federal Supreme Court could arrive, at least in 
theory, at any one of several findings: it could reject the application 
because the Constitution bans the construction of minarets, and (a) 
the construction of minarets is not protected by international human 
rights law; or (b) the Constitution trumps any contravening 
                                                                                                                      
 123.  Cf. 1 ANDREAS AUER ET AL., DROIT CONSTITUTIONNEL SUISSE: L’ETAT ¶ 1890 
(2d ed. 2006). 
 124.  See supra notes 70, 122 and accompanying text (noting that breaches of 
international human rights instruments can be invoked before Swiss courts and that 
the Federal Supreme Court is bound by international law).  
 125.  BGer July 26, 1999, 125 BGE II 417. The Kurdistan’s Workers Party 
invoked procedural and substantive guarantees of the ECHR against the confiscation 
of propaganda materials. Id. 
 126.  Yvo Hangartner, Art. 5, in 1 DIE SCHWEIZERISCHE BUNDESVERFASSUNG: 
KOMMENTAR, supra note 89, para. 49. 
 127.  If Parliament intentionally adopts a federal act that contravenes an earlier 
international agreement, the Court defers. BGer Mar. 2, 1973, 99 BGE Ib 39. Yet the 
Court generally gives international human right norms and particularly the provisions 
of the ECHR deference even over more recent federal acts. Yvo Hangartner, Art. 190, in 
2 DIE SCHWEIZERISCHE BUNDESVERFASSUNG: KOMMENTAR, supra note 89, para. 32. 
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international law.  Conversely, the Court could find for the applicants 
because (c) the minarets are protected by international human rights 
norms that have precedence over any constitutional provisions 
banning minarets. 
 A politically prudent Court will most likely opt for option (b).  
The Court (if it respects the respective construction by the ECtHR 
and the CCPR) might find it difficult to maintain that a ban would 
not be problematic under the ECHR, and certainly under the 
ICCPR128—even though the Court is not bound by international 
precedent and may chose to provide a novel and independent 
interpretation of an international norm.129  Option (c) would expose 
the Court to criticism because of the importance that both the 
constitutional system and the Swiss myth system place on popular 
sovereignty.130  Institutional concerns may also make the Court wary 
of an overly assertive stance on a democratic decision; judges are 
elected by the Federal Assembly and have to stand for reelection 
every six years.131  Therefore, applicants would have to bring their 
claim to a different forum; the most obvious option would be an 
application to the European Court of Human Rights for a breach of 
Articles 9 and 14 of the ECHR. 
B.  The Minaret Ban and the European Convention on Human Rights 
1. Does the ECHR Protect the Construction of Minarets? 
 In his statement the day after the vote, the Secretary General of 
the Council of Europe (CoE) pointed out that “the ban on the 
construction of new minarets [was] linked to issues such as freedom 
of expression, freedom of religion and prohibition of discrimination 
guaranteed by the European Convention on Human Rights.”  If an 
applicant files a claim with the ECtHR, it would be “up to the 
European Court of Human Rights to decide . . . whether the 
prohibition of building new minarets [was] compatible with the 
Convention.”132 
                                                                                                                      
 128.  See infra Parts III.B.1 and III.C.1 (discussing whether the European 
Convention protects the construction of minarets, and the scope of any protection). 
 129.  Still, the provisions would have to be construed in conformity with 
international principles. Even though the ECHR is directly applicable in Switzerland, 
it is so as an international treaty and not as domestic law. Mark E. Villiger, supra note 
70, para. 8. 
 130.  See infra Part IV.C (discussing the Swiss myth system and the Swiss 
attitude towards international law). 
 131.  BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 145, 168(1). Some judges have been 
threatened with non-reelection after controversial decisions on naturalization, see infra 
note 327, and crucifixes in public schools, see supra note 105. 
 132.   Sec.-Gen. Jagland, supra note 51. 
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 To fall within the scope of religious freedom governed by Article 
9 ECHR, building minarets would have to constitute a manifestation 
of religion through worship, teaching, practice, and observance.133  
Under the so-called Arrowsmith134 test, the turrets must also be a 
necessary element of Muslim religious manifestation.135  Unlike the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the ECtHR reserves the right to establish such 
necessity, rather than deferring to the claims of applicants.136  Thus, 
in the case of a transferred Muslim teacher trying to extend his 
Friday lunch break to attend a nearby mosque (an obligation 
confirmed by an Islamic leader before the national authorities), the 
Commission found that the applicant had not convincingly shown 
that following his transfer to a school “nearer to mosques,” he was 
required by Islam to disregard his continuing contractual obligations 
as a teacher.137  
 Therefore, for the minaret ban to violate Article 9 ECHR, the 
ECtHR would have to hold that minarets are a religious 
manifestation through worship, observation, or practice, and that 
such manifestation was necessitated by Muslim belief.  The 
etymology of “manifestation” implies a visible or even tangible 
                                                                                                                      
 133.  The list seems to be exhaustive, not just exemplary. Şahin v. Turkey, 2005–
XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, ¶ 105; Cha'are Shalom ve Tsedek v. France, 2000–VII Eur. Ct. 
H.R. 231, ¶ 73.  
 134.  Arrowsmith v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7050/75, 19 Eur. Comm'n H.R. 
Dec. & Rep. 5 (1978). The (misleadingly named) pacifist Pat Arrowsmith distributed 
leaflets to British soldiers, urging them not to accept deployment in Northern Ireland. 
Id. While the European Commission on Human Rights accepted that her pacifism 
constituted a belief for the purpose of Article 9(1), it ruled that the distribution of 
leaflets to soldiers did not actually express the belief of pacifism, even if motivated or 
influenced by it, and therefore, did not amount to manifesting practice. Id. The element 
of necessity had already been expressed more explicitly in X v. United Kingdom, App. 
No. 5442/72, 1 Eur. Comm'n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 41, 41 (1974). 
 135.  CAROLYN EVANS, FREEDOM OF RELIGION UNDER THE EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 115–25 (2001); MALCOLM EVANS, RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW IN EUROPE 307–12 (1997). 
 136.  E.g., X v. Austria, App. No. 8652/79, 26 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 89 
(1981); X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8160/78, 22 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 27, 
35 (1981); X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5442/72, 1 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 41 
(1974); see also Peter W. Edge, The European Court of Human Rights and Religious 
Rights, 47 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 680, 685 (1998) (referring to the “theological jurisdiction 
of the Court and the Commission”). Still, in some cases, the Court has consulted expert 
evidence. See, e.g., Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993) (consulting 
an interest group report); D v. France, App. No. 10180/82, 35 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & 
Rep. 199, 201 (1983). Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court usually does not question 
the religious character of a practice. See, e.g., Emp’t Div., Dep’t of Human Resources of 
Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), superseded by statute, Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–141, 197 Stat. 1488 (upholding the prohibition 
of the use of peyote (a hallucinogen) as constitutional without doubting that its 
consumption for sacramental purposes constituted a religious practice). 
 137.  X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 8160/78, 22 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
27, 35 (1981). Even if such necessity had been established, it would have been 
outweighed by his contractual obligations as a teacher. Id. 
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element.138  However, the Court (or prior to 1998 the Commission) 
has rarely explicitly subsumed a specific protected manifestation 
under worship, teaching, practice, or observance, and the four 
categories have therefore remained somewhat blurred.  Leaving 
teaching aside, do minarets constitute worship, observation, or 
practice? 
 “Practice” is the most generic term and could potentially be 
construed widely to refer to all acts consequential to religion,139 but, 
the ECtHR has stated repeatedly that Article 9 does not protect every 
act “which is motivated and influenced by a religion or belief.”140  
Still, both church bells and the call of the Muezzin would presumably 
constitute religious practices.141  If the ringing of church bells is 
covered by Article 9(1), so might be the steeples that come with the 
bells142—and by analogy their Muslim equivalents.  
 “Observance” includes customs and rules such as dress codes or 
growing a beard.143  In Manoussakis v. Greece, the Court ruled that 
withholding a permit for a place of worship violated the “right to 
worship and observance.”144  Under Article 9 ECHR, religious 
communities are therefore entitled to establish their own structural 
spaces as an accessory to the right to worship.  By extension, this 
must entail the right to erect such spaces as well, in conformity with 
building and zoning laws.  Whether this extends to specific 
architectural structures such as minarets is not evident, but it could 
be argued that through long-lasting tradition, minarets are seen as 
part and parcel of mosques.145 
                                                                                                                      
 138.  Latin manifestus < manus and fendo = made visibile, or rather made 
tangible by hand. 2 KARL ERNST GEORGES, AUSFÜHRLICHES LATEINISCH-DEUTSCHES 
UND DEUTSCH-LATEINISCHES HANDWÖRTERBUCH col. 706 (7th ed. 1880). 
 139.  EVANS, supra note 135, at 305. 
 140.  Şahin v. Turkey, 2005–XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, ¶ 105; see also Arrowsmith v. 
United Kingdom, App. No. 7050/75, 19 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 5, 71 (1978) 
(noting that “[f]or the purposes of paragraph 1 of Art. 9 the manifestation has to have 
some real connection with the belief”). 
 141.  BARBARA GARTNER, DER ISLAM IM RELIGIONSNEUTRALEN STAAT 189–98 
(2006). 
 142.  WALTER BERKA, DIE GRUNDRECHTE: GRUNDFREIHEITEN UND 
MENSCHENRECHTE IN ÖSTERREICH 559 (1999); JOCHEN ABRAHAM FROWEIN & 
WOLFGANG PEUKERT, EUROPÄISCHE MENSCHENRECHTSKONVENTION [EUROPEAN 
CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS] art. 14, ¶ 4 (3d ed. 2009). Ringing bells might also be 
more of a practice than building the steeple.  
 143.  X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 7992/77, 14 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
234, 234–35 (1978) (involving a Sikh turban); X v. Austria, App. No. 1753/63, 7 Y.B. 
Eur. Conv. on H.R., 174 (Feb. 15, 1965) (involving converted Buddhist convict growing 
beard). Again, the Court merely states that such actions fall under religious freedom 
without differentiating between the various forms of manifestation. 
 144.  Manoussakis v. Greece, 1996–IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 1346, ¶ 36. 
 145.  Cf. BBL 7603, 7631–32 (2008) (citing Bayerischer Verwaltungsgerichtshof 
[BayVGH Ve] [Bavarian Administrative Court] Aug. 29, 1996, 128 Bayerische 
Verwaltungsblätter [BayVerwBl] 144) (considering the mosque and minaret to 
constitute an “almost indissoluble unity”). 
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 Even if the ECtHR finds minarets to be protected by Article 9(1), 
their construction, like any other manifestation of religion, could still 
be subject to limitations, but “only to such limitations as are 
prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the 
interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”146  
Under this provision, bans have been upheld on certain types of ritual 
slaughter and on headscarves worn by teachers in public school or by 
university students.147  
 The minaret ban, through Article 72(3) BV, is prescribed by 
accessible, predictable, and precise law.148  In the Turkish headscarf 
case, the ECtHR held that safeguarding secular values and 
restraining religious extremism are legitimate aims for 
restrictions.149  By analogy, Switzerland would have to argue that it 
passed the minaret ban for similar purposes, relying on the ECtHR’s 
general reluctance to question states’ motives for legislation.150  But 
even if the Court concurred that the ban was motivated by concerns 
for public safety, order, religious peace, and the rights of others 
(rather than out of xenophobic prejudice), the ban would still have to 
be necessary in a democratic society.  In religious matters, the 
ECtHR grants states a wide margin of appreciation in assessing such 
necessity, taking into account national traditions and admitting that 
opinions on the relationship between state and religion “may 
reasonably differ widely” in a democratic society.151  Still, this margin 
of appreciation depends on the right at stake152 and “goes hand in 
hand with a European supervision” to ensure a reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the 
legitimate objectives pursued by the interference.153  
 In the case of the minaret initiative, proportionality requires 
that there is no means to combat extremism that would be equally 
effective but less intrusive on Muslim religious freedom.  The 
                                                                                                                      
 146.  ECHR, supra note 65, art. 9(2). 
 147.  See Şahin v. Turkey, 2005–XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173 (upholding ban of Islamic 
headscarf as applied to female medical student); Dahlab v. Switzerland, 2001–V Eur. 
Ct. H.R. 447 (upholding ban on headscarves as applied to teacher in the classroom); 
Tsedek v. France, 2000–VII Eur. Ct. H.R. 231 (upholding restrictions on ritual 
slaughter performed under Jewish tradition). 
 148.  Cf. Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 37–40 (1993) 
(finding criminal law provisions on proselytism sufficiently precise). 
 149.  Şahin, 2005–XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶ 116. 
 150.  See EVANS, supra note 135, at 148. 
 151.  Şahin, 2005–XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 109–10; see also Otto-Preminger-Institut 
v. Austria, 295 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶¶ 64–74 (1994) (discussing necessity and the 
margin of appreciation in the context of freedom of expression). 
 152.  See EVANS, supra note 135, at 143–44 (noting that in the context of 
Manoussakis v. Greece, the importance of public worship led to a narrower margin of 
appreciation). 
 153.  Şahin, 2005–XI Eur. Ct. H.R. ¶¶ 110, 116–17. 
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ECtHR—unlike, for instance, the Swiss, German, or Canadian 
constitutional courts—does not, in a prior step, assess the suitability 
of a measure to reach a legitimate aim.154  Yet, implicitly the ECtHR 
will have to consider suitability because it will be impossible to assess 
the proportionality of means and ends if there is no rational 
connection between the two.  As expounded above, such a connection 
is difficult to establish for the minaret ban.155  The ban does not 
mitigate extremist views (but instead might be used by Muslim 
extremists to stoke anti-Western resentment), and it certainly will 
not end the unequal treatment of the sexes.  Even if the Court 
assumed some connection between the ban and religious peace and 
security, it will find that such connection is too tenuous to justify the 
limitation on Muslims right to free religious worship, practice, and 
observance.156 
 In addition, the exclusive focus of the ban—only Muslims are 
affected—may violate the ECHR’s prohibition of discrimination.  
Article 14 ECHR differs from the constitutional nondiscrimination 
provision of Article 8 BV in its contingent scope, which prohibits only 
discrimination that infringes the rights protected in the 
Convention.157  Although a violation of Article 14 does not presuppose 
a violation of Article 9 (or any other right under the ECHR), it does 
require curtailment on discriminatory grounds of the “enjoyment” of 
Convention rights.158  Thus, even if the erection of specific 
architectural structures for worship does not fall under the scope of 
Article 9, a state might still violate its obligations under that 
provision in conjunction with Article 14 if it allowed some 
denominations to build towers but barred others from doing so.159  
                                                                                                                      
 154.  Compare Schweizer, supra note 89, ¶ 32, with NICHOLAS EMILIOU, THE 
PRINCIPLE OF PROPORTIONALITY IN EUROPEAN LAW 26–27 (1996), and Dieter Grimm, 
Proportionality in Canadian and German Constitutional Jurisprudence, 57 U. 
TORONTO L. J. 383, 387 (2007).  
 155.  See Bloom, supra note 100 (noting the multiple cultural and political 
purposes of minarets); see also note 106 and accompanying text (noting the prevalence 
of minarets across all subsets of Islam, from the moderate to the fundamentalist). 
 156.  See BBL 7603, 7634–38 (2008) (discussing the Swiss government’s 
acknowledgment of the difficulties in reconciling the ban with religious rights). 
 157.  Switzerland has not ratified the general prohibition of discrimination added 
to the ECHR through Protocol No. 12 to the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms art. 1, Nov. 4, 2000, E.T.S. No. 177. 
 158.  See Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages 
in Education in Belgium,” 6 Eur. Ct. H.R. 33–35 (ser. A) (1968) (“Article 14 (art. 14) 
does not form part of the enumeration of rights and freedoms in Articles 2–13 of the 
Convention . . . and Articles 1–3 of the Protocol . . . for it does no more than prohibit 
any discrimination in the enjoyment of these rights and freedoms.”).  
 159. Cf. id. at 33. 
Article 14 (art. 14) condemns only ‘discrimination’, and the Commission makes 
a point of stating precisely how it understands this word. In its opinion a State 
does not discriminate if it limits itself to conferring an ‘advantage’, a ‘privilege’ 
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Discriminating treatment is justified only if it pursues a legitimate 
aim and if there is a reasonable relationship of proportionality 
between the means employed and the aim sought to be realized.160  
The aim stated by the proponents of the minaret initiative was to 
ensure respect for civil liberties and equality before the law, and to 
combat religious extremism.161  The ECtHR would, no doubt, find 
such aims legitimate.162  Yet, not only is there no reasonable 
relationship of proportionality between these alleged aims and the 
minaret ban, the Court is bound to rule that there is no relationship 
at all. 
 In conclusion, it cannot be ruled out that the ECtHR will find the 
building of minarets outside the protective scope of Article 9(1) 
ECHR.  More likely, however, the Court will hold that religious 
edifices are also protected by Article 9(1), and that refusing 
applicants a building permit for a minaret based on Article 72(3) BV 
would violate their Convention rights.  In addition, such a violation 
will almost certainly not be considered justified under Article 9(2).  If 
it finds for a violation of Article 9, the ECtHR probably will not 
consider Article 14 separately,163 nor apply Articles 9 and 14 
concurrently.   
 If, however, the Court decides that minarets are not a 
manifestation of a religion as encompassed by Article 9(1), Article 14 
will be pivotal.  Because religious structures still fall within the 
purview of Article 9(1),164 the ban would constitute an impermissible 
discrimination on religious grounds.165 
                                                                                                                      
or a ‘favour’ on a particular group or individual which it denies to others. The 
question of a possible discrimination arises only if the difference in treatment 
in issue amounts to a ‘hardship’ inflicted on certain people. 
Id. 
 160.  Id. at 33, 44; Gütl v. Austria, 2009 Eur. Ct. H.R. 453, ¶ 34. 
 161.  SCHWEIZERISCHE EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT, supra note 92, at 27. 
 162.  Cf. Şahin v. Turkey, 2005–XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, ¶¶ 111, 114 (upholding 
restrictions on the wearing of religious headscarves in the name of equality and 
secularism). 
 163.  Cf. Kokkinakis v. Greece, 260 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 57 (1993) (declining 
to reach the Article 14 issue). 
 164.  See supra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing the connection 
between Article 9 and the erection of specific architectural structures for worship). 
 165.  I omit a detailed analysis of a possible breach of the Framework 
Convention on the Protection of National Minorities, 1 Feb. 1998, E.T.S. 157, which 
Switzerland ratified in 1998. The Framework Convention is not considered self-
executing. BGer Apr. 5, 2006, docket no. 1P 149/2004, available at http://www.bger.ch; 
cf. supra note 69. Nor does it define “national minorities”; under the definition applied 
by Switzerland the inclusion of Muslims under the Convention’s protective scope is 
envisaged only for the future. According to its declaration upon signature, Switzerland 
considers as national minorities only those groups of persons which are outnumbered 
by the national or cantonal populace, which are Swiss citizens, maintain long-lasting, 
firm and permanent connections to Switzerland, and which aspire to jointly preserve 
their shared identity, particularly their culture, their traditions, their religion, and 
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2. Implementing the ECHR 
 In the run-up to the vote, most Swiss commentators assumed, 
with the Federal Council, that a minaret ban would violate the 
ECHR.166  Possible legal repercussions were discussed only 
summarily, however, because nobody predicted that the ballot would 
be adopted.167 
 Shortly after the ballot passed, the proponents of one minaret 
project vowed to exhaust all avenues of appeal up to the ECtHR.168  
Two individual applications were lodged immediately with the 
ECtHR within weeks of the vote, followed by several non-formal 
letters of complaint.169  These direct submissions seem likely to be 
dismissed, because private applicants to the ECtHR must exhaust all 
local remedies170—a requirement that cannot be removed by merely 
pointing to the likely rejection of complaints by national courts.171  
Local remedies need not be exhausted only in exceptional 
circumstances,172 and “mere doubt as to the prospects of success of an 
available remedy” does not justify a direct appeal to the ECtHR.173  
In addition, it would be incorrect to assume that there is local remedy 
at all against a ballot initiative.174  Although the vote as such can 
                                                                                                                      
their language. BBL II 1325 (1998). If these conditions are met, Muslims would be 
considered a minority for the purpose of the Framework Convention. Second Report 
Submitted Pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of the Framework Convention for the 
Protection of National Minorities, ¶ 18 (Jan. 31, 2007), http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/ 
monitoring/minorities/3_fcnmdocs/PDF_2nd_SR_Switzerland_en.pdf. 
 166.  See supra note 65 and accompanying text (noting that the ban was 
incompatible with Articles 9 and 14 of the ECHR). 
 167.  BBL 7603, 7645 (2008); cf. supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing 
the procedure of the Federal Assembly regarding the validity of initiatives). 
 168.  Christoph Wehrli, Klares, aber vieldeutiges Nein zu Minaretten, NZZ, Nov. 
30, 2009, at 7; see supra text accompanying notes 26 (discussing one minaret project 
stalled as a result of the vote) and 115–19 (noting two filed petitions). 
 169.  The first application was brought by the former speaker of the Geneva 
mosque who now heads a foundation to further interreligious dialogue. Claudia Schoch, 
Kaum Chancen in Strassburg, NZZ, Dec. 17, 2009, at 15. Four Muslim associations in 
Switzerland submitted the second application. Weitere muslimische Verbände rufen 
Strassburg an, NZZ ONLINE, Dec. 18, 2009, http://www.nzz.ch/ 
nachrichten/schweiz/muslime_strassburg_1.4244611.html. 
 170.  ECHR, supra note 65, arts. 34, 35(1).  
 171.  Counsel for the former speaker of the Geneva mosque have implied that the 
Court could be seized directly, as local remedies would predictably be fruitless. Hafid 
Ouardiri recourt à Strasbourg, LE TEMPS (Geneva), Dec. 16, 2009. 
 172.  See FROWEIN & PEUKERT, supra note 142, art. 35, ¶¶ 29–32. 
 173.  X v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6861/75, 3 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
147, 149 (1975). 
 174.  The ECtHR President observed that it was not possible to challenge the 
outcome of a ballot initiative in the Federal Supreme Court. Les réactions 
internationales mettent la Suisse sous pression, LE TEMPS (Geneva), Dec. 1, 2009 
[hereinafter Les réactions]. 
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indeed be disputed only on very narrow grounds, the application of 
the ban will be open to challenges in the courts.175 
 The local remedy restriction, however, does not apply to other 
members of the CoE, which may refer alleged breaches of the ECHR 
to the ECtHR under Article 33.176  So far, thirteen state complaints 
have been brought before either the Commission or the Court.177  
State complaints are supposed to ensure the “collective enforcement” 
of the “public order of Europe.”178  But as an unfriendly act, a state 
complaint may carry considerable political and diplomatic costs.179  
As a result, such complaints generally have been lodged in 
extraordinary circumstances (military rule in Greece and Turkey 
respectively) or concerned longstanding political disagreements, e.g., 
the disagreements between Ireland and Great Britain or Cyprus and 
Turkey.180  In the same vein, Georgia has recently instigated 
proceedings against Russia for discrimination against Georgian 
nationals and in relation to the war with Russia in August 2008.181  
 The Council of Europe has four predominantly Muslim member 
states (Albania, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Turkey).182  
At the first meeting of the Committee of Ministers after the vote, 
Turkey provided the most outspoken criticism, together with 
                                                                                                                      
 175.  See supra note 117 and accompanying text (noting that the initiative itself 
may only be challenged for electoral irregularities) and supra note 120 (discussing the 
Swiss Court’s lack of authority to review the initiative in the abstract). At one point the 
media reported that the Court had admitted one of the direct complaints. Cf., e.g., 
Schritt des Rekurses gegen Minarettverbot, NZZ, May 21, 2010, at 13. The Court, 
however, had only requested the Swiss government to submit additional information. 
Court Moves Forward with Minaret Ban on Appeals, SWISSINFO.CH, (May 20, 2010), 
http://www.swissinfo.ch/eng/politics/Court_moves_forward_with_minaret_ban_appeals.
html?cid= 921318. 
 176.  ECHR, supra note 65, art. 33. If, however, a state complaint is brought in 
connection with violations of the Convention rights of an individual (rather than 
against a legislative act or general administrative practice), that individual must also 
have exhausted local remedies. Cyprus v. Turkey, 2001–IV Eur. Ct. H.R. 331, ¶ 99. 
 177.  FROWEIN & PEUKERT, supra note 142, art. 33, ¶ 2. 
 178.  Ireland v. United Kingdom, 25 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 239 (1978); Austria 
v. Italy, App. No. 788/60, 1961 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 116, 138. Unlike proceedings 
under ICCPR Article 41, state complaints under ECHR Article 33 are not subject to 
reciprocity or possible reservations under ECHR Article 57. See France v. Turkey, App. 
Nos. 9940/82, 9941/82, 9942/82, 9943/82, 9944/82, 35 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 
143, 169 (1983). 
 179.  Geir Ulfstein, Human Rights, State Complaints, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, ¶ 25. 
 180.  For an overview and further references, see FROWEIN & PEUKERT, supra 
note 142, art. 33, ¶ 2. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  A list of member states is available at COUNCIL OF EUR., 
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=47pays1europe&l=en (last visited Sept. 
26, 2010).  
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Azerbaijan and, somewhat unexpectedly, Sweden.183  Thus far, 
however, no state has indicated any intention to lodge a complaint. 
3. Withdrawing from the ECHR? 
 What would be the consequences if the ECtHR were to find 
either for a private or a state applicant and rule that the minaret ban 
violates the Convention?  Few international treaties provide for 
decision mechanisms with immediate municipal effect.  In most cases, 
state responsibility for a breach of contractual obligations is based on 
general international law,184 which obliges a state party to provide 
reparation through restitution, compensation, and other measures, 
and requires the state party to take steps to prevent continuing or 
renewed violations.185  Article 46(1) ECHR explicitly obliges state 
parties “to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to 
which they are parties.”  But the ECtHR’s judgments are merely 
declaratory; they do not affect the municipal legal system and cannot 
be enforced in the municipal courts.186  In most member states, 
however, a revision of a municipal judgment may be requested after it 
has been found by the Court to violate the Convention.187 
 In addition, the ECHR does not empower the Court to annul or 
repeal national legislation or to order a state party to alter its 
legislation188—hence the subsidiary remedy of just (pecuniary) 
satisfaction under Article 41.  State complaints do not significantly 
differ from individual complaints with regard to implementation:189 
the ECtHR may similarly award just satisfaction under Article 41.  In 
most cases, however, the finding of a violation has been considered 
sufficient and damages have been limited to expenses.190  If a state 
party successfully brings a claim against Switzerland, it might be 
                                                                                                                      
 183.  Stefan Bühler et al., Schweden profiliert sich als Hauptkritiker der 
Schweiz, NZZAS, Dec. 13, 2009, at 10. 
 184.  JÖRG POLAKIEWICZ, DIE VERPFLICHTUNGEN DER STAATEN AUS DEN 
URTEILEN DES EUROPÄISCHEN GERICHTSHOFS FÜR MENSCHENRECHTE 52 (1993). 
 185.  IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 459 (7th ed. 
2008). 
 186.  Villiger, supra note 70, at 476–77. 
 187.  In Switzerland, an applicant may petition the Federal Supreme Court for a 
revision of its previous judgment. BGE June 17, 2005, SR 173.110, art. 122(a). 
 188.  See Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 78 (1988) (noting 
Court’s lack of authority to order a change in Swiss legislation); Marckx v. Belgium, 31 
Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) ¶ 58 (1979) (same).  
 189.  State complaints, however, are not subject to the admissibility test 
applicable to individual applications submitted under Article 34. ECHR, supra note 65, 
arts. 27, 28. 
 190.  Franz Matscher, Kollektive Garantie der Grundrechte und die 
Staatenbeschwerde nach der EMRK, in DER RECHTSSTAAT VOR NEUEN 
HERAUSFORDERUNGEN 425 (Bernd-Christian Funk et al. eds., 2002). 
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difficult to identify the victims of a violation (all Muslims living in 
Switzerland?) and what damage they have suffered. 
 In its more recent case law, however, the ECtHR insists on the 
obligation of states to desist from any practice that has been found in 
violation of the Convention, implying an obligation to revise domestic 
laws that result in a violation.191  Therefore, if the Court found for 
applicants challenging the minaret ban, Switzerland would be 
expected to ensure permission to build the minaret in question as an 
individual measure.  As a general measure, Switzerland would have 
to ensure “through legislative or regulatory amendments” that future 
building applications would not be dismissed on grounds inadmissible 
under the Convention.192  
 If the ECtHR finds Switzerland in violation of the Convention, it 
could implement a judgment by two conceivable approaches.  A 
legislative approach would rescind Article 72(3) BV.  As illustrated by 
the minaret ban, a partial constitutional amendment could be 
initiated through a ballot initiative.  Alternatively, Members of 
Parliament, the Federal Council, or a canton may propose an 
amendment, which can then be adopted by the Federal Assembly and 
subsequently submitted to a general vote.193  Neither option seems 
viable for the time being; it would be too easy for the parties 
supporting the minaret ban to depict proponents of a new amendment 
as unpatriotic and disrespectful to the “sovereign will” of the people, 
kowtowing to unelected foreign judges in Strasbourg, and caving to 
political pressure. 
 Alternatively, the judiciary may decide to enforce an ECtHR 
judgment.  The applicants who prevail before the ECtHR would have 
to petition the Federal Supreme Court for a revision of its previous 
judgment.194  With a ruling of the ECtHR to invoke, the Court might 
find it easier to give the ECHR precedence over the constitutional 
minaret ban, overturn its previous judgment, and rule the ban 
inapplicable and obsolete.  This outcome seems unlikely.  It would 
                                                                                                                      
 191.  Sejdovic v. Italy, 2006–II Eur. Ct. H.R. 241, ¶¶ 119–22; Scozzzari v. Italy, 
2000–VIII Eur. Ct. H.R. 471, ¶ 249. For discussion, see FROWEIN & PEUKERT, supra 
note 142, art. 46, ¶¶ 6–13. An inventory of general measures taken by the contracting 
states to implement the decisions taken by the convention bodies is regularly updated. 
REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE OF EXPERTS FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF PROCEDURES FOR 
THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS [DH-PR], Measures Adopted to Prevent New 
Violations of the European Convention on Human Rights (2006), available at 
http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/ monitoring/execution/Documents/MGindex_en.asp. 
 192. See RULES OF THE COMM. OF MINISTERS FOR THE SUPERVISION OF THE 
EXECUTION OF JUDGMENTS AND OF THE TERMS OF FRIENDLY SETTLEMENTS R. 6(2)(b)(ii) 
n.2 (2006) [hereinafter RULES OF THE COMM’N OF MINISTERS] (detailing the factors 
reviewed by the Committee when evaluating a state’s compliance with a judgment). 
 193.   BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 160, 181, 194(1). The amendment must be 
approved by simple majorities of both voters and cantons. Id. art. 140(1)(a). 
 194.  See supra note 187 and accompanying text (noting the ability of parties to 
petition for such review). 
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cause a severe backlash against a judiciary that allegedly lacks 
democratic legitimacy.195  Politically, it would give additional impetus 
to the proponents of the ban, who are bound to cry foul at judges 
overruling the sovereign.  From this perspective, judges striking 
down a ballot initiative at the instigation of foreign judges would add 
injury to insult—the presumptuous act of an undemocratic, oligarchic 
cabal and a denial of the fundamental values of the Swiss 
Confederation.  The Swiss People’s Party has already stated that if 
the minaret ban is revoked based on an ECtHR judgment, it would 
demand that Switzerland either withdraw from the ECHR or add a 
minaret-specific reservation.196 
 For these reasons (which will be discussed in more detail in Part 
0 below), it is unlikely that Article 72(3) BV will be changed or denied 
application.  What are the likely repercussions for Switzerland?  
Supervision of implementation falls to the Committee of Ministers,197 
the governing body of the CoE.198  A violation may call for individual 
measures aimed at remedying the situation of the applicant,199 but 
the Committee of Ministers also examines whether general measures, 
such as “legislative or regulatory amendments,” have been adopted to 
prevent “new violations similar to that or those found or putting an 
end to continuing violations.”200  The Committee gives priority to 
supervision of the execution of judgments in which the ECtHR has 
identified a “systemic problem.”201   
                                                                                                                      
 195.  See supra note 131 and accompanying text (discussing the modes of 
selection and retention of judges, and the fallout from politically unpopular decisions). 
Unlike their colleagues on most other European supreme courts (e.g., Italy, Spain, 
Ireland, and the United Kingdom), all federal judges are elected by Parliament and 
therefore, can claim at least indirect democratic legitimacy. BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, 
arts. 145, 168(1). On the district level, judges are still elected by voters in most cantons 
and comprise both jurists and laypersons, while appellate judges are elected by 
cantonal legislatures. 
 196.  Markus Brotschi, Nach dem Ja zur Minarett-Initiative SVP will notfalls 
Menschenrechts-Konvention kündigen, TAGESANZEIGER, Dec. 1, 2009, at 3. The 
termination of the Convention would entail exclusion from the Council. See infra note 
214 and accompanying text (noting that Council membership requires ratification of 
the Convention). Reservations to the ECHR may only be made upon signature or when 
depositing the instrument of ratification. ECHR, supra note 65, art. 57(1). Similar 
demands were already raised in 1988, after the ECtHR ruled invalid a Swiss 
reservation to Article 6 ECHR. Belilos v. Switzerland, 132 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1988). 
 197.  ECHR, supra note 65, art. 46(2). After the Fourteenth Additional Protocol, 
entered into force on June 1, 2010, the Committee may now refer to the Court the 
question of whether a state party has failed to fulfill its obligation under Art. 46(1). If 
the Court finds a violation of Art. 46(1), it refers the case back to the Committee for 
further measures. Id. art. 46(4)–(5). 
 198.  Statute of the Council of Europe art. 13, May 5, 1949, 87 U.N.T.S. 103 
[hereinafter CoE Statute].  
 199.  RULES OF THE COMM. OF MINISTERS, supra note 192, R. 6(2)(b)(i) n.1. 
 200.  Id. R. 6(2)(b)(ii) n.2. 
 201.  Id. R. 4(1). 
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 Cases stay on the Committee’s agenda until an effective remedy 
has been implemented,202 and the Committee receives 
communications from the injured party that relate the success of the 
remedy.203  In cases of noncompliance, the Committee may adopt 
interim resolutions, “notably in order to provide information on the 
state of progress of the execution or, where appropriate, to express 
concern and/or to make suggestions with respect to the execution.”204  
In 2006, after continual noncompliance with a judgment of the 
ECtHR, the Committee requested that member states implement 
(unspecified) “measures” against Russia.205  A separate committee 
established by the CoE Parliamentary Assembly provides additional 
monitoring.206 
 In many cases, states are willing to cooperate with the 
Committee of Ministers and remedy the grievances addressed by the 
Court.207  For political reasons, other countries have ignored 
judgments of the ECtHR.208  Most recently, the Italian government 
vowed not to implement a ruling that required the removal of 
crucifixes from public schools.209  The ECHR itself does not contain 
any provisions on how to penalize noncompliance, and neither the 
Convention nor the earlier CoE Statute clarifies the relationship 
                                                                                                                      
 202.  Id. R. 7. 
 203.  Id. R. 9(1). 
 204.  Id. R. 16. See, e.g., Interim Resolution of the Comm. of Ministers, Res. 
DH(2001)80 (2001) (concerning the judgment of the ECtHR of 28 July 1998 in the case 
of Loizidou against Turkey). 
 205.  See Interim Resolution of the Comm. of Ministers, Res. DH(2006)26 (2006) 
(addressing the continuing incarceration of the applicants in Ilaşcu v. Russia, 2004–VII 
Eur. Ct. H.R. 318, in spite of several interim resolutions by the Committee). 
 206.  The Assembly’s Monitoring Committee is responsible for verifying the 
fulfillment of the obligations assumed by the member states under the Convention. 
EUR. PARL. ASS. RES. 1115, ¶ 5 (1997). In the case of noncompliance, the Assembly may 
penalize persistent failure to honor obligations and commitments by, inter alia, 
adopting resolutions, non-ratification of the credentials of a national parliamentary 
delegation, or the annulment of ratified credentials. Id. ¶ 12. For a list of monitoring 
proceedings, see The Monitoring Procedure of the Parliamentary Assembly, EUR. PARL. 
ASS. DOC. AS/Mon/Inf(2008)01rev2 (2008), http://assembly.coe.int/committee/MON/Role 
_E.pdf. 
 207.  See, e.g., FROWEIN & PEUKERT, supra note 142, art. 46, ¶ 22 n.29 (noting 
the changes in Turkish legislation following repeated findings of violation of the right 
to life). 
 208.  This is particularly true in the context of politically charged state 
complaints. Id. art. 33, ¶ 13 n.141.  
 209.  In Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (Nov. 3, 2009), the 
ECtHR ruled that display of the crucifix in public schools violated Article 2 of Protocol 
No. 1 to the ECHR in coordination with Article 9 of the Convention. Before the Court, 
Italy argued not only that the crucifix was both the symbol of Italian history and 
culture, and consequently of Italian identity, but that it also symbolized the principles 
of equality, liberty, tolerance, and even the Italian State’s secularism. Id. ¶¶ 13, 35. In 
response, Prime Minister Berlusconi promised not to implement a judgment that made 
him “doubt Europe.” Flavia Amabile, Crocifisso: Polemiche e proteste, LA STAMPA, Nov. 
5, 2009, at 8. 
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between membership of the Council and being a party to the 
Convention.  Under the Statute, each member state of the CoE “must 
accept the principles of the rule of law and of the enjoyment by all 
persons within its jurisdiction of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.”210  Serious violations of this obligation may result in 
suspension of membership and, ultimately, the Committee of 
Ministers may ask the offending state to withdraw from the 
Council.211  Alternatively, Member States can withdraw 
voluntarily,212 which Greece did under the Regime of the Colonels in 
1969 to preempt a request to withdraw by the Committee (the 
country was readmitted after civilian rule had been reestablished in 
1974).213  However, it is the established practice of the CoE 
Parliamentary Assembly and the Committee of Ministers that 
Council membership requires ratification of the ECHR.214 
 For a country that puts human rights at the very center of its 
foreign policy215 and has admonished some of the more recent CoE 
members “to catch up and meet the Council’s strict norms and high 
standards,”216 the mere possibility of exclusion or forced withdrawal 
from the Council is highly embarrassing.  Switzerland would join 
Belarus and Kosovo as the only non-member states on the 
continent.217   
 Although the media bandied about the possibility of expulsion 
after the vote,218 this outcome can almost certainly be ruled out.  
Other countries have been found in repeated violation of the 
Convention and were not threatened with exclusion.219  Even 
                                                                                                                      
 210.  CoE Statute, supra note 198, art. 3. 
 211.  If a state does not heed such a request, its membership may be terminated 
by the Committee. Id. art. 8. 
 212.  Id. art. 7. 
 213.  Jörg Polakiewicz, Council of Europe, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, ¶ 9. 
 214.  Interim Resolution of the Comm. of Ministers, Res. DH(2001)80 (2001). 
 215.  EIDGENÖSSICHES DEPARTEMENT FUR AUSWÄRTIGE ANGELEGENHEITEN, 
FRIEDEN UND MENSCHENRECHTE IN DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN AUßENPOLITIK (2007). 
 216.  Bundesrat, Außenpolitischer Bericht [Foreign Policy Report], BBL 6291, 
6355 (2009). 
 217.  Belarus, with an application pending since 1993, does not meet the 
democratic requirements to join; even the Special Guest status of its parliament was 
suspended in 1997. See EUR. PARL. ASS. RES. 1671, ¶ 1 (2009). Kosovo’s statehood is not 
recognized by all Council members. See id. (noting that “[a]ll references to the territory, 
institutions or population of Kosovo in the present text are made in compliance with 
Resolution 1244 of the United Nations Security Council and without prejudice to the 
status of Kosovo”). 
 218.  Claudia Schoch, Kaum Chancen in Strassburg, NZZ, Dec. 17, 2009, at 15.  
 219.  Russia, for instance, has been reprimanded numerous times for its failure 
to ensure implementation of domestic court decisions. See Philipp Leach et al., Can the 
European Court’s Pilot Judgment Procedure Help Resolve Systemic Human Rights 
Violations? Burdov and the Failure to Implement Domestic Court Decisions in Russia, 
10 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 346 (2010). 
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allowing for the difference in political weight, it is highly unlikely 
that a different approach would apply to Switzerland.  In the one 
instance where expulsion proceedings were instituted, it was against 
a dictatorial regime that had suspended most civil rights and tortured 
dissidents.220 
 Additionally, the ECtHR itself does not seem overly eager to 
assess a constitutional change endorsed by a ballot.  It remains 
unclear whether or how the fact that the ban has been adopted by 
voters rather than by the executive or legislature will affect the 
Court’s approach.  The ECtHR has not yet considered a ballot 
initiative and will tread carefully, taking into account the democratic 
legitimacy attached to a ballot vote.  Jean-Paul Costa, the president 
of the Court, even voiced doubts about whether “the decision of an 
entire people” could be the subject of proceedings before the 
ECtHR.221  Merely establishing ECtHR jurisdiction would present “a 
complex juridical problem”;222 therefore, a challenge to the ban may 
not be heard by the ECtHR at all.223  However, unless democratic 
decisions are assumed per se correct,224 the modus of adoption should 
not be relevant as long as a municipal norm violates the ECHR.  Such 
a violation entails international responsibility regardless of 
Switzerland’s internal law.225 
 Predictions over the effect of a ECtHR judgment also are rash 
because a ruling is several years away.226  These procedural caveats, 
however, should not obfuscate the crux of the problem under 
consideration.  Ideally, states become members of the ECHR because 
they genuinely believe in the values it enshrines, not because they 
can count on eschewing enforcement.  And indeed, in its report on 
foreign affairs issued two months before the minaret vote, the Federal 
Council emphasized the overarching significance of CoE agreements 
for adjudication and legislation; singled out the European Court of 
                                                                                                                      
 220.  See supra note 213 (discussing the circumstances surrounding Greece’s 
voluntary withdrawal); see generally MIKA HARITOS-FATOUROS, THE PSYCHOLOGICAL 
ORIGINS OF INSTITUTIONALIZED TORTURE 21–30 (W. Peter Robinson ed., 2003) 
(providing historical background on Greece’s governing regime). 
 221.  Svetlana Jovanovska, Schweizer Minarett-Verbot nur schwer anfechtbar, 
DER WESTEN (Ger.), Dec. 1, 2009, available at http://www.derwesten.de/nachrichten/ 
politik/Schweizer-Minarett-Verbot-nur-schwer-anfechtbar-id2195825.html (quoting 
ECtHR Chief Judge Jean-Paul Costa). 
 222.  Jean-Pierre Stroobants, Les minarets helvétiques et la justice, LE MONDE, 
Dec. 3, 2009, at 9 (quoting ECtHR Chief Judge Jean-Paul Costa). 
 223.  See Les réactions, supra note 174 (noting difficulties in mounting a legal 
challenge to the ban). 
 224.  See infra Part IV (discussing rule of law in the context of democratic 
governance). 
 225.  See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, art. 27, May 23, 1969, 1155 
U.N.T.S. 332 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (prohibiting states from invoking 
internal law as a justification for noncompliance with a treaty). 
 226.  The overall length of proceedings has been estimated at five to seven years. 
See Brotschi, supra note 196. 
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Human Rights as the main pillar of the Council of Europe;227 and 
emphasized that Switzerland “sincerely endeavored to implement 
decisions of the Court that affect it, and continually incorporates the 
Court’s jurisprudence into the national legal order.”228  The resolve to 
live up to these principles may well be tested if the ECtHR passes 
judgment on the minaret ban. 
C.  The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
1. Wide Scope of Protection . . . 
 The ECtHR will be pivotal in assessing the legal consequences of 
the minaret ban, but the ECHR is not the only relevant international 
instrument in this context.  The Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights and the (nonbinding) Declaration on the Elimination of All 
Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or 
Belief also guarantee freedom of religion and prohibit discrimination 
on religious grounds.229  Both declarations are resolutions adopted by 
the UN General Assembly, and their legal status is therefore 
somewhat complex.230  The International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR), on the other hand, is a binding 
international treaty to which Switzerland acceded in 1992.231 
                                                                                                                      
 227.  BBL 6291, 6355–56 (2009).  
 228.  Id. at 6355. 
 229.  Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of 
Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief, arts. 1(1), 2, GA Res. 36/55, U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/36/55 (Nov. 5, 1981); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, arts. 2, 18, G.A. 
Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. The 
Convention Against Racism, to which Switzerland acceded in 1994, protects from 
discrimination based on race, color, descent, or national or ethnic origin, but not 
religion. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination art. 1(1), Dec. 21, 1965, 660 U.N.T.S. 212 [hereinafter CERD]. The issue 
of minaret construction was nevertheless addressed in Switzerland’s latest periodic 
report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination. Comm. on the 
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Addendum: Switzerland, ¶ 147, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/CHE/6 (Nov. 14, 2006). In its concluding observations, the Committee noted  
with regret the lack of substantial progress made by the State party in 
combating racist and xenophobic attitudes towards some minorities, including 
black persons, Muslims, Travelers, immigrants and asylum-seekers. It is 
particularly concerned at the hostility resulting from the negative perception of 
foreigners and certain minorities by part of the population, which has resulted 
in popular initiatives questioning the principle of non-discrimination. 
Comm. on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Consideration of Reports 
Submitted by States Parties Under Article 9 of the Convention, ¶ 7, U.N. Doc. 
CERD/C/CHE/CO/6 (Aug. 14, 2008).  
 230.  Daniel Thürer, Soft Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC 
INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, ¶ 11. 
 231.  ICCPR, supra note 66; BBL IV 1105 (1991). 
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 In its concluding observations on Switzerland’s third periodic 
report under the ICCPR, the Human Rights Committee (CCPR) 
expressed its concern over the minaret initiative, observing that if 
adopted, it would bring Switzerland into noncompliance with its 
obligations under Articles 2, 18, and 20 of the ICCPR.232  Under 
Article 2(1), state parties undertake to grant the rights of the ICCPR 
to every individual within their jurisdiction “without distinction” 
based on, inter alia, race, sex, or religion.  This provision is of an 
accessory nature (as is Article 14 ECHR) and therefore requires 
another right enshrined in the Covenant, such as the freedom of 
religion (Article 18 ICCPR), to be affected.233   
 Article 18(1) guarantees the forum internum of religious belief as 
well as its manifestation “in worship, observance, practice, and 
teaching.”  Except for the order of the different forms of 
manifestations, this formulation is identical to Article 9 ECHR, and 
the respective discussion applies mutatis mutandis to Article 18 
ICCPR.234  In a General Comment, the CCPR states explicitly that 
the concept of worship also extends to “ritual and ceremonial acts 
giving direct expression to belief, as well as various practices integral 
to such acts, including the building of places of worship.”235  As a 
consequence, although religious communities are not entitled to erect 
whatever structure they dream up, state parties can restrict places of 
worship only within the limitations listed in Article 18(3).  
Specifically, any restriction on places of worship must be prescribed 
by law and necessary to protect public safety, order, health, morals, 
or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.236  The 
observations made above with regard to permissible restrictions 
                                                                                                                      
 232.  Human Rights Comm., Consideration of Reports Submitted by States 
Parties Under Article 40 of the Covenant, Concluding Observations of the Human 
Rights Committee: Switzerland, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CHE/CO/3 (Nov. 3, 2009) 
[hereinafter Concluding Observations]. Initially, the CCPR had mistakenly assumed 
that the initiative aimed to ban mosques altogether. Human Rights Comm., List of 
Issues to be Taken up in Connection with the Consideration of the Third Periodic 
Report of Switzerland, ¶ 19, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/CHE/Q/3 (Apr. 3, 2009). 
 233.  MANFRED NOWAK, U.N. COVENANT ON CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CCPR 
COMMENTARY art. 2, ¶ 15 (2d ed. 2005). For an overview, see BAHIYYIH G. TAHZIB, 
FREEDOM OF RELIGION OR BELIEF 81–92 (1996). For a discussion on ECHR Article 14 
see supra notes 157–59 and accompanying text. 
 234.  Compare NOWAK, supra note 233, art. 18, ¶¶ 21–26 (discussing the ICCPR), 
with supra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing the ECHR). 
 235.  Human Rights Comm., General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights 
Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, General Comment No. 22(48), ¶ 4, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.4 
(July 30, 1993) [hereinafter General Comment No. 22] (emphasis added). 
 236.  These limits are both wider and narrower than their equivalents in ECHR 
Article 9(2). ECHR, supra note 65, art. 9(2). Necessity is not measured by democratic 
standards; on the other hand, only fundamental rights and freedoms of others justify 
interference. 
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under Article 9(2) ECHR apply under the ICCPR as well.237  Even if 
it is assumed that the minaret ban pursues a legitimate aim, it is not 
directly (or indirectly) related and proportionate to the specific need 
on which it is allegedly predicated.238  For the reasons already set 
out,239 the minaret ban is an unsuitable and ineffective way to 
contain violent religious extremism or to stop discriminatory 
practices.  The ICCPR itself, in Article 20(2), excludes from protection 
advocacy that incites hostility or violence.  Extremist preaching can 
therefore be countered without resorting to a minaret ban.  
Consequently, the ban violates Article 18 and also constitutes 
discrimination inadmissible under Article 2 ICCPR.240 
 Although not invoked by the CCPR,241 Article 27 ICCPR is also 
pertinent to the minaret ban.  Article 27 guarantees persons 
belonging to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities the right to 
enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, 
and to use their own language.  Some debate whether this provision 
only protects nationals of a signatory state.242  The CCPR applies a 
broader and—in accordance with Article 2(1) ICCPR—more 
persuasive construction granting protection to everyone within a 
state’s jurisdiction.243  However, the protective scope of Article 27 
includes Swiss Muslims even under a narrow definition of 
“minorities.”244  Although the wording differs—Article 27 protects 
                                                                                                                      
 237.  See supra note 146 and accompanying text (noting that permissible 
restrictions must be prescribed by law and necessary to the preservation of public 
security or order, health or morals, or the rights of others). 
 238.  Cf. Human Rights Comm., supra note 235, ¶ 8 (requiring such relationship 
between state actions and the rights which they burden). 
 239.  See supra note 156 and accompanying text (arguing that the connection 
between the ban and the state’s interest in security is either lacking entirely or too 
tenuous to be credited). 
 240.  As lex specialis, Article 26 of the Covenant contains a general prohibition of 
any discrimination that is, unlike Article 2, not restricted to the rights enshrined in the 
Covenant. NOWAK, supra note 233, art. 2, ¶ 15. Switzerland, however, has entered a 
reservation that Article 26 is applicable only in connection with other rights in the 
ICCPR. BBL IV 1105–06 (1991). 
 241.  See supra note 232 (focusing on Articles 2, 18, and 20 instead). 
 242.  See, e.g., Human Rights Comm., Sub-Comm’n on Prevention of 
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging 
to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, ¶¶ 202, 568, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/SUB.2/384/REV.1 (Jan. 1, 1979); see also NOWAK, supra note 233, art. 27, ¶ 17 
(noting potentially limited applications of the protection).  
 243.  Human Rights Comm., General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights 
Committee Under Article 40, Paragraph 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, General Comment No. 23(50), U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.5 (Apr. 
8, 1994) [hereinafter General Comment No. 23]. The CCPR contends that even non-
permanent residents and visitors to a State party may constitute minorities. Id. ¶ 5.2. 
 244.  The Federal Council argued that Muslims in Switzerland may not qualify 
as a minority for the purpose of Article 27 due to their ethnic heterogeneity, the 
diversity of Islamic denominations, and their diverse ways of life. BBL 7603, 7643 
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professing and practicing a religion, whereas Article 18 ICCPR 
addresses manifestation in worship, observance, practice, and 
teaching—the protective scope of the two provisions must be 
congruent.245  Whether the rights granted by Article 27 can be limited 
in analogy with Article 18(3) is, again, controversial,246 but as 
discussed above, the conditions for restriction under Article 18(3) are 
not met by the minaret ban, which, therefore, also violates Article 27 
ICCPR. 
2. . . . But Weak Implementation Mechanisms 
 The ban on minarets thus constitutes an unjustified and 
discriminatory restriction of the guarantee of religious freedom of 
Article 18 and affects a minority protected under Article 27 ICCPR.  
As with the ECHR, claimants may invoke the ICCPR before Swiss 
courts, because the self-executing Covenant is part of Swiss law.247  
Yet, for the reasons set out above, the municipal courts are unlikely 
to overrule the constitutional ban on minarets even if they find that 
the ICCPR has been violated.248  Contrary to the ECHR, parties to 
legal proceedings in Switzerland may not subsequently appeal to an 
international body if the Covenant is breached; Switzerland is not a 
party to the first Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, so no individual 
communication can be submitted to the CCPR.   
 A communication under Article 41(1) ICCPR by another state 
party is theoretically possible because Switzerland has accepted the 
Committee’s respective competence.249  Yet, despite encouragement 
by the CCPR,250 and even though over forty parties have now issued 
                                                                                                                      
(2008). Yet the criteria of ethnicity, religion, or language do not have to be met 
cumulatively. See General Comment No. 23, supra note 243, ¶ 5.1. 
 245.  The question of what constitutes practice and profession under Article 27 
ICCPR has not been addressed by scholars or the CCPR. Yet, as Article 27 does not 
create new rights, but rather protects the enjoyment of rights by specific and vulnerable 
groups, see ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 27, it would counter the purpose of the provision 
to construe it more narrowly than Article 18. 
 246.  Relying on the text of Article 27, Manfred Nowak, supra note 233, art. 27, 
¶ 53, rejects such an analogy, arguing that the limitations of Article 18(3) may only 
apply to majority religions. This seems counterintuitive and irreconcilable with the 
general prohibition of discrimination in Article 2(1) ICCPR. 
 247.  See supra note 69 (discussing the self-executing nature of the ECHR and 
the ICCPR). 
 248.  See supra Part III.A.2 (discussing the ban on minarets and the scope of 
religious freedom governed by Article 9 ECHR). 
 249.  The declaration was originally made for five years in 1991 and has been 
extended in regular intervals since. The current declaration will be in force until April 
15, 2015. AMTLICHE SAMMLUNG DES BUNDESRECHTS [AS] [CHRONOLOGICAL 
COLLECTION OF FEDERAL LAW] 2987 (2010).  
 250.  Human Rights Comm., General Comment No. 31[80], The Nature of the 
General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the Covenant, U.N. Doc. 
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.13 (May 26, 2004) [hereinafter General Comment No. 31]. 
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declarations under Article 41(1), the CCPR has never received a state 
communication.251  Regardless, a state communication to the CCPR 
would not effectively shame Switzerland.  The procedural rules under 
Articles 41 and 42 are cumbersome, and considerations are 
confidential and do not result in a finding of violation.252 
 It has been suggested that Switzerland may also face 
proceedings before the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for 
breaching its obligations under the ICCPR.253  Switzerland accepted 
the ICJ’s jurisdiction under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute without 
reservation,254 and the wide scope of the subject matters listed under 
that provision covers a violation of Articles 18, 2, and 27 ICCPR.255  A 
claim before the ICJ would not require a previous state 
communication under Article 41 ICCPR, because no subsidiarity 
requirement applies before the World Court.256  However, compulsory 
ICJ jurisdiction under Article 36(2) requires reciprocity,257 and few 
Muslim states have made declarations that would allow them to bring 
a claim against Switzerland.258  Furthermore, any claimant before 
the ICJ would itself have to be a party to the ICCPR, and must not 
have entered reservations to Articles 2, 18, or 27.259  
 It was pointed out before and after the vote that contrary to the 
ECHR, the ICCPR cannot be denounced.260  However, discussion of 
                                                                                                                      
 251.  NOWAK, supra note 233, art. 41, ¶ 2. 
 252.  See ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 41(1)(d), (h)(ii) (explaining the requirements 
imposed upon the Committee to hold closed meetings, and discussing the reporting 
requirements of the Committee when a solution is not reached). 
 253.  Marcel Stüssi, Banning of Minarets: Addressing the Validity of a 
Controversial Swiss Popular Initiative, 3 RELIGION & HUM. RTS. 135, 147 (2008). 
 254.  BBL I 1254, 1254 (1948). 
 255.  Cf. General Comment No. 31, supra note 250, ¶ 2 (alluding to the variety of 
enforcement mechanisms available to states); Christian Tomuschat, Art. 36, in THE 
STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE 589, 631, ¶ 74 (Andreas 
Zimmermann et al. eds., 2006) (noting the extremely wide scope of matters falling 
under ICJ jurisdiction pursuant to Article 36(2)). 
 256.  Cf. Isabel Feichtner, Subsidiarity, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, ¶ 28 (noting the general lack of obstacles 
to World Court jurisdiction). 
 257.  The condition of reciprocity is generally held to be implicit in declarations 
under Article 36(2) of the ICJ Statute. See, e.g., Tomuschat, supra note 255, ¶ 27, at 
607, ¶ 73, at 630–31. For detailed discussion, see CHITTHARANJAN F. AMERASINGHE, 
JURISDICTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS 578–84 (2003). Here, the point is moot as 
Switzerland’s declaration explicitly requires reciprocity. BBL I 1254 (1948). 
 258.  See Declarations Recognizing the Jurisdiction of the Court as Compulsory, 
INT’L CT. OF JUST., http://www.icj-cij.org/jurisdiction/index.php?p1=5&p2=1&p3=3 (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2010) (listing the states that have made declarations). 
 259.  Cf. Tomuschat, supra note 255, ¶ 28, at 607–08.  
 260.  BBL 7603, 7646 (2008); Jörg Paul Müller, Gegenvorschlag zur Minarett-
Initiative ‘nachholen,’ NZZ, Dec. 4, 2009, at 23. The Netherlands at one point 
threatened to denounce the Covenant, and North Korea notified its withdrawal in 
1997. NOWAK, supra note 233, at xxxvi. The CCPR promptly stated that obligations 
would continue regardless of any supposed termination. See Human Rights Comm., 
General Comment Adopted by the Human Rights Committee Under Article 40, 
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legal proceedings under the ICCPR is even more premature than 
similar discussion under the ECHR.  States will be unwilling to 
expose their own human rights record to criticism by attacking a 
state party that (while far from perfect) pays “sustained attention” to 
the protection of human rights.261  In addition, proceedings before the 
ICJ would be expensive and time-consuming.262  Moreover, a 
judgment would offer little practical or reputational gain for an 
applicant, because effective enforcement of an ICJ judgment is even 
less certain than effective enforcement of an ECtHR judgment.263 
 Still, Switzerland is unlikely to eschew international criticism 
altogether.  The reactions to the vote by the relevant government 
actors in Muslim countries might suggest that, while clearly irked 
and offended by the vote, they are not determined to escalate the 
issue.264  Nevertheless, Muslim governments are using international 
fora such as the UN Human Rights Council to voice criticism.265  
When the OIC revived its push for instruments against defamation of 
religion and Islamophobia at the Council’s last session, it denounced 
the minaret ban as a manifestation of Islamophobia that stood “in 
sharp contradiction to international human rights obligations 
concerning freedoms of religion, belief, conscience and expression” 
and warned that the ban would “fuel discrimination, extremism and 
misperception leading to polarization and fragmentation with 
dangerous unintended and unforeseen consequences.”266 
                                                                                                                      
Paragraph 4 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, General 
Comment No. 26, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.8/Rev.1 (Dec. 8, 1997). The Swiss 
People’s Party, nevertheless, demands withdrawal should any court rescind the ban 
based on the ICCPR. See Henckel, supra note 50. Earlier, the party proposed a 
constitutional amendment prohibiting courts from applying non-terminable 
international treaties. Press Release, Schweizerische Volkspartei [SVP] [Swiss People's 
Party], Wider die schleichende Aushöhlung unserer demokratischen Rechte! (Feb. 10, 
2009) (on file with the author). 
 261.  Concluding Observations, supra note 232, ¶ 3. 
 262.  See Shabtai Rosenne, International Court of Justice, in MAX PLANCK 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, ¶ 108 (discussing the 
onerous litigation process before the ICJ).  
 263.  Cf. Christian Tomuschat, International Courts and Tribunals, in MAX 
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 37, ¶ 66 (discussing 
the lack of effective enforcement mechanisms). 
 264.  See supra note 60 and accompanying text (noting that “Muslim states and 
their regional organizations do not seek a repetition of the ‘days of rage’ that followed 
the publication and re-publications of the Danish Muhammad cartoons”). 
 265.  Human Rights Council Res. 13/16, Combating Defamation of Religions, 
13th Sess., Apr. 15, 2010, ¶ 8, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/13/16 (Apr. 15, 2010). 
 266.  See id., which was introduced by Pakistan on behalf of the OIC and 
adopted by twenty to seventeen votes, with eight abstentions—the closest vote yet on a 
resolution on defamation of religions in either the Council or the Commission on 
Human Rights. See generally Lorenz Langer, The Rise (and Fall?) of Defamation of 
Religions, 35 YALE J. INT’L L. 257, 258–62 (2010) (providing background on prior efforts 
at enacting instruments against defamation of religions). 
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IV.  COMPETING VALUES: DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION AND  
THE RULE OF LAW 
Because of the geographical situation, to which attention has been 
directed, Switzerland being a borderland of most other nationalities of 
Europe, she had many troubles growing out of racial difficulties.  The 
contentious parties were quick to see in Rosseau's [sic] doctrine of direct 
legislation, or of popular sovereignty, a chance for personal gain and 
advantage, the greatest vice that may creep into legislation.  Each 
faction, religious or political (religious being the worse), saw an 
opportunity by means of the initiative and referendum whereby they 
could enact a law in spite of the legislature.  The initiative, therefore, 
was born in sin; it was the product of selfishness, simply a scheme 
employed for party advantage. 
— Edgar B. Kinkhead, opposing the introduction  
of Swiss-style democracy to Ohio267  
 Eventually, the prohibition of minarets may have little 
international legal consequence for Switzerland.268  But the larger 
significance of the minaret ballot transcends the fact that no new 
minarets may be built between the lakes of Geneva and Constance.  
The minaret ballot also raises fundamental questions about the 
relationship between national law and international law.   
 Conflict between national and international law will persist as a 
prime concern for both the international and the constitutional 
lawyer despite the optimistic concept of a “constitutionalization” of 
the international legal order.269  The international law perspective is 
clear, if slightly blasé: according to Article 27 of the Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, domestic law is irrelevant to 
international obligations.270  From the municipal viewpoint, however, 
the introduction of direct-democratic instruments further complicates 
the already tense relationship between the two normative systems, 
                                                                                                                      
 267. Edgar B. Kinkead, Initiative and Referendum, 52 OHIO L. BULL. 423, 426 
(1907). 
 268.  In May 2010, Switzerland was again elected, with 175 votes, to the UN 
Human Rights Council after serving as an inaugural member from 2006 to 2009. Press 
Release, General Assembly, General Assembly Fills 14 Seats on Human Rights 
Council; Approves Funds for Higher UN Troop, Police Levels in Haiti; Sets Date for 
Communicable Diseases Meeting, U.N. Press Release GA/10939 (May 13, 2010). In 
June, a former Federal Councilor was elected president of the U.N. General Assembly. 
Press Release, General Assembly, By Acclamation, General Assembly Elects Joseph 
Deiss of Switzerland as President of Sixty-Fifth Session, U.N. Press Release GA/10947 
(June 11, 2010). In both cases, it had been speculated that the minaret ban might lead 
Muslim states to support other candidates; fears were also expressed that Swiss 
influence in organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF might be compromised. 
Gieri Cavelty & Philipp Mäder, Eine außenpolitische Herausforderung, AARGAUER 
ZEITUNG (Switz.), Oct. 17, 2009, at 3.   
 269.  JÜRGEN HABERMAS, Hat die Konstitutionalisierung des Völkerrechts noch 
eine Chance?, in DER GESPALTENE WESTEN 113, 137–42 (2004). 
 270.  See Vienna Convention, supra note 225, art. 27. 
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because, by deferring to “the people,” direct-democratic instruments 
give preeminence to a decision maker that is largely excluded from 
constructively participating in the international decision making 
process.271  The voters-at-large regularly reject the international 
policies suggested by their representatives, but the electorate cannot 
negotiate treaties by itself or implement effective alternatives.272  In 
Switzerland, this problem is particularly acute due to the far-
reaching participatory rights of voters.  The influence of the Genevois 
Rousseau is palpable;273 his ideals have been realized to an 
unequalled extent, granting citizens, through ballot initiatives or 
referenda, an extraordinary level of actual democratic 
participation.274  
A. A Comparative Perspective 
The government of the United States has been emphatically termed a 
government of laws, and not of men.  It will certainly cease to deserve 
this high appellation, if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a 
vested legal right. 
— Chief Justice John Marshall in  
Marbury v. Madison275 
We wouldn’t need a Constitution if we left everything to the political 
process, but if we left everything to the political process, the majority 
would always prevail, which is a great thing about democracy, but it’s 
                                                                                                                      
 271.  See BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, arts. 140, 141; see also infra notes 274, 380. 
At best, voters can expect to vote on the ratification of some treaties after they have 
been signed (as under BV Article 141), or they may torpedo international agreements 
ex post by adopting contravening national legislation, such as the ban on minarets. 
 272.  This may simply mean that voters have to vote again and again until the 
original submission is, with some delay, passed. The Irish vote on the Treaty of Lisbon 
provides a recent example. Cf., e.g., The Future’s Lisbon, ECONOMIST, Oct. 10, 2009, at 
35. On the European level, most governments now avoid consulting the voters 
altogether on issues relating to the European Union. 
 273.  E.g., FRITZ FLEINER, ENTSTEHUNG UND WANDLUNG MODERNER 
STAATSTHEORIEN IN DER SCHWEIZ 4–12 (1916). Rousseau’s views on the advantage of a 
small commonwealth for political participation seems tailor-made to Switzerland. See 
JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT OR THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL 
RIGHTS, 68–71, 102–03 (Rose M. Harrington trans., G.P. Puntam’s Sons 1893). He 
described the “troops of peasants” who settled state affairs under the oak tree as the 
“happiest people of the world”—immune to treacheries and dishonesty, as they were 
not even refined enough to be duped. Id. at 158–59. 
 274.  Cf. ROUSSEAU, supra note 273, at 23–24 (arguing that public deliberation 
“binds all subjects to the sovereign”). For more information on the ballot initiative, 
which was instituted with the 1874 Constitution, see supra note 473 and accompanying 
text. All federal acts, non-terminable international treaties of unlimited duration, as 
well as accession to international organizations are, within 100 days, subject to an 
optional referendum than can be requested either by 50,000 voters or eight cantons. BV 
Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 141. Mandatory referenda are held, inter alia, on 
amendments to the Constitution and accession to organizations for collective security 
or to supranational communities. Id. art. 140. 
 275.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 163 (1803). 
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not so good if you are a minority or if you’re a disfavored minority or 
you’re new or you’re different. 
— Theodore B. Olson, Counsel for Plaintiffs in  
Perry v. Schwarzenegger276 
 In scope and significance, the closest equivalent to Swiss direct-
democratic instruments are state-level ballot initiatives in the United 
States, which in many instances are actually modeled upon Swiss 
institutions.277  However, the United States does not allow ballot 
initiatives on the federal level because the Founding Fathers feared 
that even an extended republic might be torn asunder if competing 
factions were allowed to legislate and further their own advantage.278  
Due to this distrust of “the mischiefs of faction,”279 Americans do not 
have to constantly consider whether provisions may be written into 
the federal Constitution that blatantly contradict the Bill of Rights or 
(presumably less worrisomely) international treaty obligations.  On 
the state level, however, ballot initiatives have become an important 
instrument as well as a major industry, most notably (and 
notoriously) in California.280  Yet, unlike the Swiss system, state 
ballots are subject to judicial review both before and after the vote by 
state and federal courts.281  A ballot initiative that introduces state 
legislation must comply both with the state constitution and with 
federal laws.282  Alternatively, a ballot initiative may aim to amend 
                                                                                                                      
 276.  Transcript of Record at 45, Perry. v. Schwarzenegger, 702 F. Supp. 2d 1132 
(N.D. Cal. 2010).  
 277.  See generally JAMES W. SULLIVAN, DIRECT LEGISLATION BY THE 
CITIZENSHIP THROUGH THE INITIATIVE AND REFERENDUM (1893) (discussing direct 
participation measures). Sullivan, a labor theorist, had travelled to Switzerland in 
1888 to study direct-democratic instruments. The institution of initiatives and 
referenda was challenged as unconstitutional in 1911, allegedly violating Article 4, 
Section 4 of the U.S. Constitution, which prescribes a republican form of government 
for states. The Supreme Court ruled the question political. Pacific States Tel. & Tel. 
Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 150 (1912). For a discussion of Swiss influences on ballot 
initiatives in the United States, see DAVID D. SCHMIDT, CITIZEN LAWMAKERS 5–6 
(1989).  
 278.  THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 52–55 (James Madison).  
 279.  Id. at 55. 
 280.  Sign Here, ECONOMIST, Feb. 6, 2010, at 36–37. For a critical assessment, 
see also Philip P. Frickey, The Communion of Strangers: Representative Government, 
Direct Democracy, and the Privatization of the Public Sphere, 34 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 
421, 433–34 (1998). 
 281.  Craig B. Holman & Robert Stern, Judicial Review of Ballot Initiatives, 31 
LOY. L.A. L. Rev. 1239, 1241–45 (1998). For a discussion of the interplay between state 
and federal courts, see Julian N. Eule, Judicial Review of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L. 
J. 1503, 1545–47 (1990). 
 282.  U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 (Supremacy Clause). For the purpose of judicial 
review, it is irrelevant whether state legislation has been enacted by the state 
legislature or adopted by voters. Citizens Against Rent Control v. City of Berkeley, 454 
U.S. 290, 295 (1981). 
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the state constitution, in which case it might still be preempted by 
federal constitutional norms.283  
 The different levels of initiatives and their review are well 
illustrated by two successive ballot initiatives in California aimed at 
limiting marriage to a union between man and woman.  Proposition 
22, which was adopted in 2000 by 61 percent of voters, amended the 
Californian Family Code to recognize heterosexual marriages only.284  
In 2008, however, the Supreme Court of California held that the 
provision violated the right to marriage (as an aspect of the right to 
privacy) and equal protection under the state constitution.285  
Opponents to same-sex marriage launched a second ballot initiative 
to overturn this decision by amending the declaration of rights of the 
Californian constitution to restrict the right to marriage to include 
only opposite-sex couples.286  
 This initiative was adopted as Proposition 8 in 2008 by 52 
percent of voters, and the Supreme Court of California refused to 
declare Proposition 8 invalid under the state constitution.287  
Supporters of same-sex marriage then turned to the U.S. District 
Court of Northern California to challenge the constitutionality of 
Proposition 8 and argued that Proposition 8 was invalid under the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.288  On August 4, 2010, the district court ruled in favor 
of the plaintiffs, holding that Proposition 8 violated both the Due 
Process and the Equal Protection Clauses of the U.S. Constitution.289  
Opponents of gay marriage have already appealed the ruling to the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.290  After the appeal, the 
                                                                                                                      
 283.  Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L. J. 1425, 1458 
(1987). Clashes between state constitutional amendments and federal legislation, on 
the other hand, would presumably raise issues under the Tenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution rather than the Supremacy Clause.  
 284.  See generally In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d 384 (Cal. 2008) (discussing the 
constitutional merits of the Proposition 8 ban).  
 285.  Compare In re Marriage Cases, 183 P.3d at 384, 419, 433–34, with CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 7.5. 
 286.  Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 66 (Cal. 2009). 
 287.  Id. at 68, 123–24. Petitioners argued that Proposition 8 was not a 
constitutional amendment, but a more far-reaching revision (which requires two-thirds 
approval by both houses of the state legislature), and that it violated the separation of 
power doctrine of the state constitution. The attorney general also advocated 
invalidating the proposition, but on the ground that the inalienable rights guaranteed 
by the state constitution were not subject to abrogation by constitutional amendment 
without a compelling state interest. Id. at 63. The court, however, held that Proposition 
8 merely created a limited exception to the equal protection clause under the state 
constitution. Id. at 61. 
 288.  Perry v. Schwarzenegger, No. 3:09-c-02292, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 78817, 
at *11 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 4, 2010). 
 289.  Id. at *217.  
 290.  Maura Dolan, Schwarzenegger, Brown Urge Resumption of Gay Marriages, 
L.A. TIMES, Aug. 7, 2010, at 1. The court of appeals has already extended the stay on 
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Supreme Court could grant certiorari to a possible appeal against the 
circuit court’s decision and settle the question conclusively (or at least 
until it decides to take up a similar case once more). 
 Therefore, it would seem that in the United States, the conflict 
between the rule of law and democratic instruments is ultimately 
defused by the overruling authority of the Constitution, which is 
fictionalized as a social contract embodying the popular will.  The 
voters in the single states have to defer to the will of this overarching 
majority, and ballot initiatives that fall foul of the Constitution will 
be struck down.  Thus, judges, even when saying “what the law is,”’ 
ideally uphold the “original and supreme will” of the people as 
embodied in the Constitution.291  Judges are mere guardians of this 
covenant, although factually their power of interpreting highly 
abstract formulations amounts to much more than simple 
guardianship.  The constitutional rules guiding these guardians, 
however, may be changed, and an amendment to the Constitution—
any amendment—would bind any court of the land.  Yet, the support 
needed to amend the U.S. Constitution is very high, and amendments 
are initiated by the representatives of the people, not the people 
themselves.292  Thus, although the fundamental law of the land is 
seen as congruent with, and a reflection of, the will and the values of 
the governed, direct-democratic governance is strictly limited.  
 This narrative presupposes that everyone agrees on the limits 
set by the Constitution, or at least that the interpretations proffered 
by judges are accepted as authoritative.  Yet, the controversies 
engendered by many Supreme Court decisions on the scope of 
constitutional provisions (as well as the disagreements between the 
Justices themselves) indicate that neither precondition may be 
met.293   
 Nor is there agreement on when courts should step in and review 
a law adopted by the people directly (or through their 
representatives).  Proposition 8 was passed by a majority of 
Californian voters.  More importantly, it was launched specifically to 
overrule the 2008 judgment of the Supreme Court of California.294  
                                                                                                                      
gay marriage until the appeal is decided. Jesse McKinley, Court Extends Stay on 
Allowing Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16, 2010, at A12. 
 291.  Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176–77 (1803).  
 292.  Constitutional amendments are initiated either by Congress or state 
legislatures, convening a constitutional convention. U.S. CONST. art. V. Conversely, 
Akhil Amar argues that the Constitution contains an unenumerated right that would 
permit a majority of citizens to petition Congress to amend the Constitution and to 
subsequently ratify the adopted amendments. Akhil Reed Amar, The Consent of the 
Governed: Constitutional Amendment Outside Article V, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 457, 459 
(1994). 
 293.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 129 S. Ct. 2893 (2009) 
(disagreeing over the tenets that deem inclusion within First Amendment protection). 
 294.  Strauss v. Horton, 207 P.3d 48, 66 (Cal. 2009).  
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Should it be possible, then, to overturn such an immediate and 
unambiguous expression of the popular will simply by appealing to a 
federal court?  Should it be left to judges to decide an issue that 
voters just reclaimed for themselves?  In the U.S. District Court of 
Northern California, counsel for plaintiffs argued that the purpose of 
courts is to protect “individuals who may not be the most popular 
people” from unconstitutional discrimination.295  The defendants 
countered that judges should not tamper with the people’s decision 
and the political process.296  In a nutshell, the dilemma is what—if 
any—issues should ultimately be determined by judges?  And why 
should the will of the many be subject to the whims of a selected few?  
Should the people correct the judges’ mistakes, or vice-versa?297  
 The United States, therefore, faces questions similar to 
Switzerland, although primarily within a domestic framework.  The 
legality of ballot initiatives and legislation more generally is 
predominantly discussed from a constitutional viewpoint.298  The 
Constitution is assumed to provide the best possible protection for 
fundamental rights, and there is no need for an additional line of 
defense on the international level.  To the contrary, international 
instruments are seen as a potential threat to the rights guaranteed 
by the Constitution and its Bill of Rights.299  This skepticism towards 
international human rights law is evident on several levels.  The 
United States still has not ratified some major human rights 
                                                                                                                      
 295.  Transcript of Record, supra note 276, at 45. 
 296.  Id. at 55, 72. 
 297.  Id. at 56, 71; see infra note 314 and accompanying texts (quoting counsel’s 
statement alluding to institutional tensions inherent in direct-democratic efforts). For 
criticism of unrestrained democratic decisions, see, for example, Eule, supra note 281, 
at 1522, stating, “If the Constitution's Framers were keen on majority rule, they 
certainly had a bizarre manner of demonstrating their affection.” See also, Amar, supra 
note 283 (arguing for a tight and coherent set of federalist checks and balances 
springing from existing legal institutions); see generally, Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Challenging Direct Democracy, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 293 (2007) (debating the merits 
of any direct participation). For critical views of judicial review of democratic decisions, 
see generally MARK V. TUSHNET, TAKING THE CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS 
(1999), arguing for a “populist” constitutional law; and Jeremy Waldron, The Core of 
the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L. J. 1346 (2006), arguing against the 
democratic legitimacy of democratic institutions.  
 298.  See infra note 304 and accompanying text (noting the role and interplay of 
norms).  
 299.  69 Louis Henkin, International Human Rights and Rights in the United 
States, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: LEGAL AND POLICY ISSUES 51–53 
(Theodor Meron ed., 1985).  
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treaties,300 and when it does ratify a treaty, it reserves either specific 
constitutional provisions301 or the Constitution as a whole.302   
 In the case law of the Supreme Court, international human 
rights instruments are, at best, mentioned in passing.  Since the 
United States became a party to the ICCPR in 1992, the Supreme 
Court has referred to the Covenant (which it deems non-self-
executing) in only five cases.303  In these few instances, international 
provisions are not cited as controlling norms, but rather as mere 
persuasive support for the Court’s interpretation of domestic 
norms.304  Such sparse reference hardly suggests a “creeping trend” 
toward incorporation of human rights treaties.305  Although much ado 
is made about allegedly improper reliance on foreign and 
international law,306 even the Justices who refer to foreign and 
international law use it only to cast an additional “empirical light on 
the consequences of different solutions to a common legal problem”307 
and do not suggest deciding a case based on international rather than 
constitutional norms.308  It even appears to be irrelevant whether 
                                                                                                                      
 300.  E.g., Convention on the Rights of the Child, Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 
44 [hereinafter CRC]; CEDAW, supra note 112; ICESCR, supra note 65. On the 
CEDAW, see Harold Hongju Koh, Why America Should Ratify the Women’s Rights 
Treaty (CEDAW), 34 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 263 (2003) (arguing that the United 
States will benefit geopolitically from ratification).  
 301.  138 CONG. REC. S4781–01, at S4783 (daily ed. April 2, 1992) (ratifying the 
ICCPR and reserving the First, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments as already 
prohibiting cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment).  
 302.  Sweeping reservations of constitutional provisions were made by the 
United States when ratifying the CERD and the Convention Against Torture and 
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 1465 
U.N.T.S. 113. The reservations and declarations are available at U.N. TREATY 
COLLECTION, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/Treaties.aspx?id=4&subid=A&lang=en (last 
visited Sept. 26, 2010) (follow each respective Convention’s hyperlink, and then click 
“United States”). 
 303.  Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 522 n.12 (2008); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 
U.S. 557, 633 n.66 (2006); Roper v. Simmons 543 U.S. 551, 567 (2005); Sosa v. Alvarez-
Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 728, 734 (2003); United States v. Balsys, 524 U.S. 666, 695 n.16 
(1997). A similarly cursory search of the database for published judgments of the Swiss 
Federal Supreme Court for the same period of time reveals 42 references to the ICCPR, 
565 to the ECHR, and 10 to the (non-self-executing) ICESCR. SWISS FEDERAL COURT, 
http://www.bger.ch (last visited September 26, 2010). Only a fraction of judgments are 
published. Please note, however, that the Federal Court has no discretionary 
jurisdiction and therefore, a much larger caseload than the U.S. Supreme Court. 
 304.  Melissa A. Waters, Creeping Monism: The Judicial Trend Toward 
Interpretive Incorporation of Human Rights Treaties, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 654 
(2007). 
 305.  As suggested by Waters, supra note 304, passim. 
 306.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 622–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). For criticism of “so-called 
‘human rights norms,’” see Antonin Scalia, Commentary, 40 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1119, 
1121 (1996) (arguing for a textual approach to rights-based analysis). 
 307.  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 977 (1997) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 308.  Roper, 543 U.S. at 578 (citing international norms as non-controlling but 
“respected and significant confirmation” for its own conclusions, and stressing that 
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international norms are binding on the United States or not, despite 
the “inspirational” use of international law.309 
 The clear distinction between the protection of the constitutional 
sphere and international instruments is reflected in a distinct 
terminology.310  Civil rights and liberties are the (exclusive) domain 
of the domestic courts; human rights, on the other hand, are used in 
the context of international instruments, and are discussed 
predominantly from a policy perspective311 and with a view to their 
application and protection in other jurisdictions.312  This does not 
necessarily imply hostility to international law in general,313 but, at 
least in the context of protecting fundamental rights and freedoms, 
international human rights treaties play a less than marginal role.  
Consequently, the controversies in the United States focus on the 
alleged legislative actions of judges and lack the international 
dimension that is perceived as a threat to popular sovereignty in the 
Swiss context. 
                                                                                                                      
such reference did not lessen “their fidelity to the Constitution” 
 or their “pride in its origins”).  
 309.  Id. at 567. The international norms on the death penalty that the majority 
adduced in Roper were, due to reservations or non-ratifications, not binding on the 
United States. Cf. Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 831 n.34 (1988) (citing to 
ICCPR); Burger v. Kemp, 486 U.S. 776, 823 n.5 (1986) (Powell, J., dissenting) 
(referring to the ICCPR in much the same way as in Roper, although the United States 
had not yet ratified it). This lack of distinguishing binding international norms from 
other international or foreign provisions is even more evident in the wholesale 
condemnation of “foreign and international law.” Cf. Nicolas Q. Rosenkranz, An 
American Amendment, 32 HARV. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 475, 479 (2009) (overlooking notion 
that respect for international law, at least in the case of ratified treaties, is not a mere 
whim of activist judges, but the fulfillment of an obligation of the United States 
towards the other parties to an international agreement). 
 310.  Harold Hongju Koh, A United States Human Rights Policy for the 21st 
Century, 46 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 293, 309 (2002). 
 311.  Id. at 304–06.  
 312.  As evidenced by the annual Country Reports on Human Rights Practices 
assembled by the State Department. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, HUMAN RIGHTS REPORTS 
(2009), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/index.htm. In the same vein, 
the State Department’s reports on the U.S. human rights record only address that 
record with regard to furthering human rights in other countries. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
SUPPORTING HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY: THE U.S. RECORD 2006, at ii–iv (2007), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/80699.pdf. 
 313.  Harold Hongju Koh, International Law as Part of Our Law, 98 AM. J. INT'L 
L. 43, 48 (2004); Ralph G. Steinhardt, The Role of International Law as a Canon of 
Domestic Statutory Construction, 43 VAND. L. REV. 1103, 1106 (1990). The extreme 
view that all international law is nothing but “policy and politics” for the United 
States, e.g., Michael Stokes Paulsen, The Constitutional Power to Interpret 
International Law, 118 YALE L.J. 1761, 1842 (2009), would presuppose an 
independence from, and irrelevance of, the outside world that does not, and probably 
never has, corresponded to reality. 
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B.  A Government of Men, and Not of Laws? 
Attitudes do change.  And the political process, not you not the members 
of the Ninth Circuit, and not even . . . the Justices of the United States 
Supreme Court are here to reflect the attitudes of the American people.  
That’s what they have ballot booths for, your Honour. 
— Charles J. Cooper, Counsel for Intervenor  
Defendants in Perry v. Schwarzenegger314 
Those who say, “The voice of the people is the voice of God,” are not to be 
listened to, for the unruliness of the mob is always close to madness. 
— Alcuin of York to Charlemagne315 
 In Switzerland, international norms play a much more important 
and controlling role in the adjudication of rights claims.316  As a 
consequence, they also figure more prominently in discussions over 
popular sovereignty and majority decisions on the one hand and the 
rule of law and protection of fundamental rights on the other.  The 
Swiss Constitution provides a far less stable and constant framework 
for the protection of fundamental rights than its U.S. counterpart.  As 
pointed out above, the threshold for constitutional amendments is 
much lower in Switzerland, and constitutional amendments are 
initiated either by representatives or by voters and parties317 (or, in 
Madison’s terminology, factions318).  Substantive limits are only 
imposed by (laxly construed) peremptory norms of international law, 
and competence to invalidate initiatives lies exclusively with 
Parliament—courts do not have any say.319 
 This quasi-judicial role of Parliament is not undisputed; the 
adoption of the 1999 Constitution was preceded by an extended 
discussion over judicial review.  To not endanger the adoption of the 
new constitution, it was decided to first submit a mere “updated” 
constitution to voters, and then to piecemeal introduce additional 
provisions inter alia on the federal judiciary and direct-democratic 
rights.320  Thus, the introduction of two important judicial reforms 
                                                                                                                      
 314.  Transcript of Record, supra note 276, at 71. 
 315.  “Nec audiendi qui solent dicere: ‘Vox populi, vox Dei,’ cum tumultuositas 
vulgi simper insaniae proxima sit. " Epistolae Karolini Aevi, in 2 MONUMENTA 
GERMANIAE HISTORICA, EPISTOLAE IV, at 199 (Ernst Dümmler ed., Berlin, Edidit 
Societas Aperiendis Fontibus 1895). The English translation is taken from STEPHEN 
ALLOTT, ALCUIN OF YORK 86 (1974). 
 316.  See supra note 303 and accompanying text. 
 317.  See supra notes 31, 193. 
 318.  See supra notes 33, 278, 279. 
 319.  See supra Part II.  
 320.  The 1999 Constitution had always been “marketed” as an update or mise à 
jour of its 1874 predecessor, rather than a novel instrument. BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, 
arts. 8, 27, 38. An earlier and more ambitious attempt to adopt a new constitution had 
foundered; the 1999 revision, therefore, postponed the more contentious issues (such as 
the reform of the federal judiciary, the formula for inter-cantonal financial distribution, 
914 Vanderbilt Journal of Transnational Law [Vol. 43:863 
was postponed—the judicial review of federal acts321 and a limited 
role for the Federal Supreme Court in assessing the validity of ballot 
initiatives.322  Eventually, both changes were abandoned.323  
Similarly, both the State and National Assembly dismissed 
suggestions to increase the threshold for ballot initiatives.324 
 The suggested reforms of ballot initiatives and the introduction 
of judicial reforms failed because they were perceived as a serious 
restriction of popular sovereignty.325  The constitutional system, and 
the distribution of power between the different branches of 
government, places an elevated importance on the will of the 
people.326  Ideally, the will of the people should not be restrained in 
any manner—the Federal Supreme Court drew much ire in 2003 
when it ruled that voters on the communal and cantonal level have to 
make decisions on naturalization applications in conformity with the 
constitutional bill of rights.327  As a consequence, communal votes on 
such applications are now subject to judicial review.328  The decision 
was harshly criticized, even by moderates, who argued that the Court 
unduly tilted the balance between democracy and the rule of law in 
                                                                                                                      
and the reform direct-democratic instruments). Even so, the new constitution was 
rejected in ten cantons. ANDREAS KLEY, Geschichtliche Einleitung, in THE SWISS 
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION ¶¶ 32–37, at 3 (Bernhard Ehrenzeller et al. eds., 2d ed. 2008).  
 321.  The 1996 Draft Constitution provided for the gradual introduction of 
judicial review limited to federal acts. BBL I 362, 505 (1997). 
 322.  According to the 1996 draft, the Federal Assembly would have retained 
primary responsibility for assessing ballot initiatives. If in doubt over an initiative’s 
validity, the Assembly could have referred the matter to the Federal Supreme Court. 
Id. at 483. 
 323.  Parlamentarische Initiative (Kommission 96.091 SR), Beseitigung von 
Mängeln der Volksrechte, BBL 4803 (2001); Bundesbeschluß über die Änderung der 
Volksrechte, BBL 6485 (2002). 
 324.  AB III 1021–28 (1999); AB IV 609–10 (1999). 
 325.  Links to the protocols of the pertinent parliamentary debates stretching 
over two years are available at Geschäft des Bundesrates, DIE BUNDESVERSAMMLUNG—
DAS SCHWEIZER PARLAMENT, http://www.parlament.ch/D/Suche/seiten/geschaefte.aspx? 
gesch_id=19960091 (last visited Sept. 26, 2010). 
 326.  See, e.g., FRITZ FLEINER, SCHWEIZERISCHE UND DEUTSCHE 
STAATSAUFFASSUNG 5 (1929) (“In Switzerland, the home of Rousseau, popular 
sovereignty is rooted in the view permeating all levels of society that the people are the 
ultimate source of public authority.”).  
 327.  BGer July 9, 2003, 129 BGE I 217; BGer July 9, 2003, 129 BGE I 232. 
Obtaining Swiss citizenship through naturalization is preceded by, and contingent on, 
the residential municipality awarding municipal citizenship. Except for larger cities, 
applications for municipal citizenship are submitted to a vote of the town meeting. 
While this grass-root democracy can be seen as the epitome of republican participation 
(the community itself decides on membership in the res publica), it also offers ample 
opportunity for discrimination. Applicants from some countries were regularly rejected, 
and the Federal Supreme Court ruled that decisions of the sovereign are subject to 
substantiated reasoning as well as the prohibition of arbitrariness. BGer July 9, 2003, 
129 BGE I 232. 
 328.  BGer July 9, 2003, 129 BGE I 217, 220.    
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favor of the latter.329  Within months, the People’s Party launched a 
federal initiative to rule out judicial review of naturalization 
decisions.330 
 The dogma of popular infallibility has been particularly 
prominent in the aftermath of the minaret vote.  Constitutional and 
international lawyers may have expressed concern over a lack of 
respect for the bill of rights or the potential violation of international 
obligations, but the political forces that pushed for the ban 
immediately started denouncing any criticism of the result as 
undemocratic: when members of the government tried to assuage 
concerns of other countries over the vote, they were labeled dictators 
and suspected of aligning with foreigners rather than Swiss voters.  
Opponents of the ban were even called upon to emigrate and join the 
advocates of international law abroad in their suppression of the 
people.331  If the ban violated international law—tant pis, or perhaps 
even the better for it—such a clash would provide an opportunity to 
roll back the long-criticized encroachment of international law on the 
legislative monopoly of the people.332  Indeed, it was even argued that 
the restriction imposed on ballot initiatives by peremptory norms of 
international law should be disposed of; because human rights were 
not endangered in Switzerland, such a limitation was uncalled for 
and unnecessarily restricted popular democratic rights.333  
 The erstwhile opponents of a ban, chastised by their unexpected 
defeat at the polls, have not raised any objection to this construction 
of unfettered popular dominance.  The political parties that were 
defeated at the ballot box did not question the wisdom of the vox 
populi or insist on the principles that had informed their previous 
opposition to the ban.  Instead, they deferred by admitting that the 
lack of Muslim integration was a justified concern of voters and 
needed to be addressed, and they then hastened to address it.334  The 
reaction to the vote seemed to imply that the people can do no wrong, 
and the echo of the concept of sovereign immunity is no 
                                                                                                                      
 329.  For a summary of reactions, see Ulrich Zimmerli, Die vom Volk erlassene 
Verfassung gilt auch für den Souverän, NZZ, July 25, 2003, at 15. 
 330.  Bekanntmachungen der Departemente und der Ämter, BBL 2425 (2005). 
The initiative was rejected in 2008 by 63.8 percent of voters. Bundesratsbeschluß über 
das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung, BBL 6161 (2008). 
 331.  Markus Häfliger, Nach den Muslimen die Europäer, NZZ, Dec. 6, 2009, at 
11. 
 332.  Interpellation (09.4278), Yves Nidegger, Schweizerischen Volkspartei 
[SVP], Internationales Recht raubt die Handlungssouveränität der Schweiz (Dec. 11, 
2009), available at http://www.parlament.ch/D/Suche/Seiten/geschaefte.aspx?gesch_id= 
20094278. 
333  The Swiss People’s Party is considering a ballot initiative to that end. Ideen 
für Initiativen nach Minarettverbot, NZZ, Dec. 14, 2009, at 7. 
 334. See Aktivismus, Warnungen und Taktik, NZZ, Dec. 2, 2009, at 11. 
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coincidence.335  Under this concept of sovereign immunity, the voters 
correspond to the Schmittian sovereign: they are the unfettered and 
ultimate decision maker, which cannot be restricted or overruled.336  
Voters cannot be restrained by rules that they themselves could not 
overthrow at will, and they certainly cannot and must not be slapped 
on the wrist by international institutions.  
 Few other countries would subscribe to such an extensive view of 
popular sovereignty, and even in Switzerland, this view is at best an 
ideal—or at worst a caricature—of popular participation.  The people 
might be called to the ballot boxes every three months, yet they can 
vote on only a fraction of the questions faced by the commonwealth.  
The laws are drafted by Parliament, and adjudicated not by a people’s 
court, but by the judiciary.  Still, the semi-fictional narrative of 
unrestrained popular sovereignty is highly alluring and continues to 
shape the political discourse.  The supporters of the ban have not 
been perturbed by international criticism; instead, they seem to 
thrive on it.  Yet, hostility to international law and organizations can 
only be systematically and gainfully exploited if it is a preexistent 
and fairly widespread sentiment.  I argue here that hostility to 
international law is inherent in the narrative of a self-sufficient, 
autarkic, non-elitist, egalitarian society, which forms the basis of the 
myth system of modern Switzerland.  
C.  A Band of Brothers True . . . : The Swiss Myth System 
Lasst uns den Eid des neuen Bundes schwören./ Wir wollen sein ein 
einzig Volk von Brüdern, / In keiner Not uns trennen und Gefahr. / Wir 
wollen frei sein wie die Väter waren, / Eher den Tod, als in der 
Knechtschaft leben.  
— Friedrich von Schiller, Wilhelm Tell, act II, scene 2337 
 An explanation for the peculiar Swiss attitude toward 
international law must be sought at the intersection of the myths and 
facts of Switzerland’s tradition, its history, and its political and legal 
order.  On the factual level, Swiss reservations against strong 
political or judicial institutions reflect the historic absence of one 
centralized, authoritarian power in the lands that became today’s 
                                                                                                                      
 335.  Cf. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 
*238 (“Besides the attribute of sovereignty, the law also ascribes to the king, in his 
political capacity, absolute perfection. The king can do no wrong.”). 
 336.  Cf. CARL SCHMITT, POLITISCHE THEOLOGIE 10 (1922) (arguing that the 
sovereign operates outside the rule of law). 
 337.  FRIEDRICH SCHILLER, WILHELM TELL act 1, sc. 2 , at 72, in FRIEDRICH 
SCHILLER, WILLIAM HERBERT CARRUTH, SCHILLER'S WILHELM TELL (1898). [“Swear we 
the oath of our confederacy! / A band of brothers true we swear to be, / Never to part in 
danger or in death! / We swear we will be free as were our sires, / And sooner die than 
live in slavery!”]. FRIEDRICH SCHILLER, THE DRAMATIC WORKS: WALLENSTEIN AND 
WILHELM TELL 360 (Samuel Taylor Coleridge et al. trans., 1917) [hereinafter 
SCHILLER, DRAMATIC WORKS]. 
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Switzerland.  The Alemannic areas south of the Rhine disengaged 
from the Holy Roman Empire in the high and late Middle Ages and 
developed their own legal traditions and institutions.338  Still, the 
modern Swiss state was not erected on the basis of a unitary entity 
with a long and shared history.  Its predecessor, the medieval 
Confederacy (Eidgenossenschaft), was an association of highly diverse 
and sometimes divided polities.339  Prior to the French invasion of 
1798, most cantons were oligarchies that were ruled by aristocrats, 
guilds, or prominent families.340  Large parts of modern Switzerland 
were bailiwicks under the rule of one or several of the pre-1798 
cantons; the inhabitants of these dominions were unfree subjects.341 
 After the turmoil of the Napoleonic wars, the process of 
unification and nationalization was initiated not by the members of 
the old Confederacy, but by outside powers.342  Russia, in particular, 
exerted a heavy influence by opposing the reestablishment of the 
defunct Confederacy.343  The Congress of Vienna determined the very 
existence of the New Confederacy, as well as its territorial extent and 
political structure.344  The following three decades saw constant 
friction between progressive republican and conservative forces, and 
tensions were accompanied and exacerbated by confessional conflicts 
between Protestant and Catholic cantons that resulted in the 
                                                                                                                      
 338.  This independence was mirrored in the refusal to adopt the institutional 
reforms initiated by Maximilian I in the late fifteenth century, particularly the 
jurisdiction of the Imperial Chamber Court (Reichskammergericht). ULRICH IM HOF, 
MYTHOS SCHWEIZ 1291–1991, at 56–58 (1991); RENÉ PAHUD DE MORTANGES, 
SCHWEIZERISCHE RECHTSGESCHICHTE 141–42 (2007); cf. JOHANNES CONRADUS 
KREIDENMANN, KURTZER TRACTATUS VON DES TEUTSCHEN ADELS SONDERLICH DER 
FREYEN REICHS-RITTERSCHAFT IN SCHWABEN 147 (1646).  
 339.  The Old Confederacy (as opposed to the post-1803 Confederacy) eventually 
comprised thirteen cantons or statelets, which tried to maintain a tenuous balance 
between metropolitan and rural cantons. 1 ULRICH IM HOF & BEATRIX MESMER, 
GESCHICHTE DER SCHWEIZ, UND DER SCHWEIZER 309 (1982). After the Reformation, 
armed conflicts between Protestant and Catholic cantons erupted in 1531, 1656, and 
1712. 2 ULRICH IM HOF & BEATRIX MESMER, GESCHICHTE DER SCHWEIZ, UND DER 
SCHWEIZER 69–83, 127 (1983). 
 340.   2 IM HOF & MESMER, supra note 339, at 38–40, 116–22; ROGER 
SABLONIER, GRÜNDUNGSZEIT OHNE EIDGENOSSEN 42, 103–04 (2008). 
 341.  Urlich Im Hof, Ancien Régime, in 2 HANDBUCH DER SCHWEIZER 
GESCHICHTE 750–59 (Hanno Helbling ed., 2d ed. 1980); see also André Holenstein, 
Politische Partizipation und Repräsentation von Untertanen in der alten 
Eidgenossenschaft, in LANDSCHAFTEN UND LANDSTÄNDE IN OBERSCHWABEN 233 (Peter 
Blickle ed., 2000). 
 342.  After an invasion by French troops in 1798, the Old Confederacy was 
dissolved and replaced by a centralistic republic. Mediated by Napoleon Bonaparte, a 
federalist structure was reintroduced in 1803, with the former bailiwicks elevated to 
cantons with equal status. Id. After the French withdrawal in 1813, some of the old 
cantons hoped to reestablish the defunct Old Confederacy and its bailiwick system. 2 
IMHOF & MESMER, supra note 339, at 172, 244–47. 
 343.  KLEY, supra note 320, ¶¶ 5–6. 
 344.  Déclaration des Puissances sur les Affaires de la Confédération Helvétique, 
Mar. 20, 1815, 64 C.T.S. 5. 
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secession of the latter from the Confederacy and a brief civil war in 
1847.345 
 The federal state established in 1848 was, therefore, not the 
culmination of a century-old tradition of direct-democratic 
government originating in the valleys of Central Switzerland, where 
the freedom-loving peasants of Friedrich Schiller’s Wilhelm Tell take 
an oath to be a band of brothers true and to sooner die than live in 
slavery.346  Instead, the new entity lacked a unifying language, 
denomination, history, or political tradition; the new Switzerland was 
an “artificial construct” and the “multicultural antithesis to the 
national unification process of neighbor countries such as Germany or 
Italy, which were based primarily on the cultural, linguistic, or even 
ethnic homogeneity of a people.”347  In 1848, Switzerland was a “State 
in search of nation.”348 
 When a national Swiss identity was successfully shaped over the 
following decades, the political institutions (which were largely based 
on the American model) played an important role.349  Yet, contrary to 
the constitutional patriotism in today’s Germany,350 Swiss identity 
does not solely rely on institutions and shared values.  The process of 
political consolidation was accompanied by the construction of a 
common past, which was both fateful and purposeful.351  As in the 
United States, Swiss values and institutions are embedded in a 
national and heroic narrative that explains how liberty was fought for 
and won.352   
 American national lore focuses on the American Revolution and 
the Founders and Framers.  However, because of the somewhat 
inglorious circumstances in which the Federation of 1848 was born, 
                                                                                                                      
 345.  For a historical overview, see 2 IM HOF & MESMER, supra note 339, at 158–
83. 
 346.  SCHILLER, DRAMATIC WORKS, supra note 337. The first surviving evidence 
of the Tell legend in a Swiss context (earlier equivalents are known particularly in 
Scandinavia) is provided by a 1472 chronicle. 1 IM HOF & MESMER, supra note 339, at 
171. Schiller’s piece was not intended as an accurate account of the Swiss past; rather, 
he addressed vigilante justice, and commented upon contemporary events and the 
French Revolution. MICHAEL HOFMANN, SCHILLER: EPOCHE, WERK, WIRKUNG 170–77 
(2003). 
 347.  Wolf Linder & Isabelle Steffen, Political Culture, in HANDBOOK OF SWISS 
POLITICS 15, 16 (Ulrich Klöti et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007).  
 348.  DIE ERFINDUNG DER SCHWEIZ 1848–1998: BILDENTWÜRFE EINER NATION 
170 (Schweizerisches Landesmuseum ed., 1998). 
 349.  KARL WOLFGANG DEUTSCH, DIE SCHWEIZ ALS EIN PARADIGMATISCHER FALL 
POLITISCHER INTEGRATION 14–16 (1976).  
 350.  DOLF STERNBERGER, VERFASSUNGSPATRIOTISMUS 13–16 (1979). 
 351.  This dual approach is particularly pronounced in JOHANN CASPAR 
BLUNTSCHLI, GESCHICHTE DES SCHWEIZERISCHEN BUNDESRECHTES (1849). 
 352.  Perhaps the shared conviction that a commonwealth’s liberty was a purely 
autochthon achievement and that freedom has been wrested from an oppressor, might 
explain why, in spite of the stark discrepancy in power and influence, Swiss and 
American attitudes to international law are similarly skeptical. 
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the threads of the Swiss national fabric are spun further back to a 
misty past and to the independent communities of farmers in Central 
Switzerland, who in 1291 concluded a pact of mutual assistance to 
expel their foreign aristocratic oppressors, thus establishing the first 
Confederacy.  Swiss national identity is still strongly shaped by its 
self-perception as the world’s oldest democracy—a seed planted by 
freedom-loving farmers shaking off the yoke of Habsburg domination 
and establishing a community that grew into a modern Swiss state.  
According to the narrative, this state mirrors the ideals of its 
founders: it is a self-governing and egalitarian Alpine commonwealth 
that is neutral and peaceful, yet, adamant in defending its values and 
borders.  This is the oft-invoked “exception Switzerland” (Sonderfall 
Schweiz), a pocket of freedom and equality in a Europe dominated 
first by kings and noblemen, later by totalitarian regimes, and today 
by a supranational behemoth. 
 The tangible evidence for this narrative is the Federal Charter—
the foedus pactum of 1291 concluded between the valleys of Uri, 
Schwyz, and Unterwalden to ensure general peace and mutual 
assistance.353  During the Middle Ages, however, this document was 
largely unknown and inconsequential.354  Additionally, the Federal 
Charter was not an unequivocal declaration of independence or 
freedom; the agreement explicitly reserved and confirmed existing 
relationships of servitude.355  The Charter was elevated to 
foundational and “national” importance only in the nineteenth 
century, when it was transformed ex post into the starting point of a 
continuous direct-democratic tradition and a manifesto against 
foreign dominance and influence.356   
 The culmination of this “discovery” of a shared past took place in 
1891, when the 600-year anniversary of the now paramount 1291 
pact provided a coda to the process of nationalization and saw the 
completion of the historiographic357 and cultural358 edifice of the 
Swiss state and nation.  The Alpine mountains, passes, and valleys 
                                                                                                                      
 353.  The 1291 Charter is reprinted in HANS NABHOLZ & PAUL KLÄUI, 
QUELLENBUCH ZUR VERFASSUNGSGESCHICHTE DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN 
EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT UND DER KANTONE VON DEN ANFÄNGEN BIS ZUR GEGENWART 1–3 
(1940). For an English translation of the 1291 Charter, see 1 THE ORIGIN OF THE SWISS 
CONFEDERATION § 1 (1933), available at http://www.admin.ch/org/polit/00056/index.ht 
ml?lang=en. 
 354.  Bernhard Stettler, Bundesbriefe, in 3 HISTORISCHES LEXIKON DER SCHWEIZ 
4, 6 (Marco Jorio et al. eds., 2002).  
 355.  NABHOLZ & KLÄUI, supra note 353, at 2. 
 356.  GEORG KREIS, DER MYTHOS VON 1291, at 34–73 (1991). 
 357.  See WILHELM OECHSLI, DIE ANFÄNGE DER SCHWEIZERISCHEN 
EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT 1–26 (1891) (discussing the origins of the Swiss state). 
 358.  The construction of a Swiss National Museum was approved by the Federal 
Assembly in 1891. HANSPETER DRAEYER, Die ‘besten Schädel arischer Rasse’ als 
Kataysator für die Gründung des Schweizerischen Landesmuesums, in DIE ERFINDUNG 
DER SCHWEIZ 1848–1998: BILDENTWÜRFE EINER NATION, supra note 348, at 158–69.  
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served as the geographic foundations of this edifice (even if 
historically, cities such as Zurich, Berne, and Lucerne played a more 
prominent role).359  The farmers of these valleys formed an 
autonomous community, in the sense proper of auto-nomia: they 
adopted their own laws democratically and settled their disputes 
internally and without recourse to outside authorities.  The rejection 
of “foreign judges” is a central tenet of the Swiss myth system.360  The 
Federal Charter of 1291 states that the people of Uri, Schwyz, and 
Unterwalden would “accept or receive no judge . . . who was not a 
native or a resident with [them].”361  
 Although its members continued to pursue divergent interests, 
the Confederacy became a distinguishable entity in the fourteenth 
century.362  The Confederacy seceded de facto from the Holy Roman 
Empire in 1499, and the 1648 Treaty of Westphalia confirmed the 
separation.363  Therefore, Swiss mythology is not detached from 
historical events or void of a factual basis.  Proto-democratic 
institutions existed in several cantons.364  The narrative of freedom-
loving peasants was popular prior to 1848, as illustrated by Schiller’s 
Tell, but when appropriated for a national cause, the narrative was 
greatly embellished and causally connected to the newly established 
Federation.365  The national myth of Switzerland as the cradle of 
popular democracy, however, is false: it took a French invasion to 
introduce modern notions of liberty and equality.366  Nor is the 
picture of seclusion very accurate; politically, culturally, and 
especially militarily, the Old Confederacy was very much a part of 
European history.367   
                                                                                                                      
 359.  SABLONIER, supra note 340, at 130–33. 
 360.  See, e.g., OECHSLI, supra note 357, at 305 (discussing nativism in the Swiss 
myth system). 
 361.  “Communi etiam consilio et favore unanimi promisimus, statuimus ac 
ordinavimus, ut in vallibus prenotatis nullum iudicem, qui . . . noster incola vel 
conprovincialis non fuerit, aliquatenus accipiamus vel acceptamus.” NABHOLZ & KLÄUI, 
supra note 353, at 2. 
 362.  See 1 IM HOF & MESMER, supra note 339. 
 363.  Treaty of Peace Between the Holy Roman Empire and France, art. 63, Oct. 
24, 1648, 1 C.T.S. 271. 
 364.  1 IM HOF & MESMER, supra note 339, at 153–59. 
 365.  DRAEYER, supra, note 358; OECHSLI, supra note 357.  
 366.  See supra note 342 and accompanying text (noting the role of outside 
powers on Swiss reunuification); see also NABHOLZ & KLÄUI, supra note 355 (codifying 
modernity in the Charter). 
 367.  During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, some of the cantons pursued 
an aggressive policy of expansion, bringing down the kingdom of Burgundy, and at one 
point controlling Lombardy (the phenomenal efficacy and success of the Confederates 
was at least, in part, based on their ignoring the chivalric rules of combat, e.g., they 
usually gave no quarter). 1 IM HOF & MESMER, supra note 339, at 291–50. 
Subsequently, Swiss mercenaries were sought after all over Europe. 2 IM HOF & 
MESMER, supra note 339, at 30. The Papal Guard is the last remnant of this century-
old tradition.  
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 Yet the founding myths of seclusion and independence are very 
much alive in public discourse, and they help to explain negative 
attitudes toward international law and supranational institutions.  In 
his 2007 speech on National Day, the then-minister of justice 
explicitly likened international law to the Habsburg governors of yore 
and suggested that such law takes away the liberty of the people and 
replaces popular sovereignty with undemocratic rules, 
euphemistically and misleadingly called the “law of the peoples.”368  
As the instrument of an elitist and unelected transnational camarilla, 
international law is cast as the opposite of time-honored Swiss 
tradition.369  Anti-elitism is an important part of the myth system, 
particularly with regard to the legal system and its guardians, judges, 
and legal scholars.370  In Switzerland, neither courts nor civil 
servants are supposed to have the final say; the last word is always is 
reserved for “the people.”371 
 Any reassessment of this myth is strongly resented and resisted, 
particularly if forced upon the community by outside pressure.  Over 
the past years, both the historical self-perception and its translation 
into economic and business policies have come under sustained attack 
by other countries and international organizations.372  It has, 
therefore, become more difficult to maintain the notion of an 
                                                                                                                      
 368.  Christoph Blocher, Justizminister, Eidgenössisches Justiz- und 
Polizeidepartement, 1. August-Rede 2007 (Aug. 1, 2007). On August 1 (the national 
holiday), the conclusion of the 1291 pact is remembered, but the expulsion of the 
Habsburg Governors in 1291 and the razing of their castles, so vividly described in 
Schiller’s Tell, is as legendary as that play’s hero. 1 IM HOF & MESMER, supra note 339, 
at 171–73. 
 369.  See, e.g., Press Release, Schweizerische Volkspartei [SVP], Landesrecht 
stärken zur Wiederherstellung der Souveränität (Feb. 10, 2009), available at 
http://www.svp.ch/g3.cms/s_page/78200/s_name/pressekonferenzdetail/newsContractor
_ id/33/newsID/115/newsContractor_year/2009 (criticizing “excessive international law” 
established by “international experts, top-flight jurists, respected professors, 
congresses, international fora, international organizations, intergovernmental 
conferences, and others”).  
 370.  For an early example of the dismissive attitude towards “learned” law and 
lawyers, see KREIDENMANN, supra note 338. 
 371.  AB I 293 (2009); see also FRITZ FLEINER, BEAMTENSTAAT UND VOLKSSTAAT 
40–51 (1916) (contrasting the Swiss Volksstaat (popular State) with other European 
states where decisions are taken by a separate civil servant caste).  
 372.  In the 1990s, international pressure eventually prompted a reassessment of 
Switzerland’s policies and economic relations with the Axis powers during the Second 
World War. For a balanced overview, see JEAN-FRANÇOIS BERGIER et al., DIE SCHWEIZ, 
DER NATIONALSOZIALISMUS UND DER ZWEITE WELTKRIEG: SCHLUSSBERICHT (2d ed. 
2002). More recently, the Swiss off-shore banking model, which has to some extent 
become part of the Swiss myth system, has come under scrutiny. The United States 
and Germany in particular, but also the Group of Twenty Finance Ministers and 
Central Bank Governors (G-20) and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) have criticized the distinction between tax evasion and tax fraud 
(judicial assistance is granted only for the latter). Swiss-banking secrecy has been 
severely dented and breached on occasion. 
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autonomous and independent community, and autonomy has 
acquired an even higher status in times when internationalization 
increasingly restricts the leeway of the national law-giver, be it the 
Parliament or the people.373  Therefore, the insistence on popular 
sovereignty also covers up an increasing discrepancy between the 
“operational code” of lawmaking and the myth system of decision 
making in an autarkic community.374 
 Thus, the founding myth explains why the international legal 
system is perceived as a dangerous intrusion of the outside world, 
and why in the face of international law, some Swiss are gripped by 
an existential angst.  But this myth and its frequent invocation are 
significant in another respect.  The fight against the house of 
Habsburg provides a blueprint not only for stemming foreign 
influence or foreign rules and their application, it also defines the 
community that is established in the wake of the imagined revolution 
in terms of exclusion rather than inclusion.  The expulsion of the 
foreign becomes the founding moment of the everlasting foedus.  
 These images matter because the Swiss lack a more tangible 
shared tradition.  The national narrative is not mere folklore, but 
rather (at least on the conceptual level) a condition for the existence 
and the survival of the nation.  The mythology set out above 
necessitates a clear distinction between Switzerland and the outside 
world.  Skepticism towards the “other” is an integral part of the 
system. 
 When interviewed after the minaret vote, the President of the 
Federation was asked whether multiculturalism might have been 
pushed too far in Switzerland.  He agreed that the “swallowing 
capacity” and the “absorbency” of the people might indeed have 
reached its limit, and he subsequently outlined two potential 
solutions: either Swiss voters would be able to “cross certain limits” 
and agree, in the mold of the United States or Australia, to the 
creation of a new “cultural amalgam” of Swiss and foreign tradition, 
or immigrants “would simply have to assimilate—a process 
regrettably resisted by some foreigners.”375  
                                                                                                                      
 373.  For discussion of the internationalization of the legal order in a Swiss 
context, see generally OLIVER DIGGELMANN, DER LIBERALE VERFASSUNGSSTAAT UND 
DIE INTERNATIONALISIERUNG DER POLITIK (2005). 
 374.  The terminology is adopted from W. MICHAEL REISMAN, On the Causes of 
Uncertainty and Volatility in International Law, in THE SHIFTING ALLOCATION OF 
AUTHORITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 44 (Tomer Broude & Yuval Shany eds., 2008), 
where it is used to denote the difference between written and applied norms. Though 
not a member of the European Union, Switzerland, by necessity, has to ensure that its 
legal order remains compatible with E.U. legislation. After the voters rejected 
membership in the European Economic Area (EEA), the government officially adopted 
the self-contradictory policy of “autonomously following” E.U. legislation (autonomer 
Nachvollzug). Bundesrat, Bericht zur Aussenwirtschaftspolitik 92/1 & 2 und 
Botschaften zu Wirtschaftsvereinbarungen, BBL I 320, 329, 331 (1993).  
 375.  ‘Die Schluckfähigkeit stösst an Grenzen,’ NZZ (Switz.), Dec. 6, 2009, at 12. 
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 This juxtaposition with two immigration societies indicates that, 
unlike its American counterpart, the Swiss myth system is not geared 
toward the inclusion of new elements.  The Swiss system requires 
more than subscribing to a limited number of principles while 
maintaining a separate mentality and identity.  It demands 
conformity with a mythology that reaches back several centuries, and 
in the absence of a shared language or clear geographical boundaries, 
ensures the persistence of the imagined community.  
Multiculturalism is not an option; there is no place for minarets in 
the valleys where the farmer dwells. 
V.  WHERETO FROM HERE FOR SWITZERLAND? 
All, too, will bear in mind this sacred principle, that though the will of 
the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will to be rightful must be 
reasonable; that the minority possess their equal rights, which equal law 
must protect, and to violate would be oppression. 
— Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address, 1801376 
 Myths and their use are by no means a priori reprehensible.  
Greek mythology offers metaphors for the most fundamental passions 
and conflicts inherent in human nature.  Myths may also provide a 
sense of coherence and common purpose to larger communities.  The 
Swiss myth system established in the nineteenth century served an 
important purpose, offering a shared narrative for the newly 
established Confederation.  The myth system facilitated the 
introduction of a political system that has proven highly stable and 
immune to totalitarian temptations.  
 But if myths aim to continuously provide meaning for a society 
and its institutions, changing circumstances may sometimes 
necessitate adapting or even replacing the traditional tales that have 
thus far supplied significance and legitimacy.377  Dogmatic myths, 
which are overly retrospective and introspective, can become a 
burden and an obstacle when facing current challenges.  Today, 
boundaries have become osmotic to ideas, information, goods, and 
people.  The Swiss myth system has a strong exclusionary streak that 
can easily be exploited to haphazardly classify whole groups as 
undesirables.  The notion of a secluded community that can simply 
shut out the world is reminiscent of the fallacy that toddlers fall 
victim to when they cover their eyes: when they do not see their 
surroundings, they assume that no one can see or inconvenience 
them.  Ignoring the world at large and the inconvenient complexities 
                                                                                                                      
 376.  Thomas Jefferson, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), reprinted in 1 A 
COMPILATION OF MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENTS 1789–1897, at 309–10 
(James D. Richardson ed., 1897). 
 377.  FRITZ GRAF, GREEK MYTHOLOGY 3 (1993). 
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of its interactions is not a sustainable solution for Switzerland, and 
neither is banning whatever does not conform with traditional 
imagery and self-perception. 
 How, and by whom, might the decision to prohibit minarets be 
remedied?  From a rule of law perspective, that task would fall to the 
courts.  The Federal Supreme Court could, by giving precedence to 
international human rights norms, refuse to give effect to the 
prohibition in Article 72(3) BV.  But, for institutional, constitutional, 
and political reasons, the Court is unlikely to exercise that option.378  
Conversely, and more democratically, the sovereign itself could 
reconsider and revoke its decision.  Yet, given the many decades it 
took to remove provisions enacted after the establishment of the 
modern Confederation and during the Kulturkampf, this approach 
might not be available for another century.379  
 Therefore, the fundamental question raised by the vote on 
minarets remains unanswered: how can the conformity of Swiss laws 
with international norms be assured?  The solution suggested here is 
based on the assumption—not shared by all Swiss—that conformity 
with such norms is desirable.  International law in general, and 
human rights provisions in particular, do not have to be seen as an 
alien norm body forced upon the domestic legal order—particularly 
not in Switzerland, where all important international agreements are 
subject to referenda.380  Nor is international law an end in itself.  
Rather, it has “a general function to fulfill, namely to safeguard 
international peace, security and justice in relations between States, 
and human rights as well as the rule of law domestically inside 
States for the benefit of human beings, who, in substance, are the 
ultimate addressees of international law.”381  The spirit of 
internationally protected human rights has been approved by the 
popular sovereign through incorporation into a constitutional bill of 
rights.  It is not the international legal nature of such rights that 
should command respect and enforcement, but their rationale and 
their content, whether enshrined in a nonbinding UN resolution, an 
international treaty, or a constitution.   
                                                                                                                      
 378.  BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 145, 168(1); see supra text accompanying 
note 131. 
 379.  See infra notes 469, 472 (discussing similar culturally engendered 
controversies). See Jörg Paul Müller & Daniel Thürer, Toleranzartikel, in MINARETT-
INITIATIVE: VON DER PROVOKATION ZUM IRRTUM 277, 279 (Andreas Gross et al. eds., 
2010) for the suggestion to replace the ban by a constitutional provision committing all 
denominations to mutual respect, tolerance, and the cautious use of public symbols. 
 380.  Optional referenda on international agreements concluded for more than 
fifteen years were introduced through a ballot initiative in 1921. BBL I 424 (1921). The 
scope of referenda was extended repeatedly and now encompasses all international 
treaties that either contain important substantive provisions or require the adoption of 
federal statutes. BV Apr. 18, 1999, SR 101, art. 141(1)(d)(3); BBL 6485 (2002). 
 381.  281 CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT, INTERNATIONAL LAW: ENSURING THE SURVIVAL 
OF MANKIND ON THE EVE OF A NEW CENTURY 23 (1999). 
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 Despite the siren songs that promise a return to the days when 
the country was allegedly self-sufficient, Switzerland will not be able 
to ignore the ever-expanding norm-body of international law.  As a 
small country, Switzerland should, in fact, be in favor of mutual 
respect for legal obligations in international affairs.  The potential 
fault lines between an international rule of law and near-unrestricted 
democratic participation have been exposed by several recent ballot 
initiatives.382  A pending initiative on the deportation of delinquent 
foreigners would violate international human rights norms and also 
might be difficult to reconcile with peremptory non-refoulement 
obligations under international law.383  After the minaret vote, the 
government and Parliament are palpably perplexed as to how to react 
to such a proposal.384  Similarly contentious initiatives are bound to 
arise.  In August 2010, an initiative to introduce the death penalty for 
sexually motivated murders was launched.  Although it was soon 
withdrawn, the proposal immediately provoked renewed calls for 
substantial limitations of ballot initiatives, and for an assessment of 
the admissibility of an initiative prior to the collection of 
signatures.385  
                                                                                                                      
 382.  Regina Kiener & Melanie Krüsi, Bedeutungswandel des Rechtsstaates und 
Folgen für die (direkte) Demokratie am Beispiel völkerrechtswidriger Volksinitiativen, 
110 ZBl 237 (2009); Helen Keller et al., Volksinitiativen und Völkerrecht, 109 ZBl 121, 
126–30 (2008). 
 383.  The initiative “for the deportation of criminal foreigners” launched in 2007 
demands that non-citizens who commit specific enumerated offenses be deported 
(regardless of their current residence status) and barred from entering Switzerland for 
up to fifteen years. Eidgenössische Volksinitiative “für die Ausschaffung krimineller 
Ausländer (Ausschaffungsinitiative)” BBL 4969 (2007). The list of relevant offenses is 
highly disparate, ranging from felonies (murder, robbery, or rape) to misdemeanors 
(drug trafficking) and even mere transgressions such as illicitly obtaining social aid, as 
well as offenses lacking a statutory definition such as burglaries (a combination of 
theft, willful damage to property, and trespassing) or “serious violent crimes.” Id. The 
initiative does not allow for consideration of individual cases, e.g., delinquents would be 
deported regardless of any family ties with Swiss citizens or residents. Id. The 
initiative, therefore, would violate Article 8 ECHR and Article 17 ICCPR protecting 
family life, as well as Article 10(2) CRC. Procedural guarantees under Protocol No. 7 to 
the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Article 
1, Nov. 22, 1984, E.T.S. 117, and under Article 13 ICCPR would be implicated, as 
would bilateral treaties with the European Union. However, the Federal Council 
maintained that the initiative could be construed so as not to infringe the non-
refoulement requirement. Id. at 5101. Similar rules for criminal aliens already apply in 
the United States. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 
1996, Pub. L. No. 104–208, 110 Stat. 3009-546; cf. Lena Williams, A Law Aimed at 
Terrorists Hits Legal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 1996, at A1 (suggesting that 
such laws have unintended consequences). 
 384.  In response, and as an alternative to the deportation initiative, the Federal 
Council had already suggested tightening immigration and residence regulations. 
Bundesgesetz Entwurf über die Ausländerinnen und Ausländer (AUG), BBL 5129 
(2009). 
 385.  The initiative had been cleared by the Federal Chancery and the collection 
of signatures was about to start. Bekanntmachungen der Departemente und der 
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 Currently, the sole safeguard for international law and the only 
limit on ballot initiatives is the barrier of peremptory norms of 
international law.386  The notion of jus cogens has been criticized as 
little more than an empty formula for easy truths—the kitsch of 
international law.387  It is true that peremptory norms, as they stand 
in international law today, cover only the barest necessities of a 
minimum world public order.388  The narrow concept of peremptory 
norms applied by the Federal Assembly would allow for ballot 
initiatives that rescind the vote for women, ban the practice of non-
Christian faiths, or force women to wear burqas.  Jus cogens, in other 
words, leaves fundamental values of a liberal and democratic society 
unprotected.  Until the minaret ban, potential clashes between the 
international protection of these values and ballot initiatives have 
garnered little international attention.  If “bashing” international law 
is increasingly perceived as politically promising and gainful, 
however, violations are bound to increase in frequency and intensity 
because proponents of this combative approach do not have to pay the 
resulting reputational and political costs. 
 It has been suggested for some time now that the construction of 
a constitutional reservation of jus cogens should not be restricted by 
the scope of its equivalent under international law.389  In the context 
of domestic constitutional norms, a broader construction of 
peremptory norms might encompass regional human right standards 
such as the ECHR as an expression of an “ordre public européen.”390  
                                                                                                                      
Ämter, Eidgenössische Volksinitiative “Todesstrafe bei Mord mit sexuellem 
Missbrauch,” BBl 5471 (2010). Several politicial parties had already promised to 
invalidate the initiative in Parliament. Katharina Bracher, Volksrechte vor 
ultimativem Test, NZZ, Aug. 10, 2010, at 10. Yet a prohibition of capital punishment 
can hardly be considered part of international jus cogens, with several important states 
regularly imposing the death penalty. Switzerland, however, is under an international 
legal obligation not to reintroduce capital punishment under any circumstances as it 
has ratified the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR, Aiming at the Abolition of the 
Death Penalty, Dec. 15, 1989, 1642 U.N.T.S. 414; Protocol No. 6 to the Convention for 
the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms Concerning the Abolition 
of the Death Penalty, April 28, 1983, E.T.S. 114 (abolishing the death penalty in 
peacetime); and Protocol No. 13 to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty in all 
Circumstances, May 3, 2002, E.T.S. 187. 
 386.  BBL 7603 (2008); AB I 118–19 (2009). 
 387.  Martti Koskenniemi, International Law in Europe: Between Tradition and 
Revival, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 113, 122 (2005). 
 388.  Cf. Report of the International Law Commission on the Work of its Fifty-
Third Session, 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 85 (discussing the subordination of peremptory 
norms to primary obligations and codified law). 
 389.  Daniel Thürer, Verfassungsrecht und Völkerrecht, in VERFASSUNGSRECHT 
DER SCHWEIZ, supra note 33, ¶¶ 13–15. 
 390.  Yvo Hangartner, Völkerrecht ist nicht a priori übergeordnet, NZZ, Apr. 17, 
2009, at 16. For an extensive construction that would include the UDHR, compare 
MYERS MCDOUGAL, HAROLD D. LASSWELL & LUNG-CHU CHEN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 274, 325–27 (1980).  
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The current constitutional jus cogens reservation also was developed 
through parliamentary practice before it was codified in the 1999 
Constitution;391 and the drafting history of the 1999 Constitution 
would not rule out such an approach.392  
 Yet, it could be argued with some justification that the popular 
sovereign, when adopting the 1999 Constitution—if indeed it 
considered the issue—understood peremptory norms to refer to the 
limited international scope.  After all, the concept of jus cogens 
squarely belongs to the international legal tradition.  A constitutional 
amendment, therefore, would be a more appropriate method than a 
mere change in practice—even if winning the popular vote on such a 
change would be difficult.  Such an amendment could make 
compliance with the rights guaranteed in the ECHR a precondition 
for valid ballot initiatives, with the Federal Supreme Court assessing 
compliance.  However, this approach would place responsibility on 
the ECtHR as well, and an increasingly expansive construction of 
Convention rights by the ECtHR would unduly limit the scope of 
democratic rights in Switzerland.  A national margin of appreciation 
needs to be respected and perhaps even expanded. 
 In 2007, a parliamentary initiative was submitted to amend the 
constitutional requirements for valid ballot initiatives.  The proposal 
suggested that submitted initiatives would be invalid if they violated 
international human right norms or procedural guarantees.393  But 
given earlier unsuccessful attempts to reform direct-democratic 
instruments,394 the future of the proposal remains uncertain.  If 
Parliament adopted such a constitutional change, it would risk 
accusations of striking at the core of popular sovereignty.   
 The government is not eager to address the problem.  In a report 
on the “relationship between international law and municipal law,” 
published in March 2010, the Federal Council dismissed changes to 
the current system395 and held that current regulation of ballot 
                                                                                                                      
 391.  Prior to the adoption of the 1999 Constitution, the jus cogens reservation 
was gradually developed by constitutional scholars and was adopted by Parliament. 
See Bundesrat, Botschaft über die Volksinitiativen “für eine vernünftige Asylpolitik” 
und “gegen die illegale Einwanderung,” BBL III 1486, 1495 (1994) (providing further 
references). 
 392.  Even though the Federal Council in its draft commentary referred to norms 
“recognised as peremptory by the international community,” the Council also held that 
the scope of such norms could not be determined in abstracto, but would have to be 
determined through the practice of Federal Assembly and the Federal Supreme Court. 
BBL I 362, 446–47 (1997). During the parliamentary debates on the 1999 Constitution, 
the reservation of peremptory norms was not discussed in any detail. 
 393.  AB I 290–94 (2009). 
 394.  See supra notes 321–24 and accompanying text (discussing prior federalist 
and populist measures). 
 395.  Bundesrat, Das Verhältnis von Völkerrecht und Landesrecht, BBL 2263, 
2314, 2320–21, 2330–39 (2010). 
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initiatives offers “an optimal balance.”396  It would seem that the 
government, after repeated failures to implement changes in the past 
decade,397 does not want to fail again.  The report exudes political 
caution, and the determination not to touch the taboo of popular 
sovereignty is palpable.  It is true that “any attempt to impose further 
restrictions on ballot initiatives would lead to political and legal 
problems,”398 but the same is true if ballot initiatives ignore 
international obligations with increasing frequency.  The government 
argues that such conflict can be defused by withdrawing from treaties 
or, if necessary, by simply “accepting the consequences of violating 
international obligations.”399  This sanguine view overlooks that some 
international norms represent more than an inconvenient barrier to 
unbridled popular sovereignty.  The assumption underlying the 
international protection of human rights is that human beings have 
an inherent dignity, as well as equal and inalienable rights, and that 
these rights should be protected by the rule of law.400  No popular 
majority, no matter by what margin, should be allowed to rule 
otherwise. 
VI.  THE LARGER PICTURE: MUSLIMS IN EUROPE 
I am saying that in our culture there is no room for the muezzins, for the 
minarets, for the phony abstemious, for the humiliating chador, for the 
degrading burkah.  And should that room exist, I wouldn’t give it to 
them.  Because it would be like deleting our identity, like nullifying our 
accomplishments.  Like spitting on the freedom that we have earned, on 
the civilisation that we have installed, on the welfare that we have 
achieved.  It would be like selling my country, my patria.  And my 
country, my patria, are not for sale. 
— Oriana Fallaci, The Rage and the Pride401 
 The adoption of a minaret ban in Switzerland was facilitated by 
a peculiar constitutional architecture built on an exclusionary myth 
system.  In Part 0, I have therefore suggested rebalancing an 
institutional setup that is skewed in favor of unrestrained popular 
sovereignty.  Such an amendment, however, would only address the 
means by which the minaret ban was imposed, but not its cause.  
Swiss direct democracy, and its mythology, cannot account for 
preexisting, underlying hostility towards Muslims and Islam that 
allowed the campaign to succeed.  These negative sentiments are by 
                                                                                                                      
 396.  Id. at 77. 
 397.  BBL I 362, 505 (1997) (discussing judicial reforms); see supra text 
accompanying note 321. 
 398.  BBL 2263 (2010).  
 399. Id. 
 400.  UDHR, supra note 229, pmbl., ¶¶ 1, 3.  
 401.  ORIANA FALLACI, THE RAGE AND THE PRIDE 148–49 (2002). 
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no means exclusive to Swiss voters; it was speculated after the 
minaret ban that votes in other European countries were likely to 
lead to the same result.402  Similar complaints about Muslims occur in 
most European countries, and two grievances are particularly 
common.  First, many fear the specter of an unstemmed flow of 
immigrants coupled with high birth rates juxtaposed with the 
dwindling numbers of “Europeans proper.”  Second, many resent the 
alleged persistent refusal of the newcomers to integrate with their 
host societies by adjusting their values and mores.  
A.  The Power of Numbers 
 The ballot pamphlet began its list of grievances with the claimed 
ten-fold multiplication of Muslims in Switzerland for a reason.403  The 
number of Muslims, of course, is entirely unrelated to minarets: there 
were only four minarets in Switzerland prior to the vote,404 and it 
seems unlikely that the ban will significantly affect the number of 
Muslims.  France, with its much larger Muslim population, has fewer 
than ten minarets.405  Yet demographic concerns were nevertheless at 
the heart of the campaign to ban minarets in Switzerland.  
 The initiators were right in pointing out that the population of 
Muslims in Switzerland has increased dramatically, even if there is 
some uncertainty over the exact growth rate,406 and the 
demographics suggest that this development is far from leveling out.  
Roughly 39.2 percent of Muslims are below the age of twenty, their 
divorce rate has not increased over the past three decades, and 
Muslim women bear 2.44 children on average, as opposed to a rate of 
                                                                                                                      
 402.  Brandt, supra note 11; Luc Bronner, Pourquoi la France n'a pas de leçon à 
donner à la Suisse, LE MONDE, Dec. 12, 2009, at 2; Islam and Switzerland: The Return 
of the Nativists, ECONOMIST, Dec. 5, 2009, at 70–71; Österreichs Rechte efreut, NZZ, 
Dec. 1, 2009, at 10. 
 403.  See supra note 92 and accompanying text. 
 404.  See supra note 25 and accompanying text (noting the dearth of minarets in 
Switzerland).  
 405.  Cécilia Gabizon, Un débat qui pourrait concerner la France, LE FIGARO 
(Fr.), Nov. 30, 2009, at 7. 
 406.  There are no up-to-date census data on religion. According to the 2000 
census, 310,807 Muslims resided in Switzerland (4.26 percent of all residents)—
compared to 152,217 in 1990 (2.21 percent). CLAUDE BOVAY, EIDGENÖSSICHE 
VOLKSZÄHLUNG 2000: RELIGIONSLANDSCHAFT IN DER SCHWEIZ 11, 110 (2004). Part of 
the large increase in the 1990s was due to the conflicts in former Yugoslavia. Cf. id. at 
48. Current estimates usually put the number at 350,000 to 450,000 rather than the 
500,000 suggested by the supporters of the ban. SCHWEIZERISCHE 
EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT, supra note 92, at 23. Also, compare AB I 107 (2009), where a 
member of the initiative’s committee speaks of 350,000 Muslims in Switzerland. 
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1.43 among the general populace.407  The picture in other European 
countries is similar or even more pronounced.408 
 The correlation between religion and citizenship also sets 
Muslims apart.  In 2000, although 96.9 percent of Protestant 
residents and 78.2 percent of Catholics held a Swiss passport, 88.3 
percent of Muslims were of a foreign nationality.409  Of the 11.7 
percent of Muslims with Swiss nationality, only one-third were born 
Swiss.410  The percentage of foreigners traditionally has been high in 
Switzerland;411 yet, in the case of Muslims, their religious community 
is also largely foreign, which facilitates distinguishing traditional 
Swiss culture and Islam.  
 In Europe, nativist parties of the right or far right have achieved 
remarkable electoral successes on anti-immigration platforms over 
the past three decades.412  Fears of being overrun by foreign hordes 
are not new in the West, nor are these fears exclusive to Europe.  In 
Samuel Huntington’s view, “numbers are power, particularly in a 
multicultural society, a political democracy, and a consumer 
economy”413—the implication being that at one point, unchecked 
immigration will threaten the current political and cultural status 
quo.  In the United States, the Chinese, Japanese, and Mexicans have 
been singled out, at different times, as threats to jobs and the mores 
of genuine (i.e., Anglo-Protestant) Americans.414   
                                                                                                                      
 407.  BOVAY, supra note 406, at 48. 
 408.  See generally EUR. MONITORING CTR. ON RACISM AND XENOPHOBIA (EUMC), 
MUSLIMS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION: DISCRIMINATION AND ISLAMOPHOBIA 24–29 (2006).  
 409.  BOVAY, supra note 406, at 31–34, 119.   
 410.  Id. at 34 (stating 91.8 precent of Swiss Protestants and 69.5 percent of 
Swiss Catholics were born Swiss citizens). 
 411.  In 2007, 21.1 percent of residents were foreigners, compared, for example, 
to 10.3 percent in Austria, 8.8 percent in Germany, 6.6 percent in the United Kingdom, 
5.8 percent in France and Italy, and 4.2 percent in the Netherlands. BUNDESAMT FÜR 
STATISTIK, DIE BEVÖLKERUNG DER SCHWEIZ 2008, at 13 (2009). The extent to which 
these discrepancies are due to the varying strictness of naturalization requirements 
needs further comparative analysis. Regular naturalization (e.g., for applicants without 
family links to citizens) presupposes twelve years of legal residence in Switzerland. 
Bundesgesetz über Erwerb und Verlust des Schweizer Bürgerrechts [BüG] [Federal Act 
on Granting and Withdrawing Swiss Citizenship] Sept. 29, 1959, SR. 141.0, art. 15(1). 
 412.  Such as the Front National in France, the Freiheitliche Partei Österreich 
(FPÖ) in Austria, the Lega Nord in Italy, the Belgian Vlaams Blok/Belang, the United 
Kingdom Independence Party, the Dutch Partij voor de Vrijheid, and the People’s Party 
in Switzerland. These parties pursue different policies and their radicalism varies, yet 
their proponents all maintain that immigration is out of control. 
 413.  Samuel P. Huntington, The Hispanic Challenge, 144 FOREIGN POL'Y 30, 44 
(2004). 
 414.  Cf. Stanford Lyman, The “Yellow Peril” Mystique: Origins and Vicissitudes 
of a Racist Discourse, in ROADS TO DYSTOPIA 65, 77–80 (Stanford Lyman ed., 2001) 
(discussing race relations). In 2004, Samuel Huntington shifted his attention from 
civilizational clefts to a more imminent threat and observed that  
[i]n this new era, the single most immediate and most serious challenge to 
America’s traditional identity comes from the immense and continuing 
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 In the case of Europe, this development might be exacerbated by 
the declining heft of the continent in world politics.  After exporting 
and imposing their own values and culture for much of modern 
history, Europeans now feel that they are on the receiving end of a 
slow and gradual invasion by other people and their values.  The 
latest incarnation of this external menace is the so-called Muslim 
threat to what is now called the “Judeo-Christian” heritage of the 
Occident415—a somewhat surprising label, considering that the West 
started embracing the Jewish half of its heritage only recently.   
 The frequent reference to this binary root is problematic because 
it implicitly excludes newcomers with a different “heritage.”416  
Invoking such a genealogy also forces a clear distinction between 
those who “belong” and those who do not: the others (or simply, the 
“other”) threatening a traditional way of life.  The supposed danger is 
not limited to the large number of Muslims coming to Europe; it is 
perpetuated and exacerbated by their subsequent reproduction.   
 Frequently, the description of the Islamic expansion to and in 
the West is steeped in the language of a biological threat.  In his 
influential 1968 essay on “The Tragedy of the Commons,” the 
ecologist Garrett Hardin argued that a finite world could only support 
a finite population.417  Population growth, Hardin maintained, would 
have a particularly detrimental effect on societies deeply committed 
to the welfare state, which was threatened by “the family, the 
religion, the race, or the class (or indeed any distinguishable and 
cohesive group) that adopts over-breeding as a policy to secure its 
own aggrandizement.”418  Today, the opponents of Islam frequently 
                                                                                                                      
immigration from Latin America, especially from Mexico, and the fertility rates 
of these immigrants compared to black and white American natives. . . . This 
reality poses a fundamental question: Will the United States remain a country 
with a single national language and a core Anglo-Protestant culture? 
Huntington, supra note 413, at 32. The semantic change of the term “American 
natives” is particularly noteworthy. Id. 
 415.  See, e.g., BRIGITTE GABRIEL, BECAUSE THEY HATE 185 (2006); Bat Ye’or, 
Jihad and Human Rights Today, in THE MYTH OF ISLAMIC TOLERANCE 271 (Robert 
Spencer ed., 2005); Bernard Lewis, The Roots of Muslim Rage, THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 
1990, at 47, 60 (discussing growing cultural tensions); Flemming Rose, Muhammeds 
Ansigt, JYLLANDS-POSTEN (Den.), Sept. 30, 2005, at 3. The Dutch right-wing politician 
Geert Wilders wants to replace the constitutional guarantee of equality with a 
constitutional preference for the Christian-Judeo tradition. Klara Rosenbach, Nicht 
gleich, sondern christlich, DIE TAGESZEITUNG (Berlin), Mar. 22, 2006, at 9. 
 416.  Cf. W. Michael Reisman, Autonomy, Interdependence, and Responsibility, 
103 YALE L. J. 401, 415 (1993) (discussing how such modes of thought and speech can 
lead towards “majority paranoia, parochialism, and xenophobia”). 
 417.  Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968). 
 418.  Id. at 1246. 
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identify Muslims both in the Middle East and in Europe as such an 
“over-breeding” group.419  
 The high percentage of Muslim aliens and the higher-than-
average birth rate, however, can only partly explain resentment 
against Islam.  At 92.5 percent, the Hindu community in Switzerland 
has an even higher share of non-citizens and a birth rate of 2.79420—
yet they are not generally singled out for criticism.  One reason might 
be their low overall numbers.421  Another explanation—and one that 
is gaining currency in the West—would be that the particular 
problem with Muslims lies not only in their ballooning numbers, but 
in their very religion.  Islam is perceived as a threat incompatible 
with Western values.  Such anti-Muslim sentiments may be more 
powerful because they feed on, and into, a century-old narrative of 
conflict and competition. 
B.  A Religion Calculated for Bloodshed? 
 The cultural conflict between Islam and Christianity derives 
from a long history of conflict that began with the Arab expansion in 
the seventh century.422  Today’s critics of Islam can consequently 
point to a long and prominent pedigree.  Hugo Grotius in his de 
veritate religionis Christianae described Mohammed as a robber and 
his first followers as “men void of humanity and piety.”423  Islam was 
a religion “plainly calculated for bloodshed,” closed to rational 
argument or interpretation,424 and “directly opposed to the Christian 
religion.”425  Unlike Christianity, which, according to Grotius, was 
                                                                                                                      
 419.  BERNARD LEWIS, EUROPE AND ISLAM 18–19 (2007) (suggesting that “in the 
foreseeable future,” Muslims may constitute a majority in some European countries). 
According to Srdja Trifkovic, “most Muslim countries regard demography as a political 
weapon.” SRDJA TRIFKOVIC, THE SWORD OF THE PROPHET 283 (2002). Robert Spencer 
speaks of a “demographic jihad” and observes that “the population in the Muslim world 
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at 138. 
 420.  BOVAY, supra note 406, at 33, 43. 
 421.  In 2000, 27,839 or 0.38 percent of residents were Hindu. Id. at 12. Prior to 
2000, Hindus were subsumed under “other religions,” so their increase over the past 
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 422.  H.A.R. GIBB, MOHAMMEDANISM: A HISTORICAL SURVEY 1–15 (2d ed. 1970) 
still provides a convenient overview of early Islamic expansion. For European attitudes 
towards Islam during the Middle Ages, see generally JOHN V. TOLAN, SARACENS: ISLAM 
IN THE MEDIEVAL EUROPEAN IMAGINATION (2002). 
 423.  HUGO GROTIUS, THE TRUTH OF THE CHRISTIAN RELIGION bk. VI, §§ 4–5 
(Jean Le Clerc ed., John Clarke trans., 1819) (1627). 
 424. Id. bk. V, § 2. 
 425.  Id. 
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spread through miracles, Islam followed “where arms lead the 
way.”426 
 In comparing Christianity and Islam and finding the former 
superior,427 the Protestant Grotius continued the Catholic tradition of 
Christian apologetics; after all, impressive Muslim military and 
cultural successes necessitated justification and explanation of God’s 
mysterious larger design.428  In the Age of Enlightenment, religious 
defensiveness was complemented by the scathing criticism of more 
secular writers.  In his play Le fanatisme, ou Mahomet le prophète, 
Voltaire portrays Mohammed as a cunning, devious, scheming, 
lecherous, and power-hungry imposter demanding unquestioning 
obedience.429 
 The disdain of the Age of Enlightenment was followed by the 
much more purposive contempt of the imperialist period.  As Edward 
Saïd has shown, orientalist scholarship purporting to establish the 
cultural and even racial inferiority of the Middle Eastern people 
played an important role in justifying Western imperial rule over 
Muslim lands in the nineteenth century.430  The views on Muslims 
and on Islam were instrumental in justifying the colonial endeavor.431  
It was the Muslims’ debilitating faith that earned them a place 
among the “silent, sullen peoples” with whose care and betterment 
the white man was burdened.432  
 The imperial enterprise—at least in its colonial guise—has come 
to an end.  The West no longer “send[s] forth the best it breeds” to 
“search their manhood” in “exile.”433  Instead, numerous immigrants 
arrive from erstwhile colonies and settle in the midst of Western 
society.  Muslims, formerly the object of scholarly study and the 
subjects of colonial rule, are suddenly uncomfortably close.  Negative 
characterizations of Islam persist; indeed, they mushroomed in the 
past years, and literature critical and often disparaging of Islam 
                                                                                                                      
 426.  Id. bk. VI, § 6. 
 427. Id. bk. VI, § 4. 
 428.  According to Grotius, Mohammed planted his new religion in Arabia “by 
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could almost be considered a genre of its own.434  With increasing 
frequency, the Islamic faith itself is held responsible for the woes of 
the Muslim world and for the frictions between Muslim immigrants 
and their European hosts.435  In the Grotian vein, Islam is depicted 
as intolerant, violent, and incompatible with human rights436—claims 
often buttressed by martial and exclusionary quotations of the 
Qur’an.437  The lack of separation between church and state also is 
adduced to underline the incompatibility between Islam and modern 
society.438 
 Such arguments keep gaining wider currency for a reason.  
Orientalist and colonialist attitudes may linger, but they do not 
preclude legitimate concerns over the protection of human rights in 
the face of religious fervor.  The sweeping reservations made by 
Muslim states to international human rights instruments on the 
basis of Sharia law may, depending on how the latter is construed 
and applied, jeopardize the object and purpose of such instruments.439  
Persisting gender inequalities in Western societies440 do not 
delegitimize concerns over the status of women under Sharia rules.  
But, painting Islam as inherently hostile to human rights overlooks 
that religious commands, just like legal commands, require 
interpretation; they are tools that can be used one way or another.  
Christians, at times far less tolerant than today’s Muslims,441 no 
longer proselytize by fire and sword, even though their Scriptures 
have not changed.  A religion as such is rarely intrinsically “good” or 
“bad” for human rights.  Instead, present-day believers or their 
spiritual leaders bear the responsibility to give meaning to religious 
commands, and a more constructive approach would strive to 
                                                                                                                      
 434.  Cf. Roger Boase, Introduction, in ISLAM AND GLOBAL DIALOGUE: RELIGIOUS 
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2010] Panacea or Pathetic Fallacy? 935 
illustrate the benefits of an interpretation that accords with human 
rights provisions.442  
 Such an exegetic process, however, cannot be initiated or 
imposed from the outside; only Muslims themselves can develop the 
necessary theological and interpretative arguments.  Instead, my 
point is that categorically denying the very possibility of development 
and reform only bolsters the cause of orthodox and reactionary forces 
in Islam.  Branding Islam as inherently backwards is also 
unsustainable on a purely practical level.  Declaring a faith with over 
a billion followers to be lost for democracy and human rights would 
severely darken humanity’s prospects. 
 Admittedly, it is not conducive to Muslim demands for 
recognition in Europe that adherents of other religions are rarely 
permitted to manifest their beliefs in Muslim countries—a point 
frequently raised in the discussions over the minaret ban.443  It has to 
be acknowledged that in comparison, Muslims in Europe face fewer 
restrictions in their religious practice than their Christian peers (or 
minority Muslim denominations) in the Islamic world.444  
Understandably, it causes resentment when undemocratic regimes in 
Arab countries accuse Western countries of a lack of tolerance.  
 However, the argument of reciprocity, although common in 
international law, fails in the context of human rights both on a 
practical level and on principle.  Democracies can hardly start 
mistreating their own minorities simply because authoritarian 
regimes mistreat theirs.  More importantly, genuine adherence to 
human rights values should imply the pursuit of such values as an 
end in itself, not as a quid pro quo on the market of international 
politics.   
 Moreover, the reciprocity argument suffers from another 
fundamental defect because it links the status of Muslims in Europe 
to the situation in Muslim countries, thus tying Muslim immigrants, 
residents, or citizens to their countries of origin.  They are considered 
Muslims in Europe rather than European Muslims.  Some have 
argued that Muslims themselves adopt this status, and that they do 
not truly settle down in Europe and integrate into their host societies, 
but instead strive to reproduce the cultural, religious, and legal 
environment they left behind.  Indeed, this lack of integration on 
every level was adduced by the minaret ban’s proponents, who 
                                                                                                                      
 442.  For such an attempt, see generally TARIQ RAMADAN, WESTERN MUSLIMS 
AND THE FUTURE OF ISLAM (2004). 
 443.  AB III 535–36 (2009); AB I 99–100 (2009).  
 444.  TAD STAHNKE & ROBERT C. BLITT, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS 
FREEDOM, THE RELIGION-STATE RELATIONSHIP AND THE RIGHT TO FREEDOM OF 
RELIGION OR BELIEF: A COMPARATIVE TEXTUAL ANALYSIS OF THE CONSTITUTIONS OF 
PREDOMINANTLY MUSLIM COUNTRIES 13–18 (2005).  
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alleged that Sharia law could become a parallel legal system.445  The 
specter of a multiculturalism that amounts to little more than the 
coexistence of separate ghettos is seen as an undesirable alternative 
to proper integration.  But what exactly does “integration” into a host 
society require?  And do different hosts require different levels of 
integration? 
C.  The Terms of Integration 
 In October 2009, the cartoonist Kurt Westergaard was invited to 
give a talk at Yale University.446  In 2005, he drew what many 
Muslims considered the most offensive of the Danish Mohammed 
cartoons: the prophet wears a turban, in which a bomb inscribed with 
the Shahada (the profession of faith) is nestled.447  When prompted 
by a fairly hostile audience to justify his drawing, he adduced the 
attacks of September 11, 2001.  He also argued that Muslims in 
Denmark should be accepting the values of their host society instead 
of protesting his exercise of free speech.  He stressed that citizens in 
Denmark paid more than half their income to maintain a welfare 
state that provided generous support to newcomers; it was only 
natural to expect integration by Muslim immigrants in return.  
Westergaard’s view, although widespread in Europe, did not find 
favor with his American audience.   
 And indeed, American views on integration might differ due to 
the country’s long and continuing history of immigration.448  At least, 
in theory, being different is part of being American, an approach that 
is also mirrored in an educational system often organized along 
                                                                                                                      
 445.  In December 2008, an anthropology professor in Switzerland suggested the 
introduction of a selective legal pluralism, recognizing, within the limits of the rule of 
law and human rights, different legal cultures particularly for family and business law. 
Christian Giordano, Il pluralismo giuridico: uno strumento legale nell gestione del 
multiculturalismo?, TANGRAM, Dec. 2008, at 74. A heated polemic ensued. Pascal 
Hollenstein, Scharia-Gerichte für die Schweiz, NZZ, Dec. 28, 2008, at 9. The issue has 
proven explosive elsewhere. Ben Russell, Archbishop of Canterbury Warns Sharia Law 
in Britain Is Inevitable, INDEPENDENT, Feb. 8, 2008, at 8. The United States is not 
immune to such controversy. An alleged favorable remark on Sharia law almost 
thwarted the appointment of a legal advisor to the U.S. State Department. Eric 
Lichtblau, After Attacks, Supporters Rally Around Choice for Top Administration Legal 
Job, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 2, 2009, at 19. 
 446.  For a cursory account of the visit and the accompanying student protests, 
see Esther Zuckerman, Cartoonist’s Visit Causes Stir, YALE DAILY NEWS, Oct. 2, 2009, 
at 1. The following account is based on my attendance at the event.  
 447.  Rose, supra note 415.  
 448.  Look Out, Europe, They Say, ECONOMIST, June 24, 2006, at 29–34. Still, the 
difference may be merely gradual. The audience at Yale might not be representative for 
general feelings towards immigrants, and the United States has its own history of 
discrimination against newcomers. See supra note 414 and accompanying text (noting a 
history of economically motived discriminatory behaviour by Anglo-Americans). 
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racial, religious, cultural, and social lines.449  While African-
Americans, Asian-Americans, Indian-Americans, or Hispanic-
Americans are seen as part of the demographic make-up of the 
United States, there are no hyphenated Europeans, no African-
Germans, Indian-Austrians, or Asian-Swiss.  It might be due to 
narrower conceptions of membership in the body politic based on 
cultural heritage450 that a higher level of integration is expected and 
only a binary option is offered—either Swiss, German, French, or 
not.451  The pluralist ideal of diverse groups maintaining distinct 
identities is largely absent.452  “Multi-culturalism” may have had 
positive connotations throughout much of the 1970s and 1980s, but 
the 1990s and the beginning of the new millennium saw more critical 
attitudes toward the view that equal recognition of minority groups 
was “the appropriate mode for a healthy democratic society.”  It was 
no longer taken for granted that the refusal of multiculturalism could 
“inflict damage on those who are denied it.”453  Multiculturalism is 
now denounced as “a cast of mind founded on a sense of guilt,” and as 
“an ideological cliché rather than a social reality.”454  The opponents 
                                                                                                                      
 449.  This tendency has been further accentuated by the introduction of charter 
schools. Martha Minow et al., Pursuing Equal Education in Societies of Difference, in 
JUST SCHOOLS: PURSUING EQUALITY IN SOCIETIES OF DIFFERENCE 3, 5 (2008). Yet at the 
same time, such pluralist approaches were always opposed by assimilationist 
ideologies, as exemplified by the “Americanization” movement of the early twentieth 
century. Robert C. Post, Cultural Heterogeneity and Law: Pornography, Blasphemy, 
and the First Amendment, 76 CAL. L. REV. 297, 300–01 (1988). 
 450.  The emphasis on a majoritarian and traditional definition of culture is also 
evident in the debates on a “core culture” that re-surface in regular intervals, 
particularly in Germany. Cf. Peter Finn, Debate Over a ‘Defining Culture’ Roils 
Germany, WASH. POST, Nov. 2, 2000, at A22 (“[I]n history-haunted Germany, even the 
simplest expression of patriotism elicits a cold shiver in some quarters.”). The term 
Leitkultur was coined by Bassam Tibi. See BASSAM TIBI, EUROPA OHNE IDENTITÄT? 51 
(1998). On a regional level, this would also explain the discussions on what the criteria 
for membership in the European Union are, and whether Turkey would meet such 
criteria. See Culture Wars, ECONOMIST, Feb. 4, 2006, at 50 (discussing the interplay 
between E.U. membership and a common cultural identity). 
 451.  The binary approach, however, might also have an upside. The hyphenated 
denomination still implies and perpetuates a distinction between “composite” 
Americans and Americans tout court. Nor should American tolerance towards Muslims 
be overstated. The opposition to a mosque close to Ground Zero in Manhattan, e.g., 
Build That Mosque, ECONOMIST, Aug. 7, 2010, also paints militant Islamists and other 
Muslims with the same brush, although admittedly in the much more serious and 
emotional context of the September 11 attacks. Incidentally, opposition to mosques in 
the United States is not limited to Ground Zero. Travis Loller, Far From Ground Zero, 
Opponents Fight New Mosques, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Aug. 8, 2010. 
 452.  Post, supra note 449, at 302 (emphasizing “Americanization”); see generally 
Josef Isensee, Integration mit Migrationshintergrund, 65 JURISTENZEITUNG 317, 319 
(2010) (framing Muslim immigration as a challenge to German culture, defined to 
include religious traditions). 
 453.  CHARLES TAYLOR & AMY GUTMANN, The Politics of Recognition, in 
MULTICULTURALISM: EXAMINING THE POLITICS OF RECOGNITION 36 (1994). 
 454.  TIBI, supra note 450, at 49–50. 
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of multiculturalism claim that it amounts to a denial of Europe’s own 
cultural identity.455  In today’s Europe, the adjective “multicultural” 
evokes the same reaction as “liberal” in the United States: it is 
defended by a shrinking minority, scoffed at by most.  Instead, 
newcomers are expected to “integrate” into their host societies.456 
 What, then, does integration in Europe imply?  The “restoration 
of a whole,” as the word’s origin suggests?457  “Fusing together a 
multitude of separate persons or groups to a single social and cultural 
unit”?458  Or perhaps even “bringing into equal membership of a 
common society those groups or persons previously discriminated 
against on racial or cultural grounds”?459  A comprehensive 
discussion of the complicated issue of Muslim integration in the West 
would require a treatise of its own,460 but the minaret ban provides 
an opportunity to briefly consider what demands Muslims face and to 
what extent they are willing or able to meet them. 
 The ban’s proponents persistently argued that the ban would 
halt the alleged introduction of a competing legal system that would 
undermine the secular Swiss legal order and violate fundamental 
rights and freedoms.461  This Article earlier illustrated that there is 
no causal link between minarets and Sharia law.462  However, an 
argument against legal pluralism and relativism can be made 
independent of a causal link.  The basic values of a community as 
enshrined in constitutions—what we consider to be the fundamentals 
of a just and equal society—must not be open to cultural 
relativisation, and the freedoms thus granted must not be abused to 
undermine the very order they aim to provide.  A bill of rights should 
not be a suicide pact.463 
 The same argument must generally apply to other and less 
fundamental laws.  Defining what exactly constitutes binding law is a 
task that will continue to challenge legal scholars, but for the present 
                                                                                                                      
 455.  Id. 
 456.  E.g., Bundesgesetz über die Ausländerinnen und Ausländer [AuG] [Federal 
Act on Foreigners] Dec. 16, 2005, SR 142.20, arts. 3–4.  
 457.  Latin integratio (n.) / integro (v.). GEORGES, supra note 138, col. 290. 
 458.  DUDEN: DEUTSCHES UNIVERSALWÖRTERBUCH 839 (Dudenredaktion ed., 4th 
ed. 2001). 
 459.  7 JOHN A. SIMPSON & EDMUND S.C. WEINER, THE OXFORD ENGLISH 
DICTIONARY 1065 (2d ed. 1989). 
 460.  For recent contributions, see generally, JOHN RICHARD BOWEN, CAN ISLAM 
BE FRENCH? PLURALISM AND PRAGMATISM IN A SECULARIST STATE (2010); JYTTE 
KLAUSEN, THE ISLAMIC CHALLENGE POLITICS AND RELIGION IN WESTERN EUROPE 
(2005); BHIKHU C. PAREKH, EUROPEAN LIBERALISM AND “THE MUSLIM QUESTION” 
(2008); RAMADAN, supra note 442; BASSAM TIBI, EURO-ISLAM (2009).  
 461.  See supra note 445 (discussing opposition on cultural grounds). 
 462.  Supra Part III. 
 463.  Cf. Terminello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 13 (1949) (Jackson, J., 
dissenting) (lamenting some of the behaviors made possible by the Bill of Rights); 
ECHR, supra note 65, art. 17 (limiting abuse of rights); ICCPR, supra note 66, art. 20 
(banning propaganda). 
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purpose, the criterion is simple: the substantive and procedural 
norms codified in statutes, acts, and ordinances and applied by 
administrative and judicial officers are binding.  These norms, 
adopted through and legitimized by democratic procedures, form the 
basis of any modern commonwealth; it must be assumed that entry 
and participation are granted to outsiders only on the condition that 
these rules are respected.  Calls for the introduction of concurrent 
Sharia law, at least inasfar as such law contradicts existing legal 
norms,464 are unacceptable (even though it is difficult to assess how 
widespread such demands really are; the particular media interest 
they generate might lead to a somewhat skewed image).465 
 We have to keep in mind, however, that secular laws, even if 
apparently value-neutral, also institutionalize specific preferences.  
Although the same laws are supposed to apply equally to all, some 
might still be more equal than others.  Norms are likely to reflect, at 
least to some extent, the traditional or fundamental values of the 
majority—which indeed they have to in order to claim legitimacy and 
relevance.  In a largely homogenous society, this approach may 
express widely shared community values,466 but laws also may be 
passed with the sole intent to exclude, discriminate, or forcibly 
assimilate a minority.  Discriminatory legislation on religious 
grounds—often under the guise of formally equal treatment—is 
neither novel nor particularly Swiss.  It can be argued that the very 
purpose of religion is to increase cohesion within a group and 
facilitate repulsion of outsiders.467  Minorities are often at the 
receiving end of norms that buttress majoritarian mores, as 
demonstrated by the minaret vote.   
 In the past, this majoritarianism has affected Christian 
denominations as well.  In 1810, the city of Lausanne enacted a law 
prohibiting Catholics from displaying “external religious signs” such 
as processions, religious habits, the pealing of bells, and the 
construction of spires.468  The first Federal Constitution of 1848 
banned Jesuits and the reestablishment of previously suppressed 
                                                                                                                      
 464.  For a discussion of such introduction, see Mathias Rohe, Application of 
Shari’a Rules in Europe: Scope and Limits, 44 WELT DES ISLAMS 323, 325 (2004). 
 465.  See supra note 445 and accompanying text (discussing inherent cultural 
bias). 
 466.  Post, supra note 449, at 299–300. Rousseau had already stressed the 
importance of shared customs and the dangers of diversity to a political community. 
ROUSSEAU, supra note 273, at 73–74. 
 467.  For this argument from the viewpoint of evolutionary biology, see 
NICHOLAS WADE, THE FAITH INSTINCT: HOW RELIGION EVOLVED AND WHY IT ENDURES 
2–5 (2009). 
 468.  The ban on Catholic steeples was lifted in 1872, but the first tower was only 
built in 1935, with bells added in 1948. BERNARD SECRÉTAN, EGLISE ET VIE 
CATHOLIQUES À LAUSANNE DU XIXE SIÈCLE À NOS JOURS (2005). The author is indebted 
to Josef Lang, MP, for this reference. 
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religious orders.469  In turn, Catholic cantons discriminated against 
Protestants.470  Discrimination was even more explicit between 
differing faiths; prior to 1874, only Swiss citizens of a recognized 
Christian confession could freely move from one canton to another or 
invoke a right to free exercise of religion.471  Under the 1874 
Constitution, Article 72(3) BV (the place now taken by the minaret 
ban) contained a provision requiring state approval for the 
establishment of Catholic dioceses.472  The very first ballot initiative 
in 1894 led to a ban on the ritual slaughter of animals; the ban was, 
at least partially, a thinly veiled attempt to prevent Russian Jewish 
emigrants from settling in Switzerland.473  Many of the current 
arguments against minarets—including the spread of Sharia law—
were already advanced during the heated discussions over Muslim 
graveyards in the 1990s.474  That issue has since subsided, but was 
promptly revived in the wake of the minaret vote.475 
 Despite this potential for bias, there seems to be no alternative 
to insisting on the applicability and binding nature of legal norms, as 
long as their discriminatory effects do not transgress certain limits476 
                                                                                                                      
 469.  The ban was justified by the role that Catholic orders and the Jesuits, in 
particular, allegedly played in the conflict preceding the establishment of the Swiss 
Federation in 1848. KLEY, supra note 320, ¶¶ 13, 21. The ban was lifted only in 1973. 
Berichtdes Bundesrates an die Bundesversammlung, BBL I 1660 (1973). 
 470.  Lucerne did not permit cremation requested by Protestants, arguing that 
burial provisions requiring interment applied equally to all (erstwhile) citizens and 
were therefore nondiscriminatory. The Federal Supreme Court found the prohibition of 
cremation unconstitutional in 1893. BGer May 16, 1919, 45 BGE I 119. 
 471.  KARLEN, supra note 75, at 140–43. 
 472.  The prescription was adopted in 1873 during the Kulturkampf; it was 
rescinded by public vote in 2001, with the rationale that such a discriminatory 
restriction ran counter to important principles of equality and unnecessarily restricted 
the right to freedom of religion guaranteed by the ECHR and the ICCPR. 
Parlamentarische Initiative Aufhebung des ‘Bistumsartikels’ (Art. 72 Abs. 3 BV), BBL 
5581(2000). 
 473.  PASCAL KRAUTHAMMER, DAS SCHÄCHTVERBOT IN DER SCHWEIZ 1854–2000, 
at 75 (2000). The ban had been instituted against the recommendation of both Federal 
Council and Federal Assembly. Bundesbeschluß über das Initiativbegehren betreffend 
das Verbot des Schlachtens ohne vorherige Betäubung, BBL III 745 (1893). Supporters 
had argued that Judaism does not really require ritual slaughter. KRAUTHAMMER, 
supra, at 57. In 1973, the constitutional provision was moved to the statutory level. 
While anti-Semitism played a prominent role in the adoption of the constitutional 
provision, animal rights are at the center of today’s discussions. Yvo Hangartner, 
Rechtsprobleme des Schächtverbots, 2002 AKTUELLE JURISTISCHE PRAXIS [AJP] 1022, 
1024 (2002). A 2002 ballot initiative prohibiting imports of kosher or halal meat (which 
are permitted) failed to collect sufficient signatures. Bekanntmachungen der 
Departemente und der Ämter, BBL 6513 (2003). 
 474.  Niccolò Raselli, Schickliche Beerdigung für “Andersgläubige,” 1996 AJP 
1103 (1996). In 1999, the Federal Supreme Court held that neither the Constitution 
nor the ECHR and the ICCPR granted a right to a burial on a public graveyard in 
accordance with Muslim prescriptions. BGer May 7, 1999, 125 BGE I 300, ¶ 3(b)(bb). 
 475.  Christoph Wehrli, Schwere Kunst des Verlierens, NZZ, Dec. 4, 2009, at 13. 
 476.  Gustav Radbruch, Gesetzliches Unrecht und übergesetzliches Recht, in 1 
SÜDDEUTSCHE JURISTEN-ZEITUNG 105, 107 (1946). 
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and specific groups are not excluded from the protection of the norms.  
This basic requirement of “law-abidingness” applies in any country, 
but integration into European states seems to require more than 
obedience to the law, perhaps because modern European states were 
conceived as nation-states, or as suggested by Westergaard, as the 
price for extensive social security nets.477   
 The formation of separate cultural and linguistic communities is 
frowned upon in Europe.478  But how far should integration in 
matters of language and mores go?  Although acceptance of 
fundamental values is not contingent on language skills, such skills 
are certainly conducive to “engaging with societal relations and living 
conditions” in a host country.479  Sustainable social and particularly 
economic and professional integration generally presupposes 
linguistic adaption.  But although there are sound reasons to promote 
linguistic integration, demands for integration cross the line between 
negative commands (the prohibition to violate laws) and positive 
expectations to conform to rules beyond positive laws and moral rules 
set or imposed by “general opinion.”  In other words, these 
expectations require a minority to avoid conduct that is regarded with 
“a sentiment of aversion” and displeasure even though it is not in 
contravention of any positive law.480  
 The issue of dress codes may illustrate this problem.  Currently, 
differing dress codes are still largely considered a violation of the 
“laws set by fashion.”481  But in 2006, Prime Minister Tony Blair 
criticized the full Islamic veil as a “mark of separation.”482  In France, 
                                                                                                                      
 477.  See supra note 446 and accompanying text (discussing Westergaard’s Yale 
speech). 
 478.  The rise of Spanish, however, might prompt similar demands for linguistic 
integration in the United States. See supra note 414 (discussing racial tensions in the 
United States).  
 479.  Cf. AuG Dec. 16, 2005, SR 142.20, art. 4(4) (quoting the statute). One 
canton has recently introduced compulsory language classes for non-E.U. citizens. Non-
participation adversely affects immigration status, while fast learners might be 
rewarded by the expeditious granting of permanent residence. Sprachkurse: 
Verbindliche Integrations-Vereinbarungen in St. Gallen, TAGBLATT ONLINE, Dec. 11, 
2009, http://www.tagblatt.ch/aktuell/stgallen/stgallen/Sprachkurse-Verbindliche-
Integrations-Vereinbarungen-in-St-Gallen;art536,1434233. Under a rather illiberal 
approach, the Liberals in Zurich suggest that foreigners must learn 1,000 German 
words within one year of their arrival. KIare Regeln für die Integration, NZZ, Nov. 12, 
2009, at 20. In the German-speaking part of Switzerland, linguistic integration is 
considerably impeded by the almost exclusive use of an Alemanic dialect that differs 
starkly from the standard German taught in language classes.  
 480.  JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED 146–47 
(1832) (1995). 
 481.  See id. at 146. Garments with religious connotation for public servants, 
however, are not merely considered an infringement of a law of fasion. See supra note 
105 (discussing recent bans on religious symbolism). 
 482.  George Jones, Veil Seen as Mark of Separation, Blair Tells Muslims, 
TELEGRAPH, Oct. 18, 2006, at 2. For an overview of European legislation on veils as of 
2005, see Şahin v. Turkey, 2005–XI Eur. Ct. H.R. 173, ¶¶ 55–65. 
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public school students are already banned from wearing a headscarf 
or other “conspicuous religious symbols,”483 and further legislative 
measures are being pushed through to ban “integral veils” in public 
spaces.484  In Belgium, many schools are banning headscarves, and in 
April 2010, the Belgium House of Representatives (which can agree 
on little else) voted to ban any clothing that covered the face.485  After 
the minaret vote in Switzerland, the ban’s supporters considered 
similar dress code laws.486  In none of these countries, however, is the 
burqa a common sight, which is why proponents of its ban have to 
invoke principle to justify their endeavors.  And a question of 
principle it may well be, but perhaps the issue is not quite so pressing 
as to warrant urgency proceedings in Parliament.487  The 
Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe has also weighed 
in, arguing that a blanket burqa ban would unduly affect the 
religious freedom of women who want to cover their face.488 
 Does architecture also play a part, positive or negative, in 
integration?  In the run-up to the ballot vote, minarets were depicted 
                                                                                                                      
 483.  Conseil constitutionnel [CC] [Constitutional Court] decision No. 200–
228DC, Mar. 17, 2004, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O] [Official 
Gazette of France] 5190. 
 484.  The French government attributes high priority to the project, at one point 
even considering urgency procedures to push the law through, Judith Weintraub, 
Burqa: Fillon devrait décréter la procédure d’urgence, LE FIGARO, Apr. 23, 2010, at 3, 
even though the Conseil d’État (the highest administrative court) cautioned that such a 
ban would be “legally fragile” and might violate E.U. norms on nondiscrimination. 
CONSEIL D’ÉTAT, ÉTUDE RELATIVE AUX POSSIBILITÉS JURIDIQUES D’INTERDICTION DU 
PORT DU VOILE INTÉGRAL 21 (2010). The law will impose a fine of 150 euros for wearing 
a full-face veil and up to 15,000 euros for forcing others to wear such a veil. Cécilia 
Gabizon, Burqa: des amendes allant de 150 euros à 15 000 euros, LE FIGARO, Apr. 30, 
2010, at 11. It was approved on July 13, 2010, by an overwhelming majority in the 
Assemblée Nationale. Sophie Huet, La loi antiburqa adoptée sans opposition à 
l'Assemblée, LE FIGARO, July 14, 2010, at 5. The law was promulgated after an 
affirmative vote in the Sénate on September 14, 2010, and will enter into force in 
spring 2011. Agnès Leclair, La loi sur le voile intégral promulguée, LE FIGARO, Oct. 13, 
2010, at 11. The Conseil Constitutionnel held that the law was constitutional as long as 
it permitted wearing the veil in public places of worship. CC decision No. 2010–613DC, 
Oct. 7, 2010, J.O. 18345. 
 485.  The proposal passed by 136 votes, with two abstentions. Jean-Pierre 
Stroobants, La Belgique interdit la voie intégral, LE MONDE, May 2, 2010, at 1. As its 
adoption coincided with the collapse of the governing coalition, the bill will only become 
law when promulgated by a new government.  
 486.  Keine Burka-Diskussion jetzt, NZZ, Dec. 8, 2009, at 9; Vom Burka- zum 
Verhüllungsverbot, NZZ, June 18, 2010, at 10. 
 487.  Contra supra note 484 (noting overwhelming political support for such 
measures). Eventually, the government decided to adopt the law through regular 
proceedings. Valentina Antonova, Loi sur la burqa: pas de procédure d'urgence, LE 
FIGARO, May 7, 2010, at 4. 
 488.  Islam, Islamism and Islamophobia in Europe, supra note 58. For a 
summary overview of European legislation, see Stéphanie Le Bars, Comment les pays 
d’Europe gerent-ils le voile intégrale?, LE MONDE, July 15, 2010, at 8. 
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as conspicuous religious symbols.489  There is no question that 
minarets have to comply with zoning laws—a high threshold, because 
these laws are often unfavorable to the construction of new religious 
structures490—but conformity with planning and zoning laws still 
seems insufficient, as illustrated by the aftermath of the dispute over 
the minaret in Wangen.491  The underlying objection to minarets 
seems to be based in principle.  Obviously, minarets can be 
considered alien to Europe merely due to their relative scarcity,492 
but most minarets in Europe also preserve an architectural heritage 
alien to the European tradition and rely almost exclusively on the 
slender, pencil-sharp shape rooted in Ottoman tradition.493  It might 
be argued that by insisting on a foreign formal vocabulary, minarets 
are a sign of separation.  There are alternatives to sharp minarets 
piercing the Swiss flag: these slim towers are but one variant of a rich 
architectural tradition494 
 Minarets come in a multitude of shapes: round, helicoidal, or 
square.495  Indeed, to the Western eye, some minarets might be more 
reminiscent of the towers in San Gimignano and other cities in 
Tuscany than of the Hagia Sophia in Istanbul.496  There are many 
examples, both old and new, where mosques and minarets entered 
into a symbiosis with the architectural tradition of their host 
societies.497  Perhaps integration not only needs to be done, but also 
                                                                                                                      
 489.  BLOOM, supra note 76; see SCHWEIZERISCHE EIDGENOSSENSCHAFT, supra 
note 92 (linking minarets to Islam).  
 490.  Jäger, supra note 75, at 119. Zoning laws may also be used specifically to 
block minarets. In the Austrian Bundesländer Carinthia and Vorarlberg, the change of 
zoning laws effectively blocked the construction of minarets while avoiding the stigma 
of open discrimination. Cf. Minarette: Kanzleramt mahnt Religionsfreiheit ein, DER 
STANDARD, Nov. 30, 2009, at 4. 
 491.  See Verwaltungsgericht Nov. 24, 2006, VWBES.2006.293 (SO), 19 SOG 89, 
93 (Solothurn). 
 492.  Austria, for instance, has only has three minarets, Michael Möseneder, Die 
Angst der Bürger vor den “Leuchttürmen,” DER STANDARD, Nov. 29, 2009, at 2, and 
France less than ten, Gabizon, supra note 402, at 5. 
 493.  Hillenbrand, supra note 100, at 366. 
 494.  Vallely, supra note 48. 
 495.  For example, the Malwiyya in Samarra (Iraq), the Giralda of Seville 
(Spain), and minarets in Sfax (Tunisia), Marrakesh (Morocco), Aleppo (Syria). BLOOM, 
supra note 76, at 15, 93, 108, 122. For a schematic overview of the many minaret 
styles, see HILLENBRAND, supra note 79, at 130–31. 
 496.  For example, the minarets in Bosra (Syria), Harran (Turkey), and Fez 
(Morocco). See also BLOOM, supra note 76, at 26, 30, 163 (discussing minaret 
architecture).  
 497.  In China, some of the oldest mosques provide a striking example for a 
genuinely Muslim interpretation of traditional Chinese architecture. E.g., the Ox 
Street (Niujie) Mosque and the Dongsi Mosque in Beijing and the Huaisheng Mosque 
in Guangzhou. In the Great Mosque of Xi'an, the minaret is replaced by a pagoda. For 
pagoda-style minarets also compare the Chengjiao Mosque and the Xia-Ershe Mosque 
in Linxia City. For modern interpretations of mosque architecture see generally, the 
mosque in Penzberg, Bavaria or the Taqwa-Mosque that is currently built in 
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seen to be done?, and the architectural style of mosques and minarets 
could serve as a yardstick for the willingness of Muslims to integrate, 
as the “architectural body language of Islamic integration or the lack 
thereof”?498  
 The architectural nostalgia for ancestral Muslim countries is 
understandable, but it results in equating a cultural tradition with a 
religion,499 plays into the perception of minarets as foreign implants, 
and facilitates accusations of outside funding and conservative 
influence.500  A novel, independent, and idiosyncratic architectural 
language would have several benefits.  From a purely pragmatic 
perspective, it might reduce the jealousy and resentment of rivaling 
communities that fear the eclipse of their own identity and name.  
More importantly for Muslims, a change of architecture would be 
another step in the difficult transition from being Muslims in Europe 
to being European Muslims.  The repeated reference by the 
supporters of a minaret ban to the lack of religious freedom in 
Muslim states501 underscores that Muslims in Europe are still seen 
as representatives, at best—or a fifth column, at worst—of their 
countries of origin.  Indeed, it is common for first-generation 
immigrants to try to preserve the purity of the culture they left 
behind.  But with time, such nostalgia must be replaced by 
engagement of the present environment,502 and cultural purity must 
                                                                                                                      
Frankfurt. The architect of the latter has sought a synthesis of old and new, comparing 
the construction of Ottoman-style mosques in Western Europe to a Disney World 
approach that lacks authenticity. Traditionelle Elemente sind wichtig zur 
Identifikation, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU (Ger.), Jan. 23, 2009, at 9. Pictures of the 
mosques mentioned here can easily be found through an Internet search engine.  
 498.  The author owes this succinct formulation to Professor Gerhard Bowering 
of the Department of Religious Studies, Yale University, who also brought to my 
attention the architectural variety of mosques in China. 
 499.  TARIQ RAMADAN, FACE À NOS PEURS: LE CHOIX DE LA CONFIANCE 68–69 
(2008). 
 500.  Cf., e.g., Jan Dirk Herbermann, Das Land der Kuhglocken fürchtet den 
Muezzin, FRANKFURTER RUNDSCHAU, Nov. 25, 2009, at 6; Aufregende Minarette in der 
Calvinstadt, NZZ, Mar. 28, 2008, at 15. Over the past decade, Saudi money has funded 
countless mosques both in Europe and the United States and at the same time, has 
furthered the spread of Wahhabism. Aptullah Kuran, The Mosque in Politics, in 4 THE 
OXFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE ISLAMIC WORLD, supra note 100, at 71. Even though 
Wahhabism itself might consider minarets unnecessary, see Hillenbrand, supra note 
100 (discussing mosques as a distraction), these building projects often include 
prominent minarets. MARTIN WOKER, Muslime, Bosnjaken oder Bosnier?, NZZ, Jan. 21, 
2005. However, the importance of Saudi funding through bodies such as the Muslim 
World League is declining in Western Europe, where groups have moved to self-
financing. KLAUSEN, supra note 460, at 43.  
 501.  See supra note 443 and accompanying text (discussing religious oppression 
in the Muslim world). 
 502.  “There is no longer a place of origin from which Muslims are ‘exiled’ or 
‘distanced,’ and ‘naturalised,’ ‘converted’ Muslims—‘Western Muslims’—are at home, 
and should not only say so but feel so.” RAMADAN, supra note 442, at 52–53. This 
approach represents a significant shift from earlier, less accommodating views, cf., e.g., 
SAYYID QUTB, MILESTONES 124 (Mother Mosque Foundation, 1981) (1964).  
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not be conflated with religious merit.  Islam’s claim to be a universal 
religion rather than a cultural tradition originating on the Arabic 
peninsula can only be bolstered by the use of a universal vocabulary 
with regard to architecture.503  Building minarets is, after all, a sign 
of commitment that Muslims in Europe intend to put down roots and 
do not see their stay as merely transitory. 
 Attempts to put down roots, however, presuppose a welcoming 
ground.504  If Muslims try to overcome their seclusion and engage 
their host societies, these societies would have to be willing to 
acknowledge such efforts and reciprocate accordingly.505  And there’s 
the rub.  It is doubtful whether the actual behavior of Muslims in 
Switzerland had much influence on the minaret vote.  Of the voters 
supporting the ban, only 15 percent had based their decision on 
criticism of Muslims in Switzerland.506  Generally, the opposition to 
minarets seemed based on a preconceived idea of Islam rather than 
actual exposure to Muslims.  A majority of Muslims in Switzerland 
live in urban areas.507  Yet, the share of yes-votes was highest in 
rural areas; the six biggest cities of Switzerland, on the other hand, 
rejected the ballot,508 and the only cantons which posted an overall 
majority against the ban—Geneva, Vaud, Neuchâtel, and Basle-
City—are predominantly urbanized.509  If minarets are opposed 
independently of what they look like and how their builders behave, 
Muslim efforts at integration may not change attitudes toward the 
turrets or affect negative views of Islam.  
                                                                                                                      
But any place where the lslamic Shari’ah is not enforced and where lslam is not 
dominant becomes the home of Hostility (Dar-ul-Harb) for both the Muslim and 
the Dhirnrni. A Muslim will remain prepared to fight against it, whether it be 
his birthplace or a place where his relatives reside or where his property or any 
other material interests are located. 
Id. 
 503.  Such an approach might then help to “extrapolate the essence of the 
[Muslim] identity from the accident of its actualization in a particular time and place.” 
RAMADAN, supra note 502, at 78. 
 504.  Cf. AuG Dec. 16, 2005, SR 142.20, art. 4(4) (stating as precondition for 
integration not only the willingness of immigrants, but also the openness of the Swiss 
populace). Compare for Germany. AUFENTHALTSGESETZ (AUFENTHG) [RESIDENCE ACT], 
July 30, 2004, RGBL 1 at 1950, §43, para. 1.  
 505.  RAMADAN, supra note 499, at 13; RAMADAN, supra note 442, at 62–63. 
 506.   29 HANS HIRTER & ADRIAN VATTER, ANALYSE DER EIDGENÖSSISCHEN 
ABSTIMMUNGEN 30 (2010). 
 507.  BOVAY, supra note 406, at 22, 110. 
 508.  Namely Zurich, Geneva, Basle, Berne, Lausanne, and Winterthur (with 
Basle and Lausanne having a particularly high percentage of Muslims). See BOVAY 
supra note 406, at 22. In large urban areas, the ban was rejected by 61.4 percent of 
voters. Geografie des Protests: Die Stadt-Land-Kluft bei der Minarett-Abstimmung, 
NZZ, Dec. 2, 2009, at 11. 
 509.  BBL 3440 (2010). For an overview of urban centers in Switzerland, see 
MARTIN SCHULER et al., EIDGENÖSSISCHE VOLKSZÄHLUNG 2000: DIE 
RAUMGLIEDERUNGEN DER SCHWEIZ 131 (Bundesamt für Statistik ed., 2005). 
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 European calls for Muslims to adapt their tokens of faith to the 
visual appearance of the West would amount to preaching water 
while drinking wine.  Christian churches all over the world 
perpetuate architectural forms originating in a limited geographical 
area and often dating back to the Gothic period.  Nor can it be said 
that newly established or expanding Christian communities do not 
receive outside funding and ideological influences.510  Apparently, the 
pull of integration is supposed to work in only one direction: even 
observers who are highly critical of non-integrating Muslims in the 
West take it for granted that worldwide, their own cultural 
preferences prevail.511  
 It is impossible and wrong to expect Europe to completely 
dispose of its historic heritage, which for two millennia has been 
intertwined with Christian traditions.512  The invocatio Dei 
(Christianorum) still heads the Preamble of the Swiss 
Constitution.513  Religion held—and still holds514—a prominent place 
in what could be called the Western myth system.  Even in France, 
the paragon of laicité, the Christian heritage plays a much more 
prominent role than is generally admitted.515  State and religion are 
far from separated.516  The cultural, moral, political, and artistic 
vestiges of religion cannot be dismissed, and holding on to a Christian 
heritage is not inherently wrong in any way, as long as it does not 
                                                                                                                      
 510.  For a recent example, see Jeffrey Gettleman, After U.S. Evangelicals Visit, 
Uganda Considers Death for Gays, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at A1.  
 511. Cf., e.g., Lewis, supra note 415, at 48 (“We should not exaggerate the 
dimensions of the problem. The Muslim world is far from unanimous in its rejection of 
the West . . . there still is an imposing Western presence—cultural, economic, 
diplomatic—in Muslim lands, some of which are Western allies.”).  
 512.  It seems more appropriate to refer to a Christian tradition (i.e., the historic 
tradition linked to and based on the institutional organization of Christian 
denominations), rather than to the Christian faith. It is debatable whether tenets such 
as charity and forgiveness are more prevalent in Europe than elsewhere.  
 513.  The invocation need not be limited to a Christian interpretation, yet the 
reference to historic tradition, and the formulation itself (“Im Namen Gottes des 
Allmächtigen!”) strongly suggest a Christian context. Berhnard Ehrenzeller, Präambel, 
in DIE SCHWEIZERISCHE BUNDESVERFASSUNG: KOMMENTAR para. 19 (Berhnard 
Ehrenzeller et al. eds., 2002). Invocations of God are common in both Muslim and 
Christian contexts; for a discussion of invocationes in European constitutions and of the 
controversy over religious references in a European constitution, see KOLJA NAUMANN, 
EINE RELIGIÖSE REFERENZ IN EINEM EUROPÄISCHEN VERFASSUNGSVERTRAG (Thilo 
Marauhn & Christian Walter eds., 2008). 
 514.  Jyitte Klausen, Europe’s Uneasy Marriage of Secularism and Christianity 
Since the 1960s and the Challenge of Religious Pluralism, in RELIGION AND THE 
POLITICAL IMAGINATION (Ira Katznelson & Gareth Stedman-Jones eds., forthcoming 
2010).  
 515.  Gerhard Robbers, Hundert Jahre Laizität: Ein Blick auf die 
religionsrechtliche Situation in Frankreich, 13 INFORMATIONES THEOLOGIAE EUROPAE 
67, 69–71 (2004). 
 516.  A ballot initiative to separate church and state was soundly rejected in 
1980. Bundesratsbeschluß über das Ergebnis der Volksabstimmung, BBL II 206 (1980). 
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entail the exclusion of citizens or residents who might prefer to 
invoke another God (or no God at all). 
 However, religious affiliations become problematic if they are not 
acknowledged for what they are.  When the Italian government 
argued before the ECtHR that the crucifix “was both the symbol of 
Italian history and culture, and consequently of Italian identity, and 
the symbol of the principles of equality, liberty and tolerance, as well 
as of the State’s secularism,”517 it aimed to transform one religious 
tradition into (unalterable) norm and normality.  Proponents of the 
minaret ban maintain that churches, unlike minarets, belong in 
Switzerland because it was a Christian and not a Muslim country.518  
Thus, they aim to exclude Muslims and their faith on principle and in 
permanence. 
 The real threat to tolerance of other traditions may not lie in 
openly acknowledging a (somewhat faded) Christian heritage, but 
rather in the pretense that our tradition is not Christian—that 
European norms and values are entirely secularized, void of any 
religious bias, and hence universally applicable.  Europeans would 
then be enforcing majoritarian beliefs and traditions under the guise 
of secularism and making “conformity to the religious beliefs of others 
the price of an equal place in the civil society.”519 
VII.  CONCLUSION: BANNING MINARETS AS A PATHETIC FALLACY 
All violent feelings have the same effect.  They produce in us a falseness 
in all our impressions of external things, which I would generally 
characterize as the “pathetic fallacy.” 
— John Ruskin, ‘Of the Pathetic Fallacy’520 
 In an essay on poetry, John Ruskin examined the difference 
between the “ordinary, proper, and true appearances of things to us; 
and the extraordinary, or false appearances, when we are under the 
influence of emotion, or contemplative fancy.”521  The angry sea, cruel 
waves, remorseless floods, or ravenous billows—these descriptions do 
not reflect a sudden agency of the elements.  Nevertheless, overcome 
by strong emotions, the poet irrationally attributes the characters of a 
living creature to inanimate objects.  Such false appearances remain 
“entirely unconnected with any real power or character in the object”; 
it is the agitated observer who attributes his own heightened and 
                                                                                                                      
 517.  Lautsi v. Italy, App. No. 30814/06, Eur. Ct. H.R. (2009), available at  
http://cmiskp.echr.coe.int/tkp197/search.asp?skin=hudoc-en.  
 518.  AB I 90 (2009). 
 519.  Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 897 (1990) (Connor, J., concurring). 
 520.  John Ruskin, Of the Pathetic Fallacy, in 3 MODERN PAINTERS ch.12, § 5 
(1891). 
 521.  Id. § 4. 
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irrational feelings to the indifferent matter, which “remains entirely 
unconnected with any real power.”522  
 The same is true of ominous and menacing minarets.  Minarets 
are made of bricks and mortar, cement, or wood.  They do not oppress 
women, nor do they undermine the rule of law in Switzerland.  But a 
majority of Swiss voters, “borne away, or over-clouded, or over-
dazzled by emotion,”523 succumbed to the pathetic fallacy of ascribing 
a surprising number of these baleful powers to inanimate structures. 
 Emotions—fear, resentment, genuine concerns—played a 
prominent role during the campaign for a ban on minarets.  There are 
serious challenges to the secular state and the rule of law which are, 
at present and from a Western perspective, associated with Islam in 
particular.  But it would be yet another fallacy to believe that a 
liberal, secular society can be preserved through illiberal means.524  It 
is legitimate and even necessary in a well-ordered democratic society 
to map out the consensus on the fundamental values to which all 
comprehensive doctrines (ideologies, religions, etc.) have to 
subscribe.525  Ideally, this overlapping consensus would be “the result 
of a procedure of construction in which rational persons (or their 
representatives), subject to reasonable conditions, adopt the 
principles to regulate the basic structure of society.”526  In reality, the 
process is messy, contentious, and constant.  At no time, however, 
should we give in entirely to emotions, and a pluralistic society 
should not impose one comprehensive doctrine over others. 
 This Article argues that the minaret ban violates international 
norms protecting religious freedom and prohibiting discrimination, 
and that it cannot be justified as an effective means to combat 
extremism.  To think that such a ban will ensure gender equality and 
respect for the rule of law is a pathetic fallacy of the more pathetic 
sort.  The ban, however, did provide an excellent opportunity to 
clearly state who, or what, is to be considered Swiss.  In a time when 
the world often seems too close for comfort, the minaret ban gave 
voters the illusion that full sovereignty resides with them and they 
are still able to keep the “other” out.  They were free to reaffirm the 
insular status of their landlocked country, even if it violated 
international norms.  In the eyes of the Swiss, subsequent criticism 
from abroad only confirmed that in other countries, decisions taken 
by the people were neither understood nor respected.  Yet, the 
excessive concern with popular sovereignty, and the constant 
                                                                                                                      
 522.  Id. § 5. 
 523.  Id. § 8. 
 524.  ERNST WOLFGANG BÖCKENFÖRDE, STAAT, GESELLSCHAFT, FREIHEIT 60 
(1976). 
 525.  JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, at xv–xviii (2005). 
 526.  Id. at xx. 
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invocation of its mythological roots, does not free one from the 
obligation to guarantee individual rights and their equal protection. 
 Swiss voters have ample reasons to be proud of their polity.  In 
more than 150 years, they have generally exercised their far-reaching 
democratic rights very responsibly.  Attempts in the 1930s to abuse 
ballot initiatives to undermine or even do away with the democratic 
constitutional order were overwhelmingly resisted.527  Numerous 
populist and xenophobic initiatives have been rejected.528  Overall, 
voters have displayed a healthy dose of skepticism towards single-
issue initiatives launched by interest groups or factions,529 but 
insistence on the infallibility of the popular sovereign on principle 
pretends that Swiss voters are uniquely immune to the temptations 
of the tyranny of the majority.  This uncritical attitude to 
unrestrained popular sovereignty might be due to the absence of a 
“Weimar moment”; fortunately, Switzerland has never experienced 
the introduction of an undemocratic regime through democratic 
means.  The potential danger of a plebiscitarian democracy, so 
prevalent in Germany, is therefore absent. 
 One need not conclude, like the one character in Schiller’s 
Demetrius, that wisdom has always been with the few and not the 
many and that the votes should be weighed rather than counted.530  
At the very least, however, decisions such as the minaret ban should 
challenge us to provide a convincing rationale for the mantra that 
more direct-democratic participation is always better.531  
                                                                                                                      
 527.  In 1935, Swiss adherents of fascist ideologies (the so-called “Frontists”) 
unsuccessfully launched a popular initiative to introduce an authoritarian and 
corporatist constitutional order. The initiative was rejected by 72.3 percent of voters. 
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528 BBL 7603, 7614–15 (2008)  
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 First, the direct consultation of voters through ballot initiatives 
may be problematic from a procedural perspective: complex issues 
have to be simplified to the extent that they can be decided by a “yes” 
or a “no.”  Additionally, voters do not have to take responsibility for 
implementing their decisions (although they do suffer its long-term 
effects).  Ballot initiatives may grant a sense of empowerment and a 
temporary high, but they may be followed by a severe hangover and 
an inevitable desire for more (which is, presumably, why they have 
been called the “crack cocaine of democracy”).532  
 The second caveat against unadulterated praise of ballot 
initiatives carries more weight.  Perhaps it is true that the well-
informed voters would always make the best decisions for the public 
welfare, and that the bad decisions of the sovereign are solely due to 
misinformation and deception.533  But how does one ensure the 
responsible use of democratic rights if misinformation and deception 
cannot be precluded?  Even Rousseau, the champion of popular 
sovereignty, did not consider it limitless and believed that the 
sovereign should not impose restrictions on individuals that proved 
useless for the community at large.534  With its strong democratic 
tradition and a relatively weak judiciary, Switzerland has avoided the 
countermajoritarian difficulty,535 but at significant cost.  One of the 
pivotal tasks of the modern constitutional state is the protection of 
individual rights, even against the will of the majority.536  The most 
significant of these rights have been enshrined in international 
treaties, but as the minaret vote has shown, voters can ignore these 
treaties as well as the fundamental values of their own constitution.  
 Non-lawyers might argue that it is arbitrary to analyze the 
minarets purely from a legal viewpoint.  Why should the policies of a 
community be judged solely according to (international) legal rules?  
It is indeed not imperative that the rule of law be the criterion for 
both legitimacy and legality at once.  Polities have, over time, judged 
their communities by other values and other criteria—including equal 
distribution of the means of production, absolute compliance with 
transcendent commands, or even racial or ethnic uniformity.  
However, apart from the fact that this Article discusses non-legal 
perspectives, the objection to “legal” judgment fails to acknowledge 
that, for better or worse, “the law” and our adherence to it are major 
benchmarks of how well a modern, liberal society organizes itself.   
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 There are still other competing values.  In the case of 
Switzerland, majoritarian democracy is attributed the same status as 
the rule of law.  However, in my view the rule of law has one merit 
that majority decisions lack—it sets clear and unmovable limits.  
Dismissing the rule of law as the final arbiter over how we interact 
within our society carries the danger of open discrimination and 
suppression of minorities and tyranny of the majority.  Switzerland 
has so far stayed clear of that slope—partly thanks to the virtues of 
its citizenry, partly due to good historical fortune.  
 Ballot initiatives such as the minaret ban push the point and 
demand clarity about fundamental societal values.  If the aim is a 
culturally uniform society, then this aim should be openly 
acknowledged.  Living up to the promise of equality and human 
rights is not mandatory.  As pointed out by the supporters of the 
minaret ban, numerous countries do not subscribe to the protection of 
freedom of religion or other civil and political rights, but a country 
cannot enjoy the moral self-satisfaction that comes with 
institutionalized tolerance yet mete out its tolerance selectively.  The 
question, then, is whether the Swiss want the provisions of human 
rights instruments and their bill of rights to continue to carry 
substantial meaning and binding force.  If so, they will have to 
rebalance popular sovereignty and the rule of law and amend their 
Constitution accordingly.  Otherwise, they might be bound to 
continue falling short not only of international standards, but of their 
own. 
 
 
 
